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Abstract 
Arthur Goldberg, former United States Secretary of Labor and Associate Justice of the United 
States Supreme Court, once said, the concept of management rights is simply “a recognition of 
the fact that somebody must be the boss. . . . People can't be wandering around at loose ends, 
each deciding what to do next. Management decides what the employee is to do” (Dale, 2008, 
p. 213). Goldberg’s statement offers a suitable segue into the heart of this study about public 
employment and the constitutional rights to free speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
The setting is public elementary and secondary schools of education (k-12), and the target 
audience is executive school administrators who serve as managers responsible for the 
development, supervision, evaluation, and discipline of other district staff. The purpose is to 
provide technical guidance to school administrators relative to the current laws, regulations, and 
legal considerations of the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause in k-12 public schools 
pursuant to the 2006 United States (U.S.) Supreme Court decision in Gil Garcetti, et al. v. 
Richard Ceballos.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
Longstanding debate about the speech rights of public employees took a definitive step 
when the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court ruled in the 2006 landmark decision of Gil 
Garcetti, et al. v. Richard Ceballos (hereinafter referred to as Garcetti) that remarks made during 
the regular scope of employment duties may not be as protected as they once were. Specifically, 
the Supreme Court ruled that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official 
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline” (Garcetti, et al., 
v. Ceballos, 2006). This decision had profound repercussions on personnel management 
practices in public organizations, including public kindergarten through grade 12 (k-12) schools.  
Simply interpreted, Garcetti set forth the legal standard of pursuant to duty as an official 
metric for determining if and when public employees’ speech is constitutionally protected. This 
study seeks to heighten awareness in public school administrators of how Garcetti serves to 
guide their personnel and risk management practices, particularly decision-making, relative to 
the First Amendment and the free speech rights of public employees.  
An in-depth review of public court cases, relative to the free speech rights of public 
employees, reveals useful insight for school administrators who need to know the policy and 
practical consequences of Supreme Court decisions on school district operations. This study 
specifically analyzes the case of Garcetti, along with other applicable appellate court cases, to 
identify the valid legal principles important to school administrators who deal with matters of 
speech rights and public employees, and whose decisions carry potential risk outcomes for 
school districts. This study is designed to inform future practices of public elementary and 
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secondary school administrators for avoiding risk to their organizations by explaining the key 
legal points and practical consequences of the Garcetti decision on personnel management 
practices.  
Statement of the Problem 
The Garcetti decision opened a new chapter in public sector employee relations. The 
decision triggered reverberations in defining the free speech rights of public employees, and it 
delineated material implications for public school administrators in human resources functions, 
including personnel practices, financial operations, policy applications, and risk management. As 
such, legal issues of protected speech involving public employees are worthy topics of 
information for public school administrators, whose essential duties include making personnel 
and fiscal policy recommendations to their boards of education and making high-stakes and 
potentially costly employment and labor decisions. Risk management in schools has many fronts, 
and maintaining an efficacious workforce is critical to minimizing organizational risk.  
Successful risk management contributes to overall operational efficiency and 
organizational effectiveness, and in public education, it is the responsibility of the school board 
and the school executive officers to manage risk. Specific to human resources, risk management 
includes a strategy for avoiding or minimizing, when appropriate, costly personnel-related legal 
proceedings such as grievance hearings from collective bargaining agreement allegations or 
violations, policy proceedings, board hearings, and civil litigation. Accordingly, school 
administrators responsible for executive oversight of district operations and school finances need 
to know how legal issues relative to personnel matters can expose school districts to substantial 
legal and financial risk.  
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A recent 2016 decision out of the Sixth Circuit of Appeals, Ely v. Dearborn Heights 
School District No. 7 against Dearborn Heights School District in Michigan personified a real-
life situation in which school officials were forced to deal with First Amendment free speech 
claims as part of a serious and ongoing personnel and legal matter. The judicial decision was in 
addition to a parallel determination against the district by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). The cost to the school district was significant.  
 The headline read “OSHA orders Dearborn Heights School District to pay $193K to 
employee punished for warning of asbestos exposures at city school. District violated janitor’s 
whistleblower rights, protections after raising safety concerns” (Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, 2016, p. 1). In reality the district was ordered to pay over a half million dollars, 
because in addition to the $193,139 for back wages, damages, and other compensation as 
reported in the media, the ruling also awarded $8,139 in lost wages; $45,000 for current and 
future medical bills, and $140,000 in compensatory damages for loss of reputation and distress. 
Finally, the district was ordered to pay “reasonable attorney’s fees” (Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, 2016).  
The same year, Trotwood Madison City Schools in Michigan prevailed when an 
employee sued that “several of her students were not being educated in the Least Restricted 
Environment (“LRE”) as provided for under the Rehabilitation Act” (Williams v. Trotwood 
Madison City Schools, 2016). While the U.S. District Court from the Southern District of Ohio 
ruled in favor of the school district, applying the Garcetti standard, the district still incurred 
financial obligations with legal expenses and direct and indirect human resources including time 
and attention. The U.S. Supreme Court in Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri validated the 
effect by stating that “(a) petition taking the form of a lawsuit against the government employer 
 4 
may be particularly disruptive, consuming public officials’ time and attention, burdening their 
exercise of legitimate authority, and blurring the lines of accountability between them and the 
public” (2011). 
These cases personify the genuine scenarios of First Amendment personnel matters that 
school administrators routinely face. Recognizing situations where the Free Speech Clause is 
applicable is the first step to procuring successful local outcomes. The next step, of course, is to 
engage staff who can navigate personnel circumstances with knowledge and competency. The 
courts have repeatedly and varyingly asserted that the government may not encroach on the 
constitutional rights of its citizens except for in very narrow circumstances.1 Knowing, however, 
where the line is, between protected and unprotected speech in the workplace, is subjective.  
Scenarios such as what happened in Dearborn Heights School District and Trotwood 
Madison City Schools are not uncommon in public school districts where personnel matters are 
an everyday reality. Many of the issues are rooted in matters of speech. The proactive response is 
to have knowledgeable administrators who recognize First Amendment-related personnel issues 
when they present and then take the necessary actions to ensure an outcome that is aligned with 
the mission and vision of the local board of education.  
Superintendents and other executive school officers need to know to plan for risk 
exposure and to anticipate budget consequences. Effective leadership requires administrators, as 
fiduciary stewards of taxpayer investments and district resources, to make wise, evidence-
informed decisions and prudently administer district operations within existing resources. 
                                                 
1 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 1967; Pickering v. Board of Education of 
Township High School District 205, Will County Illinois, 1968; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School Dist., 1969; Perry v. Sindermann, 1972; Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 1979; 
Connick v. Myers, 1983; Waters v. Churchill, 1994; Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 2006; Lane v. Franks, 2014. 
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Knowing decisive personnel actions which uphold the constitutional rights of employees, used as 
an effective management strategy, can minimize risk to the organization.  
Because issues rooted in free speech policy arise daily for superintendents and other 
school administrators, they need a working understanding of the law and what to do in certain 
circumstances and still preserve organizational resources as well as their own professional 
reputations. Thus, school administrators need practical guidance to inform their decision-making 
and consequently avoid making ill-informed personnel management decisions when First 
Amendment protections are involved.  
Court cases citing Garcetti reveal a continued pattern of judicial involvement since 2006 
in re-defining the legal boundaries for public sector employees navigating the post-Garcetti era 
workplace. The pathway to and from this important Supreme Court case, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
casts the setting for this doctoral study of the practical applications of Garcetti’s pursuant to duty 
on personnel management practices. 
Purpose of the Study 
Issues of employee speech made pursuant to duty have practical implications for school 
districts, including human resources policies, personnel management practices, and financial 
risk. The purpose of this study is to learn the what and how of Garcetti’s implications by 
deconstructing applicable case law and conceptualizing it into practical policy guidance for 
public elementary and secondary school administrators relative to the free speech rights of their 
employees.  
The study is designed to develop awareness and understanding of how the courts have 
ruled and identify how the rulings have come to bear specifically on public school employees 
and school districts. The primary objective, after identifying the relevant cases, is to categorize 
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the human resources functions that are specifically affected by the Garcetti decision and then 
share the findings with public school administrators as research-based guidance for making 
personnel-related decisions relative to the First Amendment speech rights of their employees. 
The goal of this research is to provide public school administrators with topic-specific 
information as an effective approach to managing organizational risk.  
 The theory underpinning this study is that there exists a consistent pattern of rules, 
established by federal courts and set forth as legal precedents, from which school administrators 
can craft their human resources and personnel decisions. Specifically, the study will analyze the 
opinions and points of dissent from the justices and judges to develop evidence-based guidance 
for school administrators on how best to navigate First Amendment personnel issues, especially 
in light of the revolution in employment law, personnel management, and human resources 
triggered by the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the landmark decision of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos. The Court set forth to answer the question—does the First Amendment protect 
government employees from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employees’ official 
work duties. Based on the Court’s final ruling, the following questions have been developed in 
an effort to extract important information for practicing and developing school administrators.  
Research Questions 
What knowledge, based on an in-depth analysis of court cases and other relevant 
literature, can be gleaned from this study and applied to make practical recommendations for 
school administrators who are responsible for the management of human and financial 
resources? This primary question leads the following inquiry.  
Primary question. What are the effects of Garcetti on human resources and personnel 
management practices in public elementary and secondary schools? 
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Secondary question. How are the following human resources and personnel 
management functions affected by the Garcetti decision? 
 Risk management and budgeting for risk 
 Collective bargaining agreements and administrator contracts 
 Employee supervision, discipline, termination, and due process 
 Job descriptions and essential job duties 
 Performance evaluation and professional development 
 Personnel policies 
 Personnel records 
 Teacher tenure and labor law 
 Whistleblower protections 
Assumptions 
It is assumed that there is a direct line of logic that can be formed by utilizing a backward 
mapping method from each of these respective human resources functions to specific key points 
of law and ultimately to the decisions of federal cases of public employee speech before and after 
the Garcetti decision. 
It is assumed that there are multiple, legitimate vantage points to this discussion.  
It is assumed that effective public school leadership requires knowledge of fiscal 
management, human resources administration, personnel management, and labor law.  
It is assumed that involvement in legal proceedings will have an effect on school 
finances. 
It is assumed that the study of past judicial patterns can inform the strategies of school 
leaders “to develop, advocate, and enact a shared mission, vision, and core values of high-quality 
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education and academic success and well-being of each student” (National Policy Board for 
Educational Administration [formerly known as ISLLC Standards], 2015, p. 9) by anticipating 
and preparing for future policy trends. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study looks at the narrow circumstance of free speech rights for public education 
employees in Illinois, as set forth in public policy by the Garcetti decision, and it explains the 
implications of pursuant to duty on school districts and administrators.  
This study recognizes that there are other personnel management functions, but delimits 
this dissertation to the utilities identified in the Research Questions section above. 
This study focuses specifically on how the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti impacts 
public elementary and secondary schools to the exclusion of higher education, private education, 
and other governmental entities. The study is strictly delimited to the First Amendment free 
speech rights pursuant to duty of public elementary and secondary education employees to the 
inclusion of administrators and teachers and to the exclusion of students, parents, educational 
support personnel, third-party vendors, and/or other constituency groups.  
This legal analysis dissertation is specific to public kindergarten through grade 12 
education (k-12), and it studies relative case law outcomes as well as specific points of law from 
past U.S. Supreme Court, federal court, and Illinois Supreme Court decisions to the exclusion of 
other lower courts. While similarities of circumstantial details in many court cases, comparing 
and contrasting only the substantive key points of law comprise the core focus of this study. The 
substantive key points of law will be extracted from the opinion and dissent issues offered by the 
court justices. Minor case law similarities and coincidences are excluded from this study.  
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There are multiple perspectives to the discussion. This study assumes only the 
management standpoint to the exclusion of labor. This is not an assertion of preeminence of one 
over the other; rather it is merely an exclusion for the purpose of delimiting this dissertation 
discussion.  
Finally, while it is understood that “social media has expanded the opportunities for 
public employee speech and the need to interpret First Amendment protections in light of these 
new methods of communication” (Marcum & Perry, 2014, p. 6), this study does not divert focus 
to incorporate commensurately the volumes of social media scenarios into the content of this 
discussion. The focus of the study remains on the policy, practice, and financial implications of 
free speech rights pursuant to duty of public education employees.  
Summary 
This legal analysis dissertation contributes to a unique free speech discourse, specific to 
k-12 public schools. Using results from relative, prior U.S. Supreme Court, federal appellate 
court, and Illinois Supreme Court decisions, this study conceptualizes the rulings into distinct 
patterns of outcomes and theorizes various impacts on future public school policy issues relative 
to free speech and public employment.  
The study seeks first to identify the key case law findings which are significant to this 
particular issue and then, second, to ascertain the implications and legal consequences for school 
administrators navigating personnel management issues. This study outlines the effect of 
Garcetti on public school practices in an effort to help administrators improve their craft and 
contribute to the efficient operations of their school districts. By building knowledge and 
understanding in staff, especially decision-making leaders, school organizations can enrich the 
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quality of employee outputs, minimize organizational risk, and constructively manage bottom-
line operational costs.  
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Chapter II 
Methodology 
Framework 
This study proposal establishes a framework to gauge the effect of the Garcetti decision 
on public k-12 school districts relative to personnel management, public employment, and work-
related speech.  
Researching relative court cases, analyzing decisions and opinions, and systematically 
categorizing outcomes where the courts have qualified protected and non-protected speech for 
public employees forms the source of data collection for this legal analysis study. Relative cases 
will be identified and deconstructed in an effort to explore the breadth of this issue of public 
employment and protected speech and to identify trends and micro legal elements with practical 
applications for school administrators. If founded, the distillation of information and analysis of 
usable data will inform recommendations on ways to advance professional practice for public 
education professionals on issues of protected speech, employment law, and personnel 
management.  
In an effort to gauge the effect of the Garcetti decision on public school districts, the 
following research actions are proposed to address the questions outlined in the introduction 
section.  
1. Use the University of Illinois Library system and online databases to cast for primary 
sources of information on the topic of protected speech in the public workplace.  
2. Use an online legal research service to identify key court cases, findings of law, and 
points of dissent, as well as other relevant citations.  
3. Review available literature found in sources such as U.S. Supreme Court, federal 
appellate court, and Illinois Supreme Court cases, briefs, and transcripts as well as peer-
reviewed journal articles, American Law Reports, books, legal encyclopedias, legal 
dictionaries, law school reviews, and Restatements of the Law for rulings and arguments 
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relative to the free speech rights of public employees and cull for substantive legal points 
to inform this study. 
4. Summarize how the courts have ruled to date on matters of free speech for public 
employees and employers, and especially for public education employees and employers.  
5. Conduct an information analysis for the purpose of identifying trending issues and 
systematic patterns. Cull for legal patterns in opinions and dissents in the identified cases, 
code information, and categorize key points of law.  
6. Formulate recommendations, based on an analysis, for public school administrators who 
need to know that navigating the free speech rights of public school employees is an 
important part of personnel management and can have consequences for organizational 
leadership in policy and financial management. 
Sources 
The following sources will be accessed in an effort to collect topical information and to 
assist with the overall review of literature.  
1. American Law Reports, a series from the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing company, will 
be searched for appellate court cases. Applicable annotations will be reviewed for 
relevancy to the study.  
2. Legal encyclopedias such, as the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, will be 
used as introductory guides for researching fundamental legal concepts. Legal 
encyclopedias, regarded as secondary source materials, are valuable publications to 
consult initially, but offer no final legal authority.  
3. Black’s Law Dictionary, as the standard authority for legal definitions, will be used to 
provide basic meaning to common legal words, terms, and concepts.  
4. Thomson Reuters Westlaw online legal research service will be used to research cases, to 
access official court documents, and to identify key points of law and dissent. Powered 
by the proprietary KeyCite system, Westlaw is uniquely suited for this dissertation 
research with advanced search functionalities. This online legal research database will be 
the primary source for researching and gathering information.  
5. Law school reviews and journals, legal periodicals, will be used as secondary sources to 
identify topical cases and to research applicable points of law and dissent.  
6. Chicago-Kent College of Law’s Oyez online legal research database will be used as an 
online full-text retrieval of court cases and audio transcripts.  
7. Restatements of the Law, published by the American Law Institute will be reviewed for 
relevant employment law cases.  
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8. The book Case Analysis and Fundamentals of Legal Writing (Statsky & Wernet, 1995) 
will be used to gather foundational information about the judicial system, court protocols, 
and legal proceedings.  
9. The book Legal Research for Beginners (Larsen & Bourdeau, 1997) will be used to 
gather foundational information about the judicial system, court protocols, and legal 
proceedings. 
10. The book Legal Research in a Nutshell (Cohen & Olson, 2013) will be used to access 
commonly accepted terms and concepts relative to legal research matters.  
11. The book American Public School Law (Alexander & Alexander, 2012) will be used to 
cast for beginning information relative to the concept of pursuant to duty.  
12. The Center for Writing Studies at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, an online 
resource dedicated to facilitating research and promoting graduate study, will be accessed 
for technical assistance in achieving a high standard of academic writing. 
13. Ely Library at Westfield State University, an online citation resource, will be accessed for 
technical assistance in citing legal materials.  
14. Purdue Owl at Purdue University, an online writing lab with resources and instructional 
materials, will be accessed to align the formatting of the manuscript.  
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Chapter III 
Literature Review 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions forge common law and public policy. Effective school 
leaders know this, and they pay attention to legal trends so they can project substantive 
implications on their school districts (National Policy Board for Educational Administration 
[formerly known as ISLLC Standards], 2015). Like risk management, there are many fronts to 
school law and public policy. This literature review focuses specifically on the legal implications 
for public school districts of the 2006 U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
which recognized, articulated, and progressed the unique legal concept of pursuant to duty. This 
review seeks to identify and understand pertinent Supreme Court and federal appellate court 
decisions which led to the Garcetti ruling and the public policy of pursuant to duty and which 
have effected personnel management practices in public elementary and secondary schools. A 
full review of how the decisions have influenced personnel practices in school districts will 
follow. First, however, an historical reflection of pursuant to duty is provided to promote 
understanding. Then, a review of significant cases is provided to develop perspective for the 
evolution of public policy relative to public employment and First Amendment protected speech. 
This pathway is pursued because it is assumed that the study of past judicial patterns can inform 
the practices of school leaders “to develop, advocate, and enact a shared mission, vision, and 
core values of high-quality education and academic success and well-being of each student” 
(formerly known as ISLLC Standards, 2015, p. 9) by anticipating and preparing for future policy 
trends.  
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What is Pursuant to Duty 
The prevailing precedent on public workplace speech was decided 10 years ago, on May 
30, 2006, when the United States Supreme Court handed down a narrow decision in Garcetti, v. 
Ceballos. The now decade-old, five to four decision explicitly ruled that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline” (Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 2006). This ruling sent reverberations through 
public institutions on issues relative to free speech, employee discipline, and personnel 
management. At the time, the decision seemed in stark contrast to public policies fueled by four 
prior decades of employee-centered judgements handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
1968 landmark case of Marvin L. Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School 
District 205, Will County, Illinois (hereinafter referred to as Pickering) had set the then-
prevailing public policy that “(t)eachers may not constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First 
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public 
interest in connection with operation of public schools in which they work.” Pickering served as 
a bookend case which held for thirty-eight years until Garcetti’s pursuant to duty decision in 
2006. In this regard, the precept of matters of public interest was the legal precursor to pursuant 
to duty.  
The concept of pursuant to duty was originally cast in the 1960s, when the Pickering 
Court affirmatively held in 1968 that freedom of speech, as protected by the First Amendment, 
generally prohibited public employers from firing or disciplining employees for speaking out as 
citizens on matters of public concern. From that point, First Amendment free speech rights in the 
public workplace were transposed into a new legal lexicon that included public employment, 
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private citizen speech, and matters of public concern. Naturally, what constituted matters of 
public concern and their relationships to public employment and private citizenship formed the 
nexus of legal contemplation over the next four decades from Pickering (1968), to Connick v. 
Myers (1983), to Garcetti (2006), and to other court cases that ensued.  
Even before Pickering, however, the New York Times v. Sullivan case in 1964 first 
conceptualized matters of public concern. The Justices asserted that “(f)reedom of expression 
upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment.” They rationalized that open exercise 
of free speech is necessary in a democratic society, and it must especially be allowed with regard 
to “matters of the highest public interest and concern” (1964). And regardless their empathetic 
citing of First and Fourteenth Amendment immunity protections for public officials who make 
honest mistakes of fact and official conduct, the Justices affirmed that First Amendment 
“protections for speech and press were fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
bringing about political and social changes desired by the people” (1964). These policies 
captured the Court’s strong commitment to upholding the First Amendment and preserving 
freedom of speech when the Justices ruled, that even in times when public officials file for 
damages in libel action suits against citizens, that in order to prevail, they must prove that their 
critics acted with actual malice and caused injury to their official reputations.  
The New York Times v. Sullivan case exemplified the national policy, as set forth in the 
First Amendment, which was that citizens could exercise great latitude in their speech in order to 
preserve and perpetuate a democratic, free society. While the tenets of free speech have evolved 
with changing societal circumstances, the sentiment that free speech forms the core of open and 
free-will societies has remained constant. This resounding commitment was initially articulated 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1957 when it ruled in Roth v. United States that constitutionally 
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protected speech is designed to “assure unfettered interchange of ideas for bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.” The Court simply reiterated its own words 
from Roth (1957) when it said in the New York Times v. Sullivan case that “(t)he constitutional 
protections for speech and press were fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas.” The 
Court would again rule in 2014 in Lane v. Franks that “(s)peech by citizens on matters of public 
concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment, which was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” 
The pattern of public policies embedded within the U.S. Supreme Courts’ rulings were 
emerging and evolving toward the newest legal standard of pursuant to duty as introduced by the 
Garcetti case in 2006. Garcetti personified how the legal precepts of matters of public concern 
and pursuant to duty coalesced.  
Garcetti was similarly one of the cases filed along the continuum of an evolving public 
policy on constitutionally protected speech for public employees. There are relative cases in 
between Pickering and Garcetti which offer insight into the evolution of the policy; however, the 
setting for this dissertation is primarily cast between these two legal cases.  
Presented as yet another case seeking legal resolve to the question of whether a public 
employee was speaking on a matter of public concern, the landmark Garcetti decision changed 
the course of Pickering policy (Geisel, 2015). Pickering had previously established, and 
subsequent cases upheld, that First Amendment protected speech generally prohibited public 
employers from firing or disciplining employees for speaking out on matters of public concern. 
Garcetti redirected the policy by asserting that statements made by public employees, pursuant to 
their official duties, do not qualify as private citizen speech and are therefore not protected by the 
Constitution. In effect, the precedence that was re-established by the Garcetti Justices shifted the 
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judicial standard to first ask whether the speech was made pursuant to duty rather than first 
asking whether the speech was on a matter of public concern. If yes, the speech was made 
pursuant to duty, it was not constitutionally protected. If not, and the speech was made as a 
private citizen, the standard of considering if the issue concerned a matter of public interest was 
then applied. Garcetti characterized the relationship between matters of public concern and 
pursuant to duty as mutually exclusive, and by considering the precepts independently, but 
sequentially, a new standard of law emerged. This new legal metric of pursuant to duty, in effect, 
short-circuited the process for discerning protected speech by asking first if the speech was made 
during the normal course of duty rather than starting with the question about the speech being a 
matter of public concern (Dale, 2008, p. 217-218). To this end, “Garcetti fundamentally altered 
the analysis courts engage in when deliberating employee speech cases in public school settings” 
(Geisel, 2015, p. 2). Critics of the decision argue that, while the new standard allows for greater 
objectivity, it did not allow for the complexity of speech to be considered to the degrees 
necessary nor for the cases to be considered on their independent merits.  
Elizabeth Dale published a counterpoint perspective on Garcetti in this regard and argued 
that the decision will actually serve a long-term benefit to employees even though, on its face, 
Garcetti appears to be management-oriented. Dale argued that the “Supreme Court incorporated 
the idea of managements’ rights into its analysis of public employee speech rights in Garcetti,” 
and in doing so, it constrained the authority of managements’ rights to control employees to 
“past practices in the workplace, unionization and labor law, collective bargaining, legislation, 
and other legal rules” (Dale, 2008, p. 214). Dale’s argument is grounded in a theory of absolutes. 
In agreement with Garcetti, she asserts that all work-related speech is subject to managements’ 
discretion and is therefore pursuant to duty and is not protected. According to Dale, in contrast 
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and by default, all other public employee speech must be protected by the First Amendment. In 
this argument Dale asserts that this default theory is beneficial to the employee in the long-term 
because the terms of protected speech are vast, and pursuant to the decision, they are now clearly 
established along legal guidelines and are therefore not vulnerable to shifting ideologies.  
Either way, the Garcetti decision substantively influenced the personnel practices of 
public organizations, including public school districts. While the Garcetti Justices concurred 
with the Pickering policy of constitutional protections for public employees speaking as private 
citizens on matters of public concern, they diverged in their analysis from that point. The Justices 
considered the unique qualifier and priority of pursuant to duty, which distinguished it from 
preceding cases. Specifically, the Garcetti Court tested the constitutionality of speech made 
outwardly by a public employee that effectually contradicted the mission of the employing 
organization and its supervisors. The Court had already ruled in Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School District, 439 (1979) that “First Amendment protection applies when a 
public employee arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to express his 
views publicly” (Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 1979). The Court had 
previously ruled in Connick v. Myers  
that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but 
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom 
of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's 
behavior. (Connick v. Myers, 1983)  
 
Hence, the next logical question for the Court to discern was if speech is constitutionally 
protected when spoken as a public employee on a matter, or a perceived matter, of public 
concern, and this scenario is precisely what Garcetti presented. “The question presented by the 
instant case is whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from discipline 
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based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties” (Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 
2006). There will be future cases such as Lane v. Franks (2014) and Casey v. West Las Vegas 
Independent School District (2007) that will advance the next logical legal questions, but for 
now, this narrative remains focused on how Garcetti specifically contributed to the policy 
evolution of public employment and First Amendment rights.  
A substantive legal point in Garcetti is that while Ceballos’ speech was made about a 
matter of public concern, it effectually contradicted the mission of his employer. The point of 
divergence from Pickering policy was when the Garcetti Court sculpted and progressed the 
unique legal standard of pursuant to duty. In doing so, the Court asserted that speech made 
pursuant to duty is not constitutionally protected by the First Amendment because, and while a 
public institution has the obligation of allowing its employees to speak as citizens about matters 
of public concern, it must balance employee speech rights with its obligation to the taxpayers to 
operate efficiently and effectively. Garcetti cast the second bookend relative to public 
employment, speech, and the First Amendment.  
The Encyclopedia of the American Constitution projects that the First Amendment is 
becoming  
relevant in previously untouched areas, and that the coverage of the First Amendment is 
becoming broader than historically understood. As with the expansion of coverage on the 
basis of the nature of the speech, the expansion of the coverage based on the context of 
the restriction is likely to be the dominant question of free speech in the decades to come, 
as courts and others wrestle with the question of the range of human conduct. (Levy & 
Karst, 2007, p. 1135)  
Garcetti exemplifies this claim by adding another layer of criteria (i.e., pursuant to duty) 
to the existing common law. The Encyclopedia’s projection regarding the “expansion of the 
coverage based on the context” also aligns with the assertion of the Connick Court when it 
asserted that the “content, form, and context of the speech” is important to the legal 
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considerations and the outcome of proceedings. Roots of Garcetti can be traced back to the New 
York Times (1964) decision which addressed the future acts of courts determining protected 
speech from unprotected speech when it projected rules about how to deal with “cases where the 
line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated 
must be drawn.”  
To date, there have been several emerging cases with potential for refining the Garcetti 
decision, but none has had as significant an impact on public policy as has Pickering and 
Garcetti even though there were several earmarked cases along the way. Regardless of whether 
the Garcetti decision fashioned a pivotal shift in policy or merely a critical refinement of law, the 
unique standard of pursuant to duty emerged as a discrete variable for subsequent courts to 
consider in deciphering public employee/free speech cases.  
Over the course of time, the courts have vigorously preserved the constitutional rights of 
public employees to speak as private citizens on matters of public interest/concern,2 so the 
Garcetti decision seemed to shift the balance away from preserving public employees’ free 
speech rights to protecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the public employers’ operations. 
Specifically, the Garcetti Court said that “(w)hile the First Amendment invests public employees 
with certain rights, it does not empower them to constitutionalize the employee grievance” 
(2006). The Justices also opined that the “(g)overnment entity has broader discretion to restrict 
speech when it acts in its role as employer” (2006). And drawing from the previous Connick 
ruling that said,  
(i)n determining a public employee's rights of free speech, (the) task of the Supreme 
Court is to arrive at a balance between interests of the employee as a citizen, in 
                                                 
2 New York Times v. Sullivan, 1964; Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will 
County Illinois, 1968; Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 1969; Perry v. Sindermann, 
1972; Connick v. Myers, 1983; Waters v. Churchill, 1994; Garcetti v. Ceballos, 2006; and Lane v. Franks, 2014; 
Brown v. Chicago Board of Education, 2013. 
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commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, 
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 
(1983) 
 
The Garcetti Court also asserted that “(s)o long as public employees are speaking as citizens 
about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary 
for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively” (2006). For these reasons, some saw 
the Garcetti decision as a policy shift from employee rights to managements’ rights (Nahmod, 
2008; Dale, 2008).  
Pickering’s contribution to pursuant to duty. Pickering and Garcetti were the seminal 
cases on the issue of pursuant to duty. And while there are relative cases prior to Pickering and 
pertinent cases after Garcetti, the crux of the policy evolution falls chronologically between 
these two important cases. The Pickering decision changed the course of public thinking in 1968, 
and germane to this dissertation is that this landmark case was specifically set in a public k-12 
school district.  
The Pickering case was decided in favor of public school teacher Marvin Pickering on 
several key legal findings. This case will be presented in detail later, but the resulting legal points 
are important to fomenting an understanding of pursuant to duty and are therefore initially 
introduced herein. Among other key legal points, Pickering ruled that  
  “(t)eachers may not constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First Amendment 
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest 
in connection with operation of public schools in which they work;” 
 “(s)tatements by public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First 
Amendment protection despite fact that statements are directed at their nominal 
superiors;” 
 “public employment, which may be denied altogether, may not be subjected to 
conditions that diminish their Constitutional rights;” and  
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 the state should not “have an interest as an employer in regulating the speech of its 
employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with 
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” (1968) 
The cornerstone of the Pickering decision was the Court’s intent to arrive at a balance 
between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees. (1968)  
 
In arriving at their decision, the Pickering Justices established and set forth criteria for 
ascertaining protected speech for public employees. The Court outlined a two-part test, later 
known as the Pickering Balancing Test. The test first required subsequent courts to determine 
whether the employee had spoken on a matter of public concern and then second whether the 
employee’s statement had a disruptive impact that warranted disciplinary action. The Pickering 
Balancing Test offered an objective metric to cast a legal threshold for determining subsequent 
cases. Thirty-eight years later, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the concept of pursuant to duty 
as a new legal metric to answer, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, whether Richard Ceballos’ speech was 
classified as protected when he wrote and reported, pursuant to his employment duties, and 
against his supervisors’ directives, in a disposition memorandum that an affidavit used by police 
to obtain a critical search warrant in a specified case was inaccurate and made serious 
misrepresentation to the case supervisors.  
In comparison, both Pickering and Garcetti similarly sought to discern protected speech 
for public employees as their main legal questions. Two seminal arguments prevailed throughout 
these cases. Judge O’Scannlain characterized the two arguments plainly and succinctly in 
Ceballos v. Garcetti (2004) when he said that his Court was tasked with distinguishing  
between speech offered by a public employee acting as an employee carrying out his or 
her ordinary job duties and speech spoken by an employee acting as a citizen expressing 
his or her personal views on disputed matters of public import.  
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Albeit not all jurisdictional, federal court decisions have established a predictable pattern 
of legal trends from which school administrators can glean practical information relative to best 
human resource practices and personnel decision-making strategies. Since 2006, there have been 
many federal cases where the Garcetti standard of pursuant to duty has been applied to public 
institutions; however, there have been few cases litigated specific to public k-12 educational 
organizations (Geisel, 2015, p. 2).  
With regard to legal proceedings, there are few absolutes. There are no safety nets in 
either federal or state law that would protect school executives from risk in all instances, 
although the First and Fourteenth Amendments do provide some citizen and immunity 
protections in certain circumstances. So knowing that by the very nature of their work (i.e., 
pursuant to their duties), “school administrators are a particularly vulnerable class of public 
employees when it comes to their job-related expression” (Geisel, 2015, p. 9). This is important 
information for school executives and those preparing to be future administrators to know. This 
study serves to inform current and future school administrators about the issues they will face in 
light of the Garcetti decision so they are prepared to transfer theoretical knowledge into 
appropriate application and routine practice.  
Case review of Garcetti v. Ceballos. To fully understand the nuances of the Garcetti 
case, the following summary is provided.  
Richard Ceballos was employed as a deputy district attorney, specifically a calendar 
deputy with certain supervisory responsibilities over other lawyers, for the Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s office. Gil Garcetti was the publically elected official serving as the District 
Attorney of Los Angeles County at that time.  
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According to testimony in the court transcript, in February 2000, Ceballos was contacted 
by a defense attorney about a pending criminal case in the District Attorney’s office. The defense 
attorney had found serious misrepresentations of fact in a sheriff’s affidavit intended to secure a 
search warrant, and he requested Ceballos review the case. According to Ceballos, it was not 
unusual for defense attorneys to ask calendar deputies, as part of their official duties, to 
investigate aspects of pending cases. Ceballos agreed, and after conducting an in-depth review, 
including a site visit, he also had doubts about the affidavit’s accuracy. Unable to reconcile the 
inaccuracies contained in the affidavit, Ceballos relayed his findings to his supervisors Carol 
Najera and Frank Sundstedt. He followed-up with a disposition memorandum to his supervisors 
Najera and Sundstedt outlining his concerns. Ceballos then sent a second memo to his 
supervisors, and a meeting was held to discuss the affidavit. According to the record, the meeting 
became heated, and ultimately Sundstedt decided to proceed with the prosecution, against 
Ceballos’ recommendation. Subsequently, Ceballos was subpoenaed by the defense counsel to 
testify, which in essence, forced him to submit truthful testimony against the policies and 
practices of his employer, the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office. In the end, the trial court 
rejected the defense’s challenge to the warrant; but the construct of forced, truthful testimony via 
subpoena had now been introduced to the U.S. Supreme Court as a unique position of law for 
public employees and employers. The legal question of whether subpoenaed testimony is 
protected speech will again surface in the future litigation of Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 
(2014); however, in 2006, forced truthful testimony, via subpoena, was a relatively new front in 
free speech cases.  
Ceballos testified as ordered, but afterward contended that he was subjected to a series of 
retaliatory actions by his employer which included reassignment from his calendar deputy 
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position to a trial deputy position; transfer to another courthouse; and denial of a promotion. 
Specifically, Ceballos alleged that Frank Sundstedt and Carol Najera retaliated against him for 
submitting the memorandum regarding the search warrant, for otherwise reporting to or 
discussing with other persons the allegations of misconduct by the deputy sheriff, and for 
testifying truthfully at the court hearing. Gil Garcetti was named party to the suit in his official 
capacity of District Attorney for Los Angeles County, California and was duly elected to be 
accountable for the operations of the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office when Richard 
Ceballos filed a claim of denial of constitutional protections. Ceballos specifically alleged that 
the defendants retaliated against him in that  
(1) they demoted him from his position of calendar deputy to that of trial deputy; (2) 
Najera “threatened” him when he told her that he would testify truthfully at the hearing; 
(3) at the hearing itself Najera was “rude and hostile” to him; (4) Sundstedt “gave [him] 
the silent treatment”; (5) Najera informed him that he could either transfer to the El 
Monte Branch, or, if he wanted to remain in the Pomona Branch, he would be re-assigned 
to filing misdemeanors, a position usually assigned to junior deputy district attorneys; (6) 
the one murder case he was handling at the time was reassigned to a deputy district 
attorney with no experience trying murder cases; (7) he was barred from handling any 
further murder cases; and (8) he was denied a promotion. (Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 
2006) 
 
Ceballos first filed an internal grievance seeking remedy; however, it was denied. His 
claims of retaliation were not substantiated.  
Next, Ceballos sued and sought damages under Section 1983 (hereinafter referred to as 
§ 1983) in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Ninth Circuit 
District Court. Specifically, § 1983 of the United States Code allows civil action for the 
deprivation of constitutional rights, and further allows liability assignment to the party causing 
injury, except in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer’s judicial capacity (Civil Rights Act, 1871).  
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Claiming that Najera, Sundstedt, and Garcetti had violated his First Amendment rights by 
retaliating against him based on his memo and cooperation with the defense and denying him 
due process of law under the Equal Protection Clause, Ceballos filed a complaint. In the suit, 
Ceballos filed against his supervisors in their individual capacities as well as against Garcetti in 
his official capacity of District Attorney. He also filed against the County of Los Angeles. 
Ceballos sought injunctive relief for lost wages and other compensatory damages.  
Defendants Garcetti, Najera, and Sundstedt argued that no retaliatory actions had been 
taken against Ceballos and that every complaint could be legitimately explained. The core 
argument of the defendant’s case, however, was that the Ceballos’ memo did not constitute 
protected speech under the First Amendment because the content was pursuant to his official 
employment duties.  
Summary of findings. The defendants Garcetti, Najera, and Sundstedt prevailed when the 
Ninth Circuit Court concluded in 2004 that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amendment 
protection for the contents of the memo. In addition, the court also held that even if Ceballos’ 
speech was constitutionally protected, the defendants, as public officials, had the protection of 
the Eleventh Amendment provision of qualified immunity, and therefore, could not be held 
responsible for compensable damages.  
Ceballos appealed to the federal Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which 
subsequently reversed the lower court’s decision and confirmed that Ceballos’ speech was 
indeed protected by the First Amendment. The Appellate Court’s decision hinged on the legal 
condition that Ceballos had engaged in speech which addressed matters of public concern and 
was therefore, pursuant to Pickering (1968), protected by the First Amendment.  
 28 
While not the focus, but rather a contributing factor of the case, the Ninth Circuit District 
Court of Appeals did determine that the lower court had erred in its finding that the defendants 
representing Los Angeles County, as government officials, were protected by qualified immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals corrected the 
legal interpretation of the lower court and asserted that the “district attorney’s office and head 
district attorney were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity” (Ceballos v. Garcetti, 
2004). Circuit Judge Reinhardt wrote the opinion on behalf of the court. The opinion, in part, 
reflected a complex, multi-faceted rationale in explaining the court’s position on qualified 
immunity. This discussion is particularly relevant to public school administrators who believe 
they have qualified immunity for their professional decisions and actions. The court held that 
for purposes of summary judgment, qualified immunity was not available to the 
individual defendants because the law was clearly established that Ceballos’s 
speech addressed a matter of public concern and that his interest in the speech 
outweighed the public employer’s interest in avoiding inefficiency and disruption. 
Because the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to political subdivisions of the 
state, the county could ordinarily not assert sovereign immunity, although in this 
case it could do so if such immunity applied to the District Attorney. Whether the 
District Attorney, when acting in his official capacity, is entitled to such immunity 
depends on whether he was performing a state or a county function when he took 
the alleged actions with respect to Ceballos. We hold that in most respects he was 
acting in the latter capacity. Thus, he is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, and neither is the County. (Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2004)  
 
The federal Court of Appeals’ ruling for Ceballos, however, did not withstand the 
subsequent U.S. Supreme Court’s review in 2006. As an aside, the Ninth Circuit Appellate Court 
clearly articulated why Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity were not viable legal 
arguments for Garcetti to pursue (Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 2006). As such, Garcetti 
discontinued this portion of the argument when he appealed the Ninth Circuit District Court of 
Appeals’ decision to the U.S. Supreme Court for final consideration.  
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The U.S. Supreme Court set about to answer the question of when is the speech of public 
officials protected by the First Amendment? Ultimately, the High Court held, by the narrowest 
margin, a five to four vote, that speech by a public official is only protected when it is engaged in 
as a private citizen, and not when it is expressed as part of the official’s public duties. The 
Supreme Court found that Ceballos’ employers were justified in taking action against him based 
on his testimony and cooperation with the defense. “The fact that his duties sometimes required 
him to speak or write,” Justice Kennedy wrote on behalf of the Court, “does not mean his 
supervisors were prohibited from evaluating his performance” (Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 
2006). This statement created a critical distinction in the establishment of pursuant to duty as a 
new legal standard for considering these types of First Amendment cases.  
The key points held by the U.S. Supreme Court were as follows:  
 When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline. 
 In this instance, the defendant Richard Ceballos did not speak as a citizen when he wrote 
his memo. Thus, his speech was not protected by the First Amendment. (2006) 
Ultimately the Supreme Court declared that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
had erred in its legal holding, reversed the decision, and remanded the case back to the lower 
court for further consideration. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion of the Court in 
which Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined.  
Key points of law. The following are the key points of law articulated in the Garcetti 
decision. The points are critical to this discussion because they delineate specific indicators from 
which school administrators can apply to their own personnel management practices. The points 
provide important baseline gauges for developing final recommendations as part of this study, 
and this is why they are provided verbatim herein. 
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 A state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the ‘employee's 
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression.  
 Public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their 
employment; rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain 
circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.  
 Pursuant to Pickering and its progeny, two inquiries guide interpretation of the 
constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech: the first requires 
determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern; if 
not, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on the government 
employer's reaction to the speech, but if the answer is yes, the possibility of a First 
Amendment claim arises, and the question then becomes whether the government 
employer had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any 
other member of the general public.  
 A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as 
employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some 
potential to affect the entity's operations.  
 The First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the employment 
relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their 
capacities as private citizens.  
 So long as public employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, 
they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to 
operate efficiently and effectively.  
 While the First Amendment invests public employees with certain rights, it does not 
empower them to constitutionalize the employee grievance.  
 In determining whether a public employee's speech is entitled to constitutional protection, 
the fact that the employee expresses his views inside his office, rather than publicly, is 
not dispositive; employees in some cases may receive First Amendment protection for 
expressions made at work.  
 In determining whether a public employee's speech is entitled to constitutional protection, 
the fact that the speech concerns the subject matter of the employee's employment is 
nondispositive; the First Amendment protects some expressions related to the speaker's 
job.  
 When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees 
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline. 
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 Deputy district attorney did not speak as a citizen when, pursuant to his official duties as 
a calendar deputy, he wrote a disposition memorandum in which he recommended 
dismissal of a pending criminal case on the basis of purported governmental misconduct, 
and so his speech was not protected by the First Amendment; when he went to work and 
performed the tasks he was paid to perform, district attorney acted as a government 
employee, not as a citizen, and fact that his duties sometimes required him to speak or 
write did not prohibit his supervisors from evaluating his performance.  
 When a public employee speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern, the 
First Amendment requires a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the 
speech and its consequences, which degree of scrutiny is absent when the employee is 
simply performing his or her job duties.  
 Public employers may not restrict employees' free speech rights by creating excessively 
broad job descriptions; the listing of a given task in an employee's written job description 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the 
scope of the employee's professional duties, for First Amendment purposes. (Thomson 
Reuters Westlaw, n.d., p. 1-3) 
The Garcetti decision culminated from decades of court decisions about public employee 
speech in the workplace. Each case added layers of criteria for future courts to consider when 
ascertaining free speech protections for public employees. The key points of law articulated 
above exemplify cumulative effect by citing legal findings from The New York Times (1964) 
case to Connick (1983).  
Key points of dissent. There were resonating points of dissent in Garcetti as well. In this 
narrowly decided case, the points of dissent are critical to understanding and projecting future 
issues around the topic of protected speech in the public workplace. The Garcetti Court’s 
decision, being so narrowly split at five to four, offered a microcosm from which to better 
understand public sentiment on the issue of protected speech for public employees. Analyzing 
both the similar and the opposing sides of the issue is important to understanding the 
infrastructure of the argument.  
Justice Kennedy outlined the majority opinion while Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer set forth their points of dissent from a variety of legal views. Collectively the Justices 
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agreed that “(s)upervisors must ensure that their employees’ official communications are 
accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s mission” (2006). They also 
concurred that the “government needs civility in the workplace, consistency in policy, and 
honesty and competence in public service” (2006); however, the dissenting Justices argued that 
to determine whether the First Amendment protects government employees from discipline for 
speech that offends their employers, the decision warrants deliberation beyond just whether the 
speech was uttered in the course of official duties. They argued that “it is senseless to let 
constitutional protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job 
description” and “to fashion a new rule that provides employees with an incentive to voice their 
concerns publicly before talking frankly to their superiors” seemed to counter the intent (2006). 
This latter point addressed the unintended consequence of the decision which was that it would 
effectually expose public employees to greater potential for disciplinary action when they talked 
to their supervisors first rather than going public with their concerns about a public matter. The 
counter argument was that whistleblower protections were already in force at the federal and 
state levels to protect from employer retaliation on those public employees with reasonable cause 
to believe that their speech discloses a violation of a state or federal law, rule, or regulation.  
The Garcetti Justices argued that “of course a supervisor may take corrective action when 
such speech is inflammatory or misguided,” but they questioned how and where to draw the 
bright line between protected and unprotected speech. They argued that the standard of pursuant 
to duty was too oversimplified and that other contextual issues, as originally argued by Connick, 
should be considered when making decisions. They contemplated how circumstances such as 
“unwelcomed speech” would be handled under the common law of pursuant to duty. Would 
those employees engaging in unwelcomed speech be subjected to discipline after divulging a 
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matter of public concern about their supervisors; information that their “supervisor[s] would 
rather not have anyone else discover?” (2006). The dissenting Justices asserted that by placing so 
much emphasis on the single criterion of speech submitted pursuant to duty, the litmus test was 
too narrow and would miss opportunities for government employees to alert the public to the 
wrongdoing of the supervisors for whom they worked. They argued that the line of distinction 
was arbitrary and that the state would be missing valuable opportunities to hear from employees 
who could speak pursuant to their duties in addressing subjects they “know intimately for the 
very reason that it fall[s] within [their] duties” (Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 2006). Waters v. 
Churchill had already established that “government employees are often in the best position to 
know what ails the agencies for which they work” (1994). The dissenting Garcetti Justices 
underscored this point. 
The dissenting Justices urged a more moderate approach by recognizing that somewhere 
“in between these points lies a public employee’s speech unwelcome to the government but on a 
significant public issue” (2006). The Justices rejected the need for a more restrictive standard 
(i.e., pursuant to duty) and rationalized by saying that (s)uch an employee speaking as a citizen, 
that is, with a citizen’s interest, is protected from reprisal unless the statements are too damaging 
to the government’s capacity to conduct public business to be justified by any individual or 
public benefit thought to flow from the statements (2006).  
The debate was robust between the majority and the dissenting Justices. The relevant 
points of the dissent are distilled below.  
 Speech is too voluminous and complex to dichotomize into categories; in other words, 
whether the speech was uttered during the course of official work duties or not. The 
Garcetti decision effectively bifurcated the issue with its standard of pursuant to duty. 
The dissenting Justices argued that rather, each case warrants independent review on its 
merits. For example, a case where the public employee who engages in professional 
speech is obligated by professional canons and licensure regulations relative to certain 
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types of information, should be considered separate from cases where no ethics 
requirements exist for the speaker. Employees ethically bound to speak of information 
that is ultimately offensive to his employer, should not result in employee discipline even 
when the speech is made during the normal routine of work duties. In these situations, the 
employee is forced to choose between ethical conduct and earning a living. If 
contingency circumstances such as these cannot be independently considered on their 
merits, the law, in effect, will fracture within itself trying to appease competing 
authorities.  
 The policy of pursuant to duty is too restrictive and absolute when there are more 
moderate alternatives available. For example, there are alternative labor laws, such as 
whistleblower protections, that are less restrictive than pursuant to duty.  
 The unintended consequence of pursuant to duty will be that public employees will be 
incentivized to voice their concerns publicly before talking to their superiors within the 
chain of command.  
 The Pickering Balancing Test is presently sufficient to gauge case diversities and guide a 
fair and appropriate outcome. It is impossible to entirely separate matters of public 
concern and public employment. After all, “(g)overnment administration typically 
involves matters of public concern. Why else would government be involved?” (2006) 
The dissenting Justices also disagreed among themselves. For the purposes of this study, 
however, the accounting and unique exchanges of individual points of view are not considered. 
Rather, the cumulative counterpoints are presented for the purpose of projecting future policy 
shifts relative to the protected speech rights for public employees. Collectively the counterpoints 
shed additional perspective and allow better depth of understanding in the debate.  
Historical context of pursuant to duty. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its Garcetti (2006) 
decision, refined the course of rights for public employees to speak out on various issues. So now 
after reviewing this landmark case, and before launching into an in-depth legal analysis, it is 
essential to reflect on the past four decades of historical evolution as set forth from Pickering to 
Garcetti to understand how current-day policies on speech in the public employment sector have 
been fomented. 
Over time there have been wide discrepancies in legal interpretations, vast philosophical 
differences of opinion, and swinging outcomes with regard to how the courts have applied the 
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law relative to free speech, protected speech, and public employment. The current common law, 
pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Garcetti, is that speech by a public official is only 
protected if it is engaged in as a private citizen and not if it is expressed as part of the official's 
public duties. Simply stated, speech by a public official is not protected when it is expressed 
pursuant to duty. But to understand the full impact of Garcetti’s contribution to current day 
public policy, it is necessary to analyze the historical and judicial precedents relative to the free 
speech rights of public employees.  
From the case of New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964 to Garcetti v. Ceballos in 2006 and 
thereafter, the legal standards on protected speech for public employees have evolved. The 
accumulation of litigation and legal interpretations has contributed to the evolution and set forth 
a judicial discourse for distinguishing constitutionally protected speech from unprotected speech. 
Systematic patterns of judicial dissent have also contributed to the robust discourse. This 
literature review asserts to identify the key findings of law, as well as the key points of dissent, 
on the protected speech rights of public employees in an effort to understand current policy and 
the counterpoints on which policy may shift in the future.  
Chronology of major court renderings. The list below illustrates an overview 
chronology of pertinent U.S. Supreme Court and federal court cases which have collectively 
fomented the policies of free speech for public employees. The remainder of the chapter presents 
an analytical review of the identified cases and their implications for human resource policies, 
personnel management practices, and risk management in public school districts.  
1892 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Case 
asserts that public officials serve at the discretion of elected officials.  
1957 Roth v. United States, U.S. Supreme Court. Case asserts that speech by citizens on 
matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment, and was 
fashioned to assure “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.”  
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1964 The New York Times Company v. Sullivan, U.S. Supreme Court. Case asserts that 
the “debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.” 
1967 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of N. Y. U.S. Supreme Court. 
Case addresses employment contracts by making the distinction between First 
Amendment rights to free speech in public k-12 education systems and institutions 
of higher education. It ordains the legitimacy of government’s interest in 
protecting its public k-12 education system from the employment of subversives 
(i.e., Communists and others with intent to overthrow the government); however, 
sustains the necessity of academic freedom in higher education in order to preserve 
a free society – “First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, and 
government may regulate in area only with narrow specificity.” 
1968 Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will 
County, Illinois, U.S. Supreme Court. Case addresses a balance of interests. The 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon “matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.” 
1969 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, U.S. Supreme 
Court. Case addresses the free speech rights of a minor student in a public school 
setting; however, it also clarifies that “(n)either students nor teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 
1972 Perry v. Sindermann, U.S. Supreme Court. Case addresses a person's interest in a 
governmental benefit as a “property interest” subject to procedural due process 
protection if the claim of entitlement to the benefit is supported by rules of the 
agency affording the benefit or by mutually explicit understandings. The “benefit 
may not be denied to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally 
protected interests, especially his interest in freedom of speech.” 
1977 Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education, v. Doyle, U.S. Supreme 
Court. Case addresses constitutionally protected conduct that played a substantial 
part in the decision not to rehire a non-tenured teacher, but it did not necessarily 
amount to a constitutional violation justifying remedial action especially if the 
district “would have reached same decision even in absence of protected conduct.” 
1979 Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, U.S. Supreme Court. Case 
addresses public concerns of a public employee expressed in private versus in 
public. The Court said that “Constitutional freedom of speech is not lost to public 
employee merely because he arranges to communicate privately with his employer 
rather than to spread his views before public.” 
1983 Connick v. Myers, U.S. Supreme Court. Case addresses public matters versus 
private concerns by asserting that “(w)hile the First Amendment invests public 
employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to constitutionalize the 
employee grievance.”  
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1994 Waters v. Churchill, U.S. Supreme Court. Case addresses that for government 
employee's speech to be protected, it “must be on a matter of public concern and 
the employee's interest in expressing herself on the matter must not be outweighed 
by any injury the speech could cause to the interest of the state as an employer in 
promoting the efficiency of public services it performs through its employees.” 
 2006 Garcetti v. Ceballos, U.S. Supreme Court. Case asserts that “(w)hen public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not 
insulate their communications from employer discipline.”  
2007 Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corporation, United States Court of 
Appeals, Seventh Circuit. Case asserts that “(t)he First Amendment does not entitle 
primary and secondary teachers, when conducting the education of captive 
audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart from the curriculum 
adopted by the school system 
2014 Lane v. Franks, U.S. Supreme Court. Case asserts that the “First Amendment 
protects speech on a matter of public concern by a public employee who provides 
truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the scope of his ordinary 
job responsibilities.” 
2016 Lincoln Brown, Plaintiff, v. Chicago Board of Education, United States Court of 
Appeals, Seventh Circuit. Case exemplifies how procedural due process 
protections, as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, apply synonymously with 
First Amendment protections.  
Evolution of public policy. Toward the end of the nineteenth century and early in the 
history of discourse on government regulation of speech, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
when still a member of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, characterized the sentiment of 
constitutionally protected speech in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford (1892) by saying that a 
policeman “may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to 
be a policeman.” Holmes contended that Policeman John J. McAuliffe did have a constitutional 
right to free speech, and he was in fact free to speak. McAuliffe was not, however, guaranteed 
continued employment because public employment was a privilege and not a constitutional right.  
Holmes’ “rights-privilege distinction effectively denied free speech protections to public 
employees because it was an understood condition of public employment” (McAuliffe v. Mayer, 
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Etc., of City of New Bedford, 1892). The “rights-privilege” distinction perpetuated the mindset of 
the “servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him. 
On the same principle the city may impose any reasonable condition upon holding offices within 
its control” (McAuliffe v. Mayer, Etc., of City of New Bedford, 1892). Although not a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, Holmes' 1892 Massachusetts’ opinion captured the sentiment relative to 
public employee expression during the era. The decision bolstered the notion that “public 
employment was viewed as a privilege and not a right” (Alexander & Alexander, 2012, p. 810).  
This decision also underscored the relevance of contractual provisions between school 
boards and teachers during that era. At the time, Boards could legitimately “prohibit the exercise 
of various rights and freedoms by teachers” (Alexander & Alexander, 2012, p. 810-811) 
including speech. Not until Pickering in 1968 were constitutional rights and freedoms extended 
to protect teacher employment and school board relationships (Alexander & Alexander, 2012, 
p. 811).  
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, things began to change. The courts began to 
consider social issues such as legal oaths and the implications on free speech rights. Public 
employers requiring their public employees to denounce affiliation with subversive political 
organizations or membership in the Communist Party, as a condition of public employment 
became a legal consideration. Where employers in the past had been more empowered to make 
such demands on their employees as a condition of employment, policies changed after Wieman 
v. Updegraff (1952), Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction (1961), and Keyishian v. Board of 
Regents (1967). Loyalty oaths were deemed unconstitutional. The new common law, in a general 
sense, refined the definition yet broadened the scope of speech in the public workplace.  
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From 1972 to 1990, the numbers of U.S. Supreme Court cases relative to free speech 
cases steadily increased. This trend in the number of overall free speech cases has since been 
declining, but it is worthwhile to note that this past era had a significant impact on the practical 
application of free and protected speech, just as Circuit Judge O’Scannlain asserted.  
In 2004 when the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, ruled in Ceballos v. Garcetti, 
Circuit Judge O’Scannlain characterized the “Holmesian logic” as being “drastically cast aside” 
from the “courts generally accepted then-Judge Holmes’s immoderately narrow view of the First 
Amendment rights of public employees” (2004). Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion, written on behalf 
of the court, recognized that “(t)he Supreme Court’s burgeoning recognition of public 
employee’s First Amendment rights reached its first apex in Pickering v. Board of Education” 
(Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2004). The Court clearly asserted its claim that matters of First 
Amendment were evolving, and the Court’s opinion strayed from the traditional “Holmesian 
logic.”  
Conclusion of pursuant to duty. The data confirms Justice Kennedy’s assertion in the 
Garcetti opinion that free speech cases began to increase during the mid-twentieth century. Data 
provided in Figure 1 below is an accounting of the number of free speech cases heard by the U.S. 
Supreme Court since the year 1900. The number of cases peaked in the years ranging from 1972 
and 1990, but then began a downward trend to today. While the trend has shown decline in 
numbers since the 1990, only one year, 2013, is on record for having absolutely no free speech 
cases. This trend data suggest that continued judiciary consideration will propagate well into the 
future and will likely be in-step with emerging social, academic, and economic issues. 
Information is provided in Figure 1 to support this claim.  
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Figure 1. U.S. Supreme Court: Numbers of general free speech cases (Number of Supreme Court 
Cases Citing Free Speech in General, Westlaw Next, n.d.). 
 
The punctuating free speech case came in 1968 when the U.S. Supreme Court changed 
the course of public policy with Pickering v. Board of Education when it ruled unconstitutional 
the dismissal of a public school teacher who had published an editorial, inclusive of factual 
errors, in his local newspaper criticizing the board of education and other school administrators 
for misuse of public education funds. Thus in a short period of time, the public policy pendulum 
swung broadly from McAuliffe to Pickering. And yet, unknown at the time, the policy would 
narrow its course again from Pickering to Garcetti. As history reflects, the multi-faceted issue of 
speech in the public workplace continues to be relevant and is far from settled. For this reason, it 
is important for school administrators to know the relevance and implications of the legal 
precepts of matters of public concern and pursuant to duty on personnel practices. 
What is a Matter of Public Concern  
The courts have had much to say about what constitutes a matter of public concern, 
starting with the landmark 1968 U.S. Supreme Court case of Marvin L. Pickering v. Board of 
Education of Township High School District 205, Will County, Illinois. The ruling, in the k-12 
public education case, asserted that freedom of speech, as protected by the First Amendment, 
generally prohibits public employers from firing or disciplining employees for speaking out on 
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matters of public concern. This ruling fostered material implications for public employers, 
including public schools, on the supervision, evaluation, discipline, termination, and due process 
of employees.  
The Pickering Court set forth criteria requiring a “balance between the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, 
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees” (1968). To achieve the balance referred to in the decision, the Court outlined specific 
criteria for ascertaining protected speech with a two-part litmus test, later known as the Pickering 
Balancing Test. The test first required a court to decipher whether the employee had spoken on a 
matter of public concern, and then second, whether the employee’s statement had a “disruptive” 
impact. But what constituted a “matter of public concern” and a “disruptive” effect soon became 
fodder for further judicial consideration.  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Pickering exemplified a major shift in public policy from 
the late nineteenth century when the McAuliffe v. Mayor Etc., of City of New Bedford (1892) 
Court recognized public employment as a privilege, and public sentiment was that employees 
serve at the will of the employer (Alexander & Alexander, 2012, p. 810). Decades later in 1968, 
Pickering recognized that public employees do have First Amendment free speech protections, in 
certain circumstances, and it set forth to qualify objective criteria to discern those circumstances. 
Subject to interpretation, is whether the Pickering decision was a departure from public policy or 
a refining of public policy. Either way, the case changed public policy and secured First 
Amendment rights for public employees speaking as private citizens on matters of public 
concern.  
 42 
The Pickering decision, like the other relative U.S. Supreme Court rulings, set forth 
multiple implications for personnel management practices. On their face, the decisions have 
affected areas as foundational as developing and managing personnel policies, collective 
bargaining agreements, and employee handbooks to areas as serious as employee discipline and 
dismissal. The decisions, among other things, have established new boundaries for public 
employees relative to free and protected speech in and about the workplace.  
The Court would be called on again in Connick v. Myers (1983); Waters v. Churchill 
(1994); and Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) to qualify a matter of public concern, but it was the 
Justices who decided Lane v. Franks (2014) who eventually ruled that speech by public 
employees involves matters of public concern, as required for First Amendment protection,  
when the speech can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest; that 
is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.  
According to Lane, the litmus test in determining whether speech by a public employee 
involves matters of public concern requires the consideration of “content, form, and context of 
the speech,” just as the previous Connick decision had ruled. The U.S. Supreme Court in the case 
of Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri (2011) also cited “content, form, and context of the 
speech” for determining when speech by a public employee involves a matter of public concern.  
What is Speech 
Even with today’s sophisticated modern languages and innumerable communication 
venues, a concise definition of speech remains elusive. What is speech and why is it important to 
quantify and qualify for the purposes of this study? The courts have pondered the circumstances 
of speech cases for decades, and the legal definition of speech continues to be refined as new 
circumstances emerge from public employment and First Amendment free speech protections in 
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the public workplace. The courts have been routinely called upon to discern between protected 
and unprotected speech, each case, however, presented with a slightly different approach.  
Justice Breyer in his dissent of the Garcetti decision opined that,  
(b)ecause virtually all human interaction takes place through speech, the First 
Amendment cannot offer all speech the same degree of protection. Rather, judges must 
apply different protective presumptions in different contexts, scrutinizing government's 
speech-related restrictions differently depending upon the general category of activity. 
(Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 2006)  
 
Breyer was the first to officially point to what many believe was a major contradiction in 
rulings between the Connick Court and the Garcetti Court in that the new standard of pursuant to 
duty denied subsequent courts the obligation of considering the content, form, and context of the 
speech. 
To understand speech for the purpose of this discourse is to study it within the context of 
the First Amendment and its inherent protections. Public employees who file claims of 
deprivation of constitutional rights do so under § 1983 of the United States Code, which allows 
for civil action and liability assignment to the party causing injury, except in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity (Civil 
Rights Act, 1871). The pathway for public employees to First Amendment protections is by 
claiming violations of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
To understand the concept of speech is to know that free speech is not always protected 
speech. Much of First Amendment doctrine, set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court, has been “an 
attempt to develop and refine precisely this sort of distinction,” (Encyclopedia of the American 
Constitution, 2007, p. 1053). What is now known as the Pickering Balancing Test is a direct 
result of judicial attempts to discern speech into categories of being protected and being 
unprotected.  
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True versus false speech. It was the New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) decision that set 
the stage for Pickering with specific regard to the distinction of protections for true versus false 
speech. By ruling that even speech containing factual errors can be protected because errors do 
not constitute sufficient reasoning “for repressing speech that would otherwise be free” (1964), 
the New York Times Justices incorporated law and policy on truthful speech as well as false 
speech. The Pickering Court followed suit when it later ruled that “(c)omments by teachers on 
matters of public concern that are substantially correct may not furnish grounds for dismissal 
even though they are critical in tone (1968). In referring to The New York Times (1964) decision, 
the Pickering opinion specifically stated that  
the public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance - 
the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment - is so great that it has 
been held that a State cannot authorize the recovery of damages by a public official for 
defamatory statements directed at him except when such statements are shown to have 
been made either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth 
or falsity. (1968) 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court summarized its position in 1968 in the Pickering decision by 
asserting that  
(w)here teacher has made erroneous public statements on issues currently subject of 
public attention that are critical of ultimate employer but that are neither shown nor can 
be presumed to have in any way either impeded teacher's proper performance of his daily 
duties in classroom or to have interfered with regular operation of schools generally, 
interest to school administration in limiting teachers' opportunities to contribute to public 
debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting similar contribution by any 
member of general public. 
 
This ruling later became part of the Pickering Balancing Test because it attempted to 
balance employee’s interest, as a citizen, speaking on matters of public concern with the 
government’s interest, as an employer, in providing public services efficiently.  
The core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The fierceness for 
which the First Amendment is exercised and protected in the United States is commensurate to 
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its national policy and the essential belief that freedom of speech is fundamental to the concept 
and core values of democratic societies. The First Amendment, which guarantees among other 
rights, freedom of expression, is in the primal position of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights 
underscoring its critical relativity to free society. As such, the momentum of free will in a 
democratic society constantly foments policy changes around free speech issues.  
The relevance of Pickering and Garcetti is that free speech lies at the heart of American 
democracy, and speech in the workplace adds yet another complex dimension. This is especially 
true in the public sector where individual employees speak representatively on behalf of the 
government as an entity. Systemic vulnerabilities such as personal judgement, bias, and opinion 
carry potential to sidle into the administration of public policy and ultimately undermine 
constitutional, statutory, and/or judicial intent. As such, the threat of uninformed, incompetent, 
biased, and/or unjust individuals leveraging the seat of public authority, while acting in the 
respective roles of public employers, constitutes a matter of public concern. The U.S. 
Constitution is uniquely staged to address this potential vulnerability. Specifically, Articles I, II, 
and III of the U.S. Constitution provide for the balance of power in government by separating it 
into three distinct branches. The legislative branch (U.S. Const. art. I; i.e., Congress) was 
established to make laws; the executive branch (U.S. Const. art. II; i.e., President, Vice-
President, and Cabinet) was charged with carrying out laws; and the judicial branch (U.S. Const. 
art. III; i.e., U.S. Supreme Court and Other Courts) was designed to evaluate laws and set forth 
common laws. Each branch respectively generates national policies via its decisions, statutes, or 
court rulings.  
The explicit purpose of three separate branches of government is to “ensure a central 
government in which no individual or group gains too much control,” (USA.gov, n.d.) and 
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asserts unbalanced power and policies on its citizens. As such, the policy of the U.S. federal 
government is to serve the citizens of its democratic society with three branches of government 
in order to accomplish a balanced system of civil governance. The relevance is that the 
Constitution identifies the Supreme Court as one of the three ultimate authorities in the nation for 
founding public policy. The Court’s decisions, in conjunction with those made by Congress and 
the President, represent the primary sources of law and policy in the United States.  
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California (1927) opined about the critical 
nature of public discourse by stating that 
(t)hose who won our independence believed that . . . public discussion is a political duty; 
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They 
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order 
cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is 
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that 
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in 
the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that 
the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as 
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument 
of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, 
they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 
(Whitney v. California, 1927) 
 
The Encyclopedia of the American Constitution asserts that  
(t)he First Amendment is typically understood to protect from government abridgment a 
broad realm of what might be called “symbolic activity,” including speech, religion, 
press, association, and assembly. Because these symbolic activities are intertwined with 
many other activities that the government is clearly empowered to regulate—for instance, 
education and economic relations—the courts have experienced considerable difficulty in 
distinguishing impermissible infringement on First Amendment freedoms from legitimate 
exercises of government authority. (2007, p. 1053)  
 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall in Rankin v. McPherson asserted that, 
“vigilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do not use authority over employees to 
silence discourse, not because it hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree 
with the content of employee’s speech” (1987).  
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So while a fundamental purpose of the First Amendment, as noted by New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, is to ensure that debate on public issues “be uninhibited, robust, and wide open” 
(1964), the craft of balancing free speech rights in and about public workplaces for employers 
and employees has proven challenging. U.S. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 
acknowledged this when he said in 1965, “(t)he line between protected and unprotected portrayal 
is dim and uncertain, and judges do experience great difficulty in marking it,” (Brennan, 1965, 
p. 6). Justice Brennan further lamented that the  
Supreme Court’s concern with the true significance of the first amendment has been 
primarily confined to the last fifty years. That is not a long time in the history of the 
constitutional interpretation, not long enough in any event to justify the assumption that 
the Court has yet spoken the final word. (Brennan, 1965, p. 1-2)  
 
Now 50 years beyond Brennan’s 1965 astute reflection on the previous 50 years of the 
First Amendment, it is now 2017, and a collective century has passed. A number of fundamental 
free speech issues have surfaced; cases have been litigated and settled; an abundance of data has 
been generated; and the courts continue to be called upon to interpret the First Amendment and 
define free and protected speech. There are remarkable and punctuating cases that are studied in 
an effort to better understand the legal circumstances of public employees and their rights to 
protected speech. Understanding pursuant to duty and its relevance to personnel practices such as 
employee supervision, discipline, termination, and due process first requires a conceptualization 
of matters of public concern, private citizen speech, employee speech, and protected speech.  
What is Protected Speech  
From the case of New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964 to Garcetti in 2006 and thereafter, 
the legal standards on protected speech for public employees have evolved. U.S. Supreme Court 
and other federal court decisions have had subsequent implications on public policy as well as 
consequences on personnel management practices. The accumulation of litigation and legal 
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interpretations has contributed to the evolution of free speech and set forth a judicial discourse 
for distinguishing constitutionally protected speech from unprotected speech. Systematic patterns 
of judicial dissent have also contributed to the robust discourse of defining what constitutes 
protected speech.  
What the Courts Have Said About Protected Speech and Public Employment 
The U.S. Supreme Court has over time continuously refined the terms of what constitutes 
protected speech for government officials. There are a number of cases that have specifically 
qualified protected speech and differentiated between unprotected speech. Below are synopses of 
the cases which have contributed to the evolution. The substantive cases will be presented in 
greater detail at a later point in this chapter, but for now, the synopses below suffice to explain 
the central themes of protected and unprotected speech for public employees, as determined by 
the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal appellate courts, after the 1964 decision in New York 
Times v. Sullivan.  
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Pickering (1968) that statements made by public 
officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the 
fact that statements are directed at their nominal superiors.  
In 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously in favor of a public school teacher in 
the case of Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School District. This case further defined protected 
speech by asserting that constitutional freedom of speech is not lost to public employees merely 
because they arrange to communicate privately with their employers rather than to spread their 
views in public.  
 Sheila Myers, Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans, Louisiana challenged the 
parameters of protected workplace speech in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Harry Connick v. 
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Myers when she claimed in 1983 that her employer, District Attorney Harry Connick, violated 
her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when he terminated her for workplace speech. The 
U.S. Supreme Court further differentiated between protected and unprotected speech when it 
upheld Connick’s decision to terminate Myers.  
The Connick decision contributes to the public debate on protected speech for public 
employees from yet another vantage. One of the main outcomes of the Connick Court’s ruling 
was its direct address of the constitutionality of employee grievances. The Court acknowledged 
the difference between claims of constitutional violations for the sake of safeguarding public 
employee’s rights as citizens to participate in discussions concerning public affairs and attempts 
to constitutionalize employee grievances. The Court rejected Myers' claim of a First Amendment 
violation and rather found that she was attempting “to gather ammunition for another round of 
controversy” with her supervisors (1983). Connick argued that his decision was grounded in 
“long-standing recognition that the First Amendment’s primary aim is the full protection of 
speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities involved in the 
administration of a government office” (1983). The Court’s decision asserted that the “First 
Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints 
over internal office affairs” (Connick v. Myers, 1983). 
  The Connick decision refined, yet again, the criteria for discerning constitutionally 
protected speech for public employees by articulating what it was not. In 1983, the policy “that a 
state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s 
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression” was well established common law in 
accordance with Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967), Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), 
and Perry v. Sindermann (1972). The Connick Court refined the criteria further by ruling that  
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(w)hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but 
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a federal court is not appropriate forum in which to review wisdom of 
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to employee’s behavior. 
(1983)  
 
Further the Connick Court stated that “(w)hether a public employee’s speech addresses a 
matter of public concern so as to shield employee from discharge for expressing those views 
must be determined by content, form and context of given statement, as revealed by whole 
record” (1983). In other words, if the speech is self-serving, it may not be eligible for First 
Amendment protections, but each case must be determined on its merits and in relation to the 
evidence presented.  
Connick, on its merits, bolstered the growing understanding of workplace speech and 
what is constitutionally protected. It also provided foundational key points of law such that years 
later it would buttress the Garcetti decision and would further specify legal terms in the 
evolution of constitutionally protected speech for public employees.  
While Pickering required that constitutional protections be accorded public employee 
speech when spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the Connick decision underscored 
the importance of treating public employees like any member of the general public, and as such, 
did not automatically restrict all office-based speech as protected or non-protected.  
Connick refined the Pickering standard by asserting that “(s)o long as public employees 
are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech 
restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively” (1983). 
Connick also confirmed that employee speech has no First Amendment protection based on the 
employer’s “reaction” to the speech.  
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Later, in 1995, in the U.S. Supreme Court case of U.S. v. National Treasury Employees 
Union, the Court clarified that the Pickering Balancing Test, “for determining the validity of 
restraint on job-related speech of public employees, has been applied only when employee 
speaks as citizen upon matters of public concern, rather than as employee upon matters only of 
personal interest.” This case mirrored the outcome of Connick which asserted that public 
employees should certainly be afforded First Amendment speech protections, but not so that they 
can air their grievances about their employers publicly without consequences.  
The U.S. v. National Treasury Employees Union (1995) Court held that private speech by 
a public employee that involves nothing more than complaining about changes in the employee's 
own duties “may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of justification on 
government employer; if, however, (the) speech involves (a) matter of public concern, (the) 
government bears (the) burden of justifying its adverse employment action” (1995). 
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rankin v. McPherson further clarified that  
(e)ven where public employee's speech does not touch upon a matter of public concern, 
speech is not totally beyond protection of the First Amendment, but, absent most unusual 
circumstances, federal court is not an appropriate forum in which to review wisdom of 
personnel decision taken by public agency allegedly in reaction to employee's behavior. 
 
The 1994 decision in Waters v. Churchill, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that  
(f)or government employee's speech to be protected, it must be on a matter of public 
concern and the employee's interest in expressing herself on the matter must not be 
outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the interest of the state as an 
employer in promoting the efficiency of public services it performs through its 
employees.  
 
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe that  
(u)nder the First Amendment government employees have the right to speak on matters 
of public concern, typically matters concerning government policies that are of interest to 
the public at large, a subject on which public employees are uniquely qualified to 
comment.  
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That same year, 2004, the case of City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe also clarified “that when 
government employees speak or write on their own time on topics unrelated to their 
employment, speech can have First Amendment protection, absent some governmental 
justification far stronger than mere speculation in regulating it,” (2004). But in determining 
“whether public employee's speech is protected by First Amendment, speech is entitled to 
Pickering balancing only when an employee speaks as a citizen upon matters of public concern 
rather than as employee upon matters only of personal interest” (2004). This case mirrored 
Connick (1983) and U.S. v. National Treasury Employees Union (1995) in that matters of 
personal interest did not necessarily constitute protected speech. The City of San Diego, Cal. v. 
Roe Court ruled in 2004, as had Connick in 1984, that each case must be examined “for content, 
form, and context of given statement, as revealed by the whole record, in assessing whether 
public employee's speech addresses “matter of public concern” for First Amendment purposes.” 
As discussed previously, Pickering (1968), Garcetti (2006), and other U.S. Supreme 
Court and federal appellate courts have confirmed that public employees do not surrender all 
their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment; rather, the First Amendment 
protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing 
matters of public concern. As was also discussed previously, the distinction between protected 
and unprotected speech is subject to legal interpretation, and until Garcetti, there was nothing 
close to a thin white line test. The Garcetti Court asserted that  
Pursuant to Pickering and its progeny, two inquiries guide interpretation of the 
constitutional protections accorded to public employee speech: the first requires 
determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern; if 
not, the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on the government 
employer's reaction to the speech, but if the answer is yes, the possibility of a First 
Amendment claim arises, and the question then becomes whether the government 
employer had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any 
other member of the general public. (2006) 
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The Court asserted that “in determining whether a public employee's speech is entitled to 
constitutional protection, the fact that the speech concerns the subject matter of the employee's 
employment is nondispositive” (2006). The Garcetti Court said that in some instances the First 
Amendment does protect expressions related to the speaker's job. 
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. 
Brentwood Academy (2007), the Justices followed the precedents established by Connick and 
Garcetti by ruling that so long as public employees are speaking as citizens about matters of 
public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their 
employers to operate efficiently and effectively.  
Then in 2007, the 10th Circuit of Appeals, coined a new concept in Brammer-Hoelter v. 
Twin Peaks Charter Academy and again in 2015 in Nixon v. City and County of Denver in its 
attempts to ascertain protected speech when it characterized a series of legal precedents 
collectively known as the “Garcetti/Pickering analysis.” According to the 10th Circuit of 
Appeals, there are five key points of law that constitute the Garcetti/Pickering analysis, and they 
prescriptively offer a concise set of considerations that can guide decisions about discerning 
protected from unprotected speech in the public workplace, including the public school office. 
The five considerations of the Garcetti/Pickering analysis are:  
(1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s official duties; (2) whether 
the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the government’s interests, as 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the 
plaintiff’s free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating factor 
in the adverse employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the 
same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct. (Brammer-Hoelter v. 
Twin Peaks Charter Academy, 2007; Nixon v. City and County of Denver, 2015; Holben, 
Jacobs, Levin, Surette, & Van Arsdale, p. 7) 
 
The Justices who decided Lane seemed to emulate and expand upon the key legal points 
of the 10th Circuit of Appeals in attempting to qualify speech by setting forth a comprehensive 
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ruling that articulated the cumulative criteria imposed by the courts from the beginning. An 
extensive review of the Lane case will come later as it serves to provide a substantive summary 
of the major issues that have contributed to the cumulative evolution of the policy of public 
employment and protected speech. By some accounts, the Lane decision advances the discussion 
beyond Garcetti with the addition of more protected speech qualifiers. And while Lane appears 
to shift public policy away from Garcetti and back toward Pickering, both cases agree that 
without a significant degree of control over its employees’ words and actions, a government 
employer would have little chance to provide public services efficiently. Waters v. Churchill 
(1994) and Garcetti also agreed that a government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech 
when it acts in its employer role, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that 
has some potential to affect its operations.  
The preponderance of cases underscore Garcetti’s assertion that citizens who works for 
the government are nonetheless still citizens. According to Garcetti (2006) “(t)he First 
Amendment limits a public employer’s ability to leverage the employment relationship to 
restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private 
citizens.” So long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they 
must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate 
efficiently and effectively (Connick v. Myers, 1983; Holben et al., 2016, p. 157-159). 
In Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School District (2010), the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, while not jurisdictional to all, made an important contribution to 
this discussion. Casey ruled primarily on the legal point of qualified immunity for public school 
board members and administrators, but in doing so, also asserted a precedent relative to protected 
and non-protected speech. The Court established that speech can simultaneously fall into the 
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separate categories of protected and non-protected speech. Ms. Casey, a public school 
superintendent, under § 1983 claim, alleged that she was retaliated against and inherently 
deprived of her constitutional rights by her board of education for exercising her First 
Amendment rights. The speech in question included statements that were within the scope of the 
superintendent’s duties in that they included advisement to the board of education about lawful 
and proper financial procedures. Her speech also included statements alleging state and federal 
law violations that were not being heeded by members of her board of education. The Court 
found that while the superintendent’s speech mostly fell pursuant to her duties of advising the 
board of education and was not protected, some of it was spoken as a private citizen on 
violations of board procedures, which was a matter of public concern and was therefore 
constitutionally protected. Another interesting point about the Casey case was that it uniquely 
illustrated the immediate effect of the Garcetti decision when while the case was pending, the 
Garcetti decision was handed down forcing plaintiff Casey to concede that part of her speech 
was not constitutionally protected because it was pursuant to her official duties as 
superintendent. Casey further exemplified Garcetti’s narrowing effect on defining protected 
speech.  
The U.S. Supreme Court followed suit in Lane v. Franks (2014) when it delineated that 
speech by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment, and this 
remains true even when the speech concerns information related to or learned through public 
employment. The Lane Court asserted that  
First Amendment interest at stake in speech by a public employee on a matter of public 
concern that is related to or learned through public employment is as much the public's 
interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee's own right to disseminate it. 
(2014)  
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On its face, the Lane ruling appears to reverse direction from the earlier Garcetti ruling. 
The Justices sharpened the critical question relative to protected speech by ruling that 
(m)ere fact that a citizen's speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his public 
employment does not transform that speech into employee speech, rather than First 
Amendment-protected citizen speech, and the critical question is whether the speech at 
issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of the citizen's duties as a public employee, not 
whether the speech merely concerns those duties. (2006)  
 
Further consideration of protected speech was also given by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the case of Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri (2011). The Court held that when a public 
employee sues a government employer under the First Amendment's Speech Clause, the 
employee must show that he or she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 
Under the First Amendment, if a public employee does not speak as a citizen, or does not 
address a matter of public concern, when he or she sues his or her government employer, a 
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision 
allegedly made in reaction to the employee's behavior. In other words, it’s a personnel matter 
when the employee is not speaking as a citizen and is not addressing a matter of public concern, 
and the matter, which could include discipline, should be handled between the employer and the 
employee. This holding was handed down initially by the Rankin and the Connick Courts.  
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court also summed up many of its rulings in Harris v. Quinn 
(2014) when it asserted that  
(p)ublic employee speech is unprotected if it is not on a matter of public concern or is 
pursuant to an employee’s job duties, but speech on matters of public concern may be 
restricted only if the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
the public services it performs through its employees outweighs the interests of the 
employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.  
 
Garcetti consolidated myriad legal issues, drawn from previous cases, and potentially set 
forth the most concrete criteria for ascertaining free speech parameters for public employees. 
 57 
While Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti represent the three major Supreme Court cases 
recognized for defining First Amendment protected speech for public employees, there are other 
U.S. Court decisions which clarify protected speech for public employees. Those cases are 
briefed below.  
Detailed Case Reviews 
1964-U.S. Supreme Court, The New York Times Company, Petitioner, v. L.B. 
Sullivan. Ralph D. Abernathy et al., Petitioners, v. L.B. Sullivan. Originally, L.B. Sullivan, the 
Montgomery, Alabama city commissioner, filed a libel suit against the New York Times 
Company and four black ministers for publishing an “editorial advertisement,” specifically “not 
a commercial advertisement,” communicating “information, expressing opinion, reciting 
grievances, protesting claimed abuses and sought financial support on behalf of a movement 
whose existence and objectives were matters of the highest public interest and concern” (New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964). Specifically, the advertisement alleged that the arrest of the 
Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury was part of a conspiracy to undermine Dr. 
King’s civil rights’ efforts in the South. Sullivan claimed that the allegations made against the 
Montgomery, Alabama police department and published in the New York Times, libeled him 
personally.  
While this landmark U.S. Supreme Court case only minimally relates to this dissertation 
study, it does offer several foundational points worthy of inclusion. The primary message of the 
Court is that open and uninhibited speech is so integral to a free society, that the rights of 
government officials, as representatives of the State, may be diminished commensurately to 
ensure constitutional protections for all. According to this Court, under the current system of 
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government, “counterargument and education are the weapons available to expose” 
unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements; not abridgment of free speech.  
Legal questions.  
 To what extent do the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a state’s power 
to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his or her 
official conduct? 
 Did Alabama’s libel law, by not requiring Sullivan to prove that an advertisement 
personally harmed him and dismissing the same as untruthful due to factual errors, 
unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment’s freedom of speech and freedom of 
press? 
Holding. Unanimous decision for the New York Times Company. The Court held that 
the First Amendment protects the expression of all statements, even false claims, about the 
conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice, or in other 
words, are made with knowledge that they are false or are in reckless disregard of their truth or 
falsity.  
Justices. Decided by the Warren Court (1962-1965). Chief Justice Warren, Justices 
Black, Clark, Brennan, White, Goldberg, Stewart, Harlan, and Douglas voted unanimously in 
favor of the New York Times Company (IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, n.d.).  
Key findings of law.  
 The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged a “profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and 
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.” This commitment underscores the critical importance 
of free speech in sustaining a democratic society where the will of the people prevails.  
 Federal rule prohibited the U.S. Supreme Court from allowing public officials to recover 
damages for defamatory falsehood relating to their official conduct unless they prove that 
the statements in question were made with actual malice. In effect, this ruling required 
government officials, in order to successfully claim defamation and libel against someone 
aggrieving their conduct or decisions, to meet the legal standard of malice. 
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 False statements and factual errors are protected by the Constitution under the First 
Amendment when made without malice. “The constitutional protections for speech and 
press do not turn upon the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which 
are offered.” 
Key points of dissent. There were no points of dissent as the decision was unanimously in 
favor of the New York Times Company.  
Implications. The policy of the United States is so resolute on upholding the free speech 
rights of its citizens that school administrators, as “government officials,” have minimal recourse 
against citizens who voice public grievances aimed at their conduct and decisions, even when the 
statements are false.  
The Court also established a standard of malice necessary for government officials to 
successfully claim defamation or libel. The reality of the malice standard, however, is that the 
burden of proof is extremely high for proving that the defendant made statements that were false 
or acted in reckless disregard of truth or falsity toward the government official.  
1967-U.S. Supreme Court, Harry Keyishian et al., Appellants, v. The Board of Regents 
of the University of the State of New York et al. Harry Keyishian and his fellow faculty and staff 
members transitioned to state employment in 1962 when the privately owned and operated 
University of Buffalo merged into the State University of New York system. At that time, the 
public policy of New York state stood to prevent the appointment and continued employment of 
“subversive persons” who willfully advocated or taught doctrine of treason or sedition. Under 
this policy, Keyishian and his colleagues were required by the State University of New York to 
sign, as conditions for continued employment in state government, loyalty oaths declaring that 
they were not, nor ever had been, Communists. Defending their First Amendment rights, they 
refused to sign the affirmation and subsequently filed suit in federal court. The case was 
eventually heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
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This case too has foundational points worthy of inclusion in the study. The message from 
the Court was that unconstitutionally vague laws violate the First Amendment, and it takes more 
than mere membership in a subversive organization to warrant criminal punishment or 
disbarment from public employment. Like the Garcetti case, the Court was split 5 to 4 signifying 
competing arguments.  
Legal question. Are the provisions requiring public employees to formally renounce their 
affiliation with Communism so overly broad and vague that they are unconstitutional? 
Holding. Five to four decision in favor of Keyishian.  
Justices. Decided by the Warren Court (1965-1967). On behalf of the Court, Justice 
Brennan delivered the opinion. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Fortas 
concurred. Justices Clark, Harlan, Steward, and White dissented (IIT Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, n.d.).  
Key findings of law.  
 While there is no doubt about the legitimacy of a state’s interest in protecting its public 
education system from subversion, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly 
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.  
 Standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression since 
First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, and government may 
regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.  
 Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is 
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. 
 Danger of the chilling effect upon exercise of First Amendment rights which arise when 
one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position must be guarded 
against by clearly informing teachers what is prohibited.  
 Statutory provisions making treason and sedition grounds for removal from public school 
systems or state employment, barring from employment in public school systems any 
person willfully advocating or teaching doctrine of forcible overthrow of government, 
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disqualifying public school employees who are involved with distribution of written 
matter advocating or teaching doctrine of forcible overthrow are unconstitutionally vague 
laws that violate the First Amendment. 
 Mere Communist Party membership, even with knowledge of party’s unlawful goals, 
cannot suffice to justify criminal punishment or warrant a finding of moral unfitness 
justifying disbarment (Thomson Reuters Westlaw [Westlaw], n.d., p. 1-3) 
Key points of dissent. The duties of public employees should allow the government to 
inquire into employees’ fitness to serve in particular positions and that actions that “advocate, 
advise, or teach” the overthrow of the government are not unconstitutionally vague.  
Implications. Public school districts should avoid policies or practices requiring public 
employees to sign contingency agreements, such as loyalty oaths, that limit their constitutional 
rights as citizens when required as conditions of their employment.  
1968-U.S. Supreme Court, Marvin L. Pickering, Appellant, v. Board of Education of 
Township High School District 205, Will County, Illinois. Marvin Pickering was a public 
school teacher employed by the Board of Education of Township High School District 205 in 
Will County, Illinois, who submitted an editorial to the local newspaper criticizing the Board of 
Education and the superintendent’s handling of “past proposals to raise new revenue for the 
schools” (1968). The Board argued that Mr. Pickering’s letter was “detrimental to the efficient 
operation and administration of the schools of the district” (1968), and consequently, they 
terminated him.  
Pickering subsequently filed suit against the school district for violating his First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights. He claimed that the Board of Education wrongfully terminated 
him and violated his constitutional right to express his concerns as a private citizen about a 
matter of public concern  
Pickering first filed in the Circuit Court of Will County, and when he did not prevail, he 
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. The state Supreme Court likewise found that the “board 
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of education did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the teacher.” Pickering then appealed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, which ruled in 1968, by an eight to one vote, that the school district had 
indeed violated Marvin Pickering’s constitutional rights.  
The issues before the U.S. Supreme Court centered on whether Marvin Pickering’s 
statements were protected by the First Amendment. Pickering argued that his letter should be 
protected on the basis that he spoke as a private citizen on a matter of legitimate public concern. 
Because he was terminated from public employment for making statements that should have 
been protected by the First Amendment, but instead offended his employer, Pickering claimed 
that he was subjected to unconstitutional retaliation. Also germane to the issue is that Mr. 
Pickering’s public editorial contained statements that were false and factually incorrect. The 
respective Courts therefore also considered whether false speech is eligible for constitutional 
protections.  
Legal questions.  
 Was Pickering’s letter to the editor of a local newspaper protected by the First 
Amendment when he criticized his public employer?  
 Was Pickering’s speech constitutionally protected? 
Holding. Delivering the majority opinion on behalf of the Court, Justice Thurgood 
Marshall, in an eight to one decision, ruled in favor of plaintiff Marvin Pickering. The Court held 
that the Board of Education had violated Pickering’s First Amendment right to speech as a 
private citizen on a matter of public concern.  
The Court also dismissed the argument that only truthful speech is protected speech. The 
Court qualified protected speech to include false statements unless they are made “knowingly or 
recklessly.”  
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The Supreme Court’s ultimate ruling in Pickering illustrated the Court’s shift from the 
previous McAuliffe v. Mayor Etc., of City of New Bedford (1892) decision which ruled that 
public employment is a privilege, and employees serve at the will of the employer (Alexander & 
Alexander, 2012, p. 810). Whether the Pickering decision was a departure from or a refining of 
public policy is subject to interpretation. The case did, however, change public policy and 
secured First Amendment rights for public employees speaking as private citizens on matters of 
public concern. Ultimately the Court set forth criteria requiring a “balance between the interests 
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the 
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees” (1968).  
Justices. Decided by the Warren Court (1967-1969). Justice Chief Justice Warren, 
Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Fortas, Black, Douglas, and Harlan formed the majority 
opinion. Justice White dissented in part (IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, n.d.). 
Key findings of law.  
 Teachers may not constitutionally be compelled to relinquish First Amendment rights 
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in 
connection with operation of public schools in which they work. 
 Supreme Court, on appeal by dismissed teacher from state court decision affirming 
determination of school board dismissing teacher for sending letter to local newspaper in 
connection with proposed tax increase, declined to treat teacher’s claim that procedure 
followed deprived him of due process in that he was not afforded impartial tribunal as 
independent ground for decision, where teacher failed to raise such claim at any point in 
state proceedings and made contention for first time in Supreme Court. 
 Where state courts, in action by dismissed teacher against board of education seeking 
reinstatement, at no time gave de novo consideration to statements contained in teacher’s 
letter, which constituted basis for teacher’s dismissal, Supreme Court was free to examine 
evidence in case completely independently and to afford little weight to factual 
determinations made by board of education. 
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 Comments by teachers on matters of public concern that are substantially correct may not 
furnish grounds for dismissal even though they are critical in tone. 
 Accusation by school teacher that too much money is being spent on athletics by 
administrators of school system cannot reasonably be regarded as per se detrimental to 
district’s schools. 
 Question whether school system requires additional funds is matter of legitimate public 
concern on which judgment of school administration, including school board, cannot be 
taken as conclusive and it is thus essential that teachers, who, as a class, are members of 
community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to 
operation of schools should be spent, be able to speak out freely on such questions 
without fear of retaliatory dismissal. 
 Where teacher has made erroneous public statements on issues currently subject of public 
attention that are critical of ultimate employer but that are neither shown nor can be 
presumed to have in any way either impeded teacher’s proper performance of his daily 
duties in classroom or to have interfered with regular operation of schools generally, 
interest to school administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public 
debate is not significantly greater than its interest in limiting similar contribution by any 
member of general public. 
 Statements by public officials on matters of public concern must be accorded First 
Amendment protection despite fact that statements are directed at their nominal superiors. 
 Absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, teacher’s exercise 
of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish basis for his 
dismissal from public employment. 
 Act of school teacher, in writing and sending letter to local newspaper, in connection with 
proposed tax increase, that was critical of manner in which board of education had 
handled past proposals to raise new revenue for schools did not, in absence of proof of 
false statements knowingly or recklessly made, afford basis for teacher’s dismissal. 
(Thomson Reuters Westlaw, n.d., pp. 1-3) 
Key points of dissent. Justice Byron White dissented in part. He agreed that the 
letter might have constituted protected speech; however, he preferred to remand the case 
back to the lower court for further deliberation on whether the false statements in the 
letter were knowingly or recklessly untruthful.  
Implications. Like Marvin Pickering, teachers and other public school employees have 
constitutional rights to speak as private citizens on issues of public concern, and as long as their 
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speech is absent of malice to mislead or is recklessly untruthful, they are constitutionally 
protected from any resulting employer discipline or sanctions. Speech does not have to be 
truthful or factual to be protected by the Constitution. 
Discerning the line between guaranteed constitutional speech and legitimately 
regulated speech is the role of the school administrator. Examining statements, 
contemplating issues, and analyzing circumstances under which the speech was made to 
determine alignment with the principles of the First Amendment, is a professional 
practice skill for school administrators to develop, refine, and sustain as a part of 
effective school leadership.  
 The Pickering Court did not specifically mention tenure protections as teacher property 
rights; however, there are personnel implications for school administrators when non-renewing 
and terminating teachers.  
1969-U.S. Supreme Court, John F. Tinker and Mary Beth Tinker, Minors, etc., et al., 
Petitioners, v. Des Moines Independent Community School District et al. This case “is the most 
important Supreme Court case in history protecting the constitutional rights of students” 
(Chemerinsky, 2000, p. 527). The Tinker Court asserted in its majority opinion that 
(i)n our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School 
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Students in school as well 
as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental 
rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations 
to the State. In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of 
only that which the State chooses to communicate. They may not be confined to the 
expression of those sentiments that are officially approved. In the absence of a specific 
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to 
freedom of expression of their views. As Judge Gerwin, speaking for the Fifth Circuit, 
said, school officials cannot suppress ‘expressions of feelings with which they do not 
wish to contend.  
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And while this dissertation study specifically excludes student speech as a research indicator, 
Tinker is an historically defining case relative to free speech and public k-12 education. 
Specifically, Tinker addressed the constitutional rights of students, but in doing so, the decision 
also referenced the speech rights of their teachers. The ruling confirmed that certain First 
Amendment rights extend to students and teachers alike. On this basis, the argument is 
substantiated for including the case in this study.  
The Court made the following critical distinctions in the 1969 case relative to teachers 
and contributed to the evolution of protected speech rights of public employees.  
Legal question. What are students’ freedom of speech protections, as guaranteed by the 
First Amendment, when protesting and exhibiting symbolic speech?  
Holding. By disciplining students for wearing black armbands on their sleeves as a 
symbol of their disapproval of the Vietnam War, the school district violated the “students’ right 
of expression of opinion” (1969). The Supreme Court held that neither students nor teachers lose 
their First Amendment rights to free expression when they step onto school property.  
Justices. Decided by the Warren Court (1967-1969). Justice Abe Fortas delivered the 
opinion of the court with a seven to two majority vote. Chief Justice Warren and Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, and Warren concurred with the majority opinion. For varying 
reasons, Justices Stewart and White also concurred with the majority. Black and Harlow 
dissented (IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, n.d.).  
Key findings of law. Because Tinker is primarily about student speech, and student 
speech is not a focus of this study, only those key findings relative to teachers are included 
below. The points do not constitute the whole of findings from the justices.  
 Wearing of armband for purpose of expressing certain views is type of symbolic act that 
is within the free speech clause of the First Amendment. 
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 Pure speech is entitled to comprehensive protections under the First Amendment. 
 School officials cannot suppress expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to 
contend.  
 First Amendment rights, applied in light of special characteristics of the school 
environment, are available to teachers and students.  
 Neither students nor teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.  
Key points of dissent. 
 The First Amendment does not provide the right to express any opinion at any time. 
Because the appearance of the armbands distracted students from their work, they 
detracted from the ability of the school officials to perform their duties, so the school 
district was well within its rights to discipline the students. 
 School officials should be afforded wide authority to maintain order unless their actions 
can be proven to stem from a motivation other than a legitimate school interest. 
(Thomson Reuters Westlaw, n.d., p. 1-4) 
Implications. The case generated several key findings of law relative to school personnel 
management. Primarily, the case established that neither students nor teachers loose 
constitutional protections to free speech while at school. In those instances, when school 
administrators do take action to suppress the speech rights of students, the legal standard for 
justification is to prove that the students’ conduct would “materially and substantially interfere” 
with the efficient operation of the school. If this standard cannot be met, the potential for a First 
Amendment violation exists. Likewise, this same standard can be applied to teachers’ conduct 
given that both Tinker (1969) and Pickering (1968) constitutionalized teachers’ rights as private 
citizens to speak on matters of public concern.  
Finally, Tinker introduced the concept of “pure speech” in a legal context. It established 
that “symbolic speech” is akin to “pure speech” and is therefore eligible for the same protections 
as actual speech (1969). So based on the Tinker decision, students are constitutionally protected 
when they express their views symbolically by wearing “messages on t-shirts or buttons, but via 
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other forms of expression as well, including jewelry, hair styles, rubber bracelets, tattoos, body 
piercings, armbands, and styles of clothing, to name just a few” (Waggoner, 2013, p. 65). So “as 
long as normal school functions are not unreasonably disrupted” (1969), students and teachers, 
pursuant to Tinker, are allowed to engage in symbolic speech at school. These legal points 
summarize the direct implications for school personnel management.  
1977-U.S. Supreme Court, Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education, 
Petitioner, v. Fred Doyle. In 1969, 3 years after initially being hired by the Mt. Healthy City 
School District, Fred Doyle was elected president of the teachers’ association (i.e., union). The 
following year, he served on the union’s executive board, at which time, there were contentious 
relations between the school board and the association.  
Afterwards, in 1970, Doyle was involved in a series of antagonistic personnel incidents 
that were not tied to his work in the teachers’ union. Among the incidents, Doyle got into an 
argument with another teacher, which resulted in a physical exchange between the two teachers 
and ultimately suspensions for both. Other teachers got involved by taking sides, walking out of 
the workplace, and causing a substantial disruption to the operations of the organization.  
Among a variety of adversarial incidents, Doyle argued with other employees including 
school cafeteria staff over the size of a serving of spaghetti. He referred to students using 
derogatory comments and made an “obscene gesture” to two girls. Then Mr. Doyle exercised his 
First Amendment right to free speech and disclosed the substance of an internal district 
communication regarding a proposed dress code for staff. Doyle gave the information to a disc 
jockey who subsequently aired the information on a local radio station as a community news 
item. The board subsequently terminated Doyle who in response requested a “statement of 
reasons” for the termination. The board cited “a notable lack of tact in handling professional 
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matters” and referenced the “radio station incident” and the “obscene gesture incident” in its 
reasoning (Thomson Reuters Westlaw [Westlaw], n.d., p. 6). Doyle brought action against the 
school district claiming his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated 
when he was terminated for engaging in protected speech.  
The U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit District confirmed a lower district court’s 
finding that the teacher’s exercise of free speech had played a substantial part in the board’s 
decision not to renew the teacher’s contract, and as such, had violated Doyle’s constitutional 
rights. On further appeal, however, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Doyle’s entitlement to 
constitutionally protected speech, but further asserted that the lower courts had not adequately 
considered whether the board of education would have arrived at the same decision in the 
absence of the protected conduct. On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court upheld the board 
of education’s right to terminate Fred Doyle.  
Legal questions. 
 Was Mt. Healthy City School District Board protected by the sovereign immunity clause 
of the Eleventh Amendment when it terminated non-tenured Fred Doyle from a public 
teaching position?  
 Did Mt. Healthy City School District Board violate Fred Doyle’s First Amendment rights 
by not renewing his contract after he contacted a local radio station and divulged internal 
school communications?  
Holding. On behalf of the Court, Justice Rehnquist wrote the unanimous decision in 
favor of Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
board of education was justified in discharging probationary, non-tenured teacher Fred Doyle. 
The ruling further held that the school district was not entitled to sovereign immunity. The Court 
rationalized that local board members serve as public officials on a “municipal corporation” and 
are not “state officials” as required for Eleventh Amendment protections. As such, the Mt. 
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Healthy City School District Board of Education did not prevail on the minor point of immunity, 
but they did prevail on the major issue of Mr. Doyle’s termination.  
Justices. Decided by the Burger Court (1975-1981). Chief Justice Berger and Justices 
Rehnquist, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens voted 
unanimously in favor of the school district (IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, n.d.).  
Key findings of law. Speaking on behalf of the Court, Justice Rehnquist held that the 
board of education had the right to terminate Mr. Doyle for his conduct. The Court found that  
 constitutionally protected conduct played a substantial part in the decision not to rehire 
the teacher; however, it did not necessarily amount to a constitutional violation. Justice 
Rehnquist further opined that the true point for consideration was whether the board of 
education had shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have reached the 
same decision even in the absence of protected conduct by the teacher.  
 school board members are not considered to be officials of the state for the purpose of 
being eligible for Eleventh Amendment protections. The Court declared that “a local 
school board . . . is more like a county or city than it is like an arm of the state, and it 
therefore was not entitled to assert any Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in 
federal court.” 
Key points of dissent. None cited. 
Implications. The Mt. Healthy decision imparted two relevant points of law which have 
practical implications for school administrators. Superintendents and other school administrators 
need to know that there are inherent safeguards to follow when releasing non-tenured teachers to 
avoid potential claims of First and Fourteenth Amendment violations.  
There is substantial evidence that Mr. Doyle had repeatedly participated in workplace 
activities with adversarial outcomes that affected the efficient operations of the school district. 
Based on the multiple and varied accounts of aggravating conduct by Mr. Doyle, the Court was 
able to consider a multitude of factors in the case. The Court recognized that the school district 
did cite the “radio incident” in its reason for terminating Doyle. The “radio incident,” taken in 
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sole context, constituted protected speech. The board was acting on “the radio incident,” but only 
as the last incident in a series of significant conduct breaches by Mr. Doyle. The “radio incident” 
was merely the last instance that triggered the boards’ action to terminate Mr. Doyle for 
egregious behavior. The “radio incident” was not acted upon in its sole capacity.  
In this case, school administrators were appropriately positioned to be successful against 
a § 1983 claim, a claim of retaliation, or a claim of union animus and improper labor practices. 
Because there was an accumulation of evidence on which the school board made its final 
decision to terminate Mr. Doyle, the Court ruled on the preponderance of the evidence and not 
on the single “radio incident.” This is a critical distinction for administrators to consider when 
developing management skill for discerning protected speech from unprotected speech.  
Two final implications for school administrators to know is that they, nor their districts, 
are eligible for Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunities because they are engaging in duties 
that serve as county or city officials and not in the capacity of state officials. Workplace 
retaliation and union animus are also relative issues worthy of further exploration.  
1979-U.S. Supreme Court, Bessie B. Givhan, Petitioner, v. Western Line Consolidated 
School District et al. Bessie Givhan was dismissed from her employment as a public junior high 
English teacher. Afterwards, Givhan filed a § 1983 claim against the school district alleging that 
her First and Fourteenth Amendment protections had been violated. She argued that she was 
terminated as a result of her involvement in a desegregation suit against the school district as her 
employer. Specifically, Ms. Givhan and her principal had a private discussion at school about the 
district’s minority hiring practices, which she later argued was a matter of public concern and 
subject to constitutional protection. Ms. Givhan claimed that she was terminated as a result of 
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that discussion with the principal. She further claimed that her due process rights were also 
violated when the school district terminated her for participating in that discussion.  
As an antecedent case to Garcetti, Givhan established important points of law relative to 
the issue of protected speech for public employees. Like plaintiff Marvin Pickering, the Supreme 
Court held that plaintiff Bessie Givhan’s speech, made while at work, was protected by the First 
Amendment when she complained privately to the principal about the district’s personnel hiring 
policies. Also like Marvin Pickering, Givhan was not denied the right by her employer to speak 
as a citizen on a matter of public concern nor were her fundamental rights as a citizen denied by 
virtue of her employment with the local school district.  
This U.S. Supreme Court case is relative to the Garcetti decision because it served to 
forge judicial groundwork by offering a ruling in an absolute case in contrast. To explain, the 
Givhan decision, 27 years earlier, set the Garcetti decision, if logic prevails, for a predictable 
outcome. In Givhan, the plaintiff’s speech, spoken at work and about work, was protected 
because Bessie Givhan’s comments were expressed privately to her building principal about 
personnel practices; subject matter which was outside the scope of her official duties as a junior 
high English teacher. Whereas in contrast, the later Garcetti Court found that while Bessie 
Givhan’s speech was protected because it was outside the scope of her work duties, Richard 
Ceballos’ speech was not protected because it fell within the scope of his work duties. In other 
words, Ceballos’ speech was made pursuant to his official duties and was therefore not protected 
by the Constitution. The Garcetti Court later confirmed this absolute contrast logic.  
Legal question. Was public school teacher Bessie Givhan’s speech protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments when she was critical of the school’s desegregation efforts in a 
private conversation with her school principal in his office?  
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Holding: Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion of the Court. In a unanimous 
decision in favor of Bessie Givhan, the Court held that  
(1) the school principal, having opened his office door to the teacher, was hardly in a 
position to argue that he was the unwilling recipient of her views, and (2) constitutional 
freedom of speech is not lost to a public employee merely because he arranges to 
communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the 
public. (Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 1979) 
Justices. Decided by the Burger Court (1975-1981). Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens (IIT Chicago-
Kent College of Law, n.d.). 
Key findings of law.  
 As opposed to situation in which government employee is involved, in which case 
manner time and place of delivery of his or her remarks may be material in constitutional 
free speech context, it is generally content of statements made by teacher, when he or she 
speaks publicly, that must be assessed to determine whether such statements in any way 
either impeded proper performance of his or her daily duties in classroom or interfered 
with regular operation of schools generally. 
 School principal, having opened his office door to teacher, was hardly in position to 
argue, in proceeding on her complaint that she had been wrongfully terminated for her 
exercise of free speech, that he was unwilling recipient of her views. 
 Constitutional freedom of speech is not lost to public employee merely because he 
arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread his views 
before public. 
 Judgment affirming judgment for teacher on her complaint that she had been wrongfully 
terminated for exercise of free speech was reversed, and case remanded, to allow 
opportunity to employer to show that teacher would have been terminated regardless of 
her “demands” presented privately to principal.  
Key points of dissent: None. This was a unanimous decision in favor of Bessie Givhan.  
Implications. Public employees have the right to communicate privately with their 
employers rather than to spread their views before public audiences. In the context of discerning 
constitutionally-protected free speech, however, school administrators should consider the 
manner, time, and place of delivery of employee remarks (Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated 
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School District, 1979). Also, they should contemplate the material substance of the speech and 
ascertain if the speech has “in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his 
daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools 
generally” (Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County 
Illinois, 1968).  
Consistent with the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle (1977) 
Supreme Court decision, the Givhan Court likewise granted the school district the opportunity to 
show that it would have reached the same decision in terminating the teacher, even in the 
absence of protected conduct by the teacher. To this end, administrators should employ the 
technique of collecting multiple data points when preparing to release teachers who might have 
some legitimate claims of § 1983 violations. 
Acts of administrators to willingly listen bolster employees’ arguments that their speech 
is protected, especially when expressed privately to their superiors. The defining point for 
employee protected speech, however, is whether it is spoken outside the scope of duties (Givhan 
v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 1979) or inside the scope of duties (Garcetti, et al., 
v. Ceballos, 2006). School administrators should resist engaging in or listening to employee 
speech they believe is not protected and subject to disciplinary action.  
Finally, potential risk zones for administrators include circumstances where speech is 
spoken outside the scope of duties and is protected, and speech spoken inside the scope of duties 
and is not protected. What statutory and common laws say about speech spoken inside the scope 
of duties that is protected and speech spoken outside the scope of duties that is not protected are 
worthy topics of continued study.  
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1983-U.S. Supreme Court, Harry Connick, Individually and in His Capacity as 
District Attorney, etc., Petitioner, v. Sheila Myers. Sheila Myers, Assistant District Attorney in 
New Orleans, Louisiana challenged the parameters of protected workplace speech when she 
claimed that her employer District Attorney Harry Connick violated her First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights when he terminated her. She claimed he dismissed her, against her 
constitutional right to free expression, when she circulated a workplace questionnaire to other 
attorneys concerning the office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance 
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressure to work 
in political campaigns.  
Connick, on the other hand, claimed that he terminated Myers on the basis of her 
resistance to an assigned transfer of duties. He argued that Myers’ circulation of the 
questionnaire occurred soon after his discussion with her about a forthcoming transfer, and her 
subsequent actions constituted a disruption in the workplace. Connick terminated Myers on the 
grounds of insubordination, and for this reason, he argued that he was justified in his decision to 
terminate her. While Myers prevailed in circuit court and in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the case and upheld Connick’s decision to 
terminate Myers.  
The Connick decision contributes to the public debate on protected speech for public 
employees from yet another vantage. One of the main outcomes of the Connick Court’s ruling 
was its direct address of the constitutionality of employee grievances. The Court acknowledged 
the difference between claims of constitutional violations for the sake of safeguarding public 
employee’s rights as citizens to participate in discussions concerning public affairs and attempts 
to constitutionalize employee grievances. The Court rejected Myers’ claim of a First Amendment 
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violation and rather found that she was attempting “to gather ammunition for another round of 
controversy” (1983) with her supervisors. Connick argued that his decision was grounded in 
“long-standing recognition that the First Amendment’s primary aim is the full protection of 
speech upon issues of public concern, as well as the practical realities involved in the 
administration of a government office” (1983). The Court’s decision asserted that the “First 
Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints 
over internal office affairs” (Connick v. Myers, 1983). 
  The Connick decision refined, yet again, the criteria for discerning constitutionally 
protected speech for public employees by articulating what it was not. In 1983, the policy “that a 
state cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s 
constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression” was well established common law in 
accordance with Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967), Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), 
and Perry v. Sindermann (1972). The Connick Court refined the criteria by further ruling that  
(w)hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, 
but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most 
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not appropriate forum in which to review 
wisdom of personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to 
employee’s behavior. (1983) 
 
Further the Court stated that “(w)hether a public employee’s speech addresses a matter of 
public concern so as to shield employee from discharge for expressing those views must be 
determined by content, form and context of given statement, as revealed by whole record” 
(Connick v. Myers, 1983). In other words, if the speech is self-serving, it may not be eligible for 
First Amendment protections, but each case will be determined on its merits and in relation to 
the evidence presented.  
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Connick, on its merits, bolstered the growing understanding of workplace speech and 
what is constitutionally protected. It also provided foundational key points of law such that years 
later it would buttress the Garcetti decision and further specify terms in the evolution of 
constitutionally protected speech.  
While Pickering required that constitutional protections be accorded public employee 
speech when spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the decision underscored the 
importance of treating public employees like any member of the general public, and as such, did 
not automatically restrict all office-based speech as protected or non-protected.  
Connick refined the Pickering standard by asserting that so long as employees spoke as 
citizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are 
necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively. Connick also confirmed that 
employee speech has no First Amendment protection based on the employer’s reaction to the 
speech.  
Legal question. Was the questionnaire distributed by Sheila Myers subject to 
constitutional protections of free speech?  
Holding. In a five to four decision, Supreme Court Justice White held that the discharge 
of former assistant district attorney Sheila Myers did not violate her constitutionally protected 
right to free speech.  
 In determining a public employee’s rights of free speech, the problem is to arrive “at a 
balance between the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting on matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees (Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 1968). 
 When a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but 
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom 
of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee’s 
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behavior. Here, except for the question in respondent’s questionnaire regarding pressure 
upon employees to work in political campaigns, the questions posed do not fall under the 
rubric of matters of “public concern.”  
 The District Court erred in imposing an unduly onerous burden on the State to justify 
respondent’s discharge by requiring it to “clearly demonstrate” that the speech involved 
“substantially interfered” with the operation of the office. The State’s burden in justifying 
a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s expression.  
  The limited First Amendment interest involved here did not require petitioner to tolerate 
action that he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and 
destroy the close working relationships within the office. The question on the 
questionnaire regarding the level of confidence in supervisors was a statement that 
carried the clear potential for undermining office relations. Also, the fact that respondent 
exercised her rights to speech at the office supports petitioner’s fears that the function of 
his office was endangered. And the fact that the questionnaire emerged immediately after 
a dispute between respondent and petitioner and his deputies, requires that additional 
weight be given to petitioner’s view that respondent threatened his authority to run the 
office. (Thomson Reuters Westlaw, n.d., p. 2-3) 
Justices. Decided by the Burger Court (1981-1986). Justice White wrote the majority for 
the Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor concurred. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. (IIT Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, n.d.).  
Key findings of law.  
 In determining a public employee’s rights of free speech, task of the Supreme Court is to 
arrive at a balance between interests of the employee as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.  
 Ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no fixed tenure or applicable 
statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review even if reasons for dismissal are 
alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable. 
 When a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but 
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual 
circumstances, a federal court is not appropriate forum in which to review wisdom of 
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to employee’s behavior. 
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 Whether a public employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern so as to shield 
employee from discharge for expressing those views must be determined by content, 
form and context of given statement, as revealed by whole record. 
 Discharge of former assistant district attorney did not violate her constitutionally 
protected right of free speech where when district attorney proposed to transfer attorney 
she strongly opposed transfer, expressing her views to several of her supervisors, she 
thereafter prepared a questionnaire which she distributed to other attorneys concerning 
office transfer policy, office morale, need for a grievance committee, level of confidence 
in supervisors and whether employees felt pressure to work in political campaigns, and 
except for the question regarding pressure upon employees to work in political 
campaigns, questions posed in questionnaire did not fall under rubric of matters of 
“public concern.” 
 In civil rights action in which former assistant district attorney contended that her 
employment was terminated because she exercised her constitutionally guaranteed right 
of free speech, district court erred in imposing unduly onerous burden on the state to 
justify attorney’s discharge by requiring it to “clearly demonstrate” that speech involved 
“substantially interfered” with operation of office; state’s burden in justifying a particular 
discharge varies depending upon nature of employee’s expression. (Thomson Reuters 
Westlaw, n.d., p. 1-2) 
Key point of dissent. All speech concerning the way government is run is protected by 
the First Amendment.  
Implications. School administrators can learn from the Connick case that in discerning 
constitutionally protected speech, consideration may be given to the motivation of the speech. 
There is a difference between speech made for the purpose of protecting free speech rights and 
speech intended to undermine supervisors and their administrations. The Constitution does not 
protect grievance speech.  
The Court acknowledged constitutional protections for employee speech when spoken as 
citizens upon matters of public concern. The Court did not, however, extend protections to 
employees who speak upon matters only of personal interest.  
While there was some evidence that Myers’ questionnaire touched on a matter of public 
concern when it asked other employees about their comfort with being asked to participate in the 
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political campaign activities, the overwhelming evidence showed that this question was only a 
minor part of mostly unprotected content asked by Ms. Myers. Personnel issues rarely present 
singularly and in isolation. Being capable of teasing out First Amendment issues for individual 
analysis is a management skill to be developed by school administrators as a part of effective 
personnel management and school leadership practices.  
The Court asserted that the role of personnel management rightfully belongs to the local 
board of education and not the judicial system. 
1994-U.S. Supreme Court, Cynthia Waters, et al., Petitioners, v Cheryl R. Churchill, et 
al. Through the Seventh Circuit of Appeals and to the U.S. Supreme Court for final resolve, 
Waters v. Churchill set forth the additional criterion of a test of reasonableness when 
determining if the speech of public employees is protected by the First Amendment or not. In yet 
another litigation attempting to further discern protected speech from unprotected speech, Waters 
v. Churchill instituted a new legal standard requiring employers to consider the context of facts 
and circumstances when deciphering protected speech. Waters contributes to the ongoing 
discussion and litigation attempting to define constitutionally protected speech by addressing the 
unique circumstances of “reasonable investigation” and of discrepancy between what an 
employee believes he/she said and what the employer understood him/her to say, as evidenced 
through the hearsay of others.  
Legal questions.  
 Did the public hospital, where Cheryl Churchill was employed, violate her First 
Amendment right to free expression when she was terminated for making critical 
statements at work about her supervisor Cynthia Waters? 
 Was Churchill’s speech about Waters the basis for the termination?  
 81 
Holding. The Court was unable to reach a majority opinion; however, a plurality decision 
prevailed when a majority of four justices opined that public employees cannot be dismissed or 
disciplined for their speech unless the employer has a “reasonable basis” for believing that the 
speech was either disruptive or involved a matter of purely private concern, outside the scope of 
First Amendment protection. There had to be some reasonable, factual basis for its actions.  
Justice O’Connor, writing on behalf of the Court, held in favor of Waters on the grounds 
that the 
(1) government, as employer, has far broader powers in First Amendment context than 
does the government of sovereign; (2) government employee’s speech is treated 
differently than private person’s speech with regard to substance and procedural 
requirements; (3) before government employer can discharge employee for unprotected 
speech, it must undertake reasonable investigation to determine what the speech actually 
was and must in good faith believe the facts on which it purports to act; (4) hospital had 
undertaken adequate investigation; (5) nurse’s speech as believed by hospital officials 
was not protected; but (6) genuine issue of fact existed as to the motivation of the hospital 
officials.  
Justices. Decided by the Rehnquist Court (1993-1994). Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg (IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law, n.d.). 
Key findings of law. Among other key points of law, the Court found the following.  
 For government employee’s speech to be protected, it must be on a matter of public 
concern and the employee’s interest in expressing herself on the matter must not be 
outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to the interest of the state as an 
employer in promoting the efficiency of public services it performs through its 
employees.  
 Government as employer has far broader powers in regard to employees’ speech than 
does the government as sovereign. 
 Government employee speech must be treated differently than private speech with regard 
to procedural requirements as well as substance. 
 First Amendment does not preclude government, as employer, from relying on hearsay or 
knowledge of people’s credibility or other factors when determining the factual issue of 
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what an employee’s speech consisted of for purpose of determining whether the 
employee may be disciplined. 
 Government employer which seeks to punish employee for speech must act on the facts 
as it reasonably finds them to be and as it in good faith finds them to be. 
 If employment action against government employee is based on what employee 
supposedly said and a reasonable supervisor would recognize that there was substantial 
likelihood that what was actually said was protected speech, management must tread with 
certain amount of care; it need not be the care with which trials and the rules of evidence 
and procedure are conducted, but it should be a care that a reasonable manager would use 
before making an employment decision.  
 At-will government employee generally has no claim of protection based on the 
Constitution at all. 
 Investigation undertaken by government employer as to what employee had said was 
reasonable, so that employee could be discharged based on employer’s determination of 
what she said, where supervisors interviewed the person to whom the comments were 
made and interviewed person who overheard them three times and made the decision 
based on statements of two trusted employees, the endorsement of those employees’ 
reliability by three managers, and the benefits of a face-to-face meeting with the 
employee who was discharged.  
 As long as public employee was discharged only for the part of her speech that was either 
on a matter not of public concern or was disruptive, it was irrelevant whether the rest of 
the speech was nondisruptive and related to a matter of public concern. (Thomas Reuters 
Westlaw, n.d., p. 1-4) 
Key points of dissent. The key points of dissent among the Justices were many, but the 
common disagreement was again on the best approach to define protected speech. The Justices 
chose to apply the Connick test in the case, but disagreed on how to do it. They debated whether 
the Connick standard should be applied to the speech as the government employer found it to be 
in the course of a reasonable investigation or to the speech as it was interpreted by the employer 
at the time and which formed the basis of the decision to terminate?  
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas asserted that the “plurality’s recognition of a broad new 
First Amendment right to an investigation before dismissal for speech is unprecedented and 
unpredictable in its application and consequences” (Waters v. Churchill, 1994).  
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Implications. Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas suggested in the Waters’ decision that 
implications and consequences relative to employee discipline would result. Their assertion 
holds true for school administrators navigating personnel management practices. Waters set forth 
that before government employers can discharge employees for unprotected speech, they must 
first conduct “reasonable investigation to determine what the speech actually was and must in 
good faith believe the facts on which it purports to act” (1994).  
Like Connick (1983) and Pickering (1968), the Waters’ decision asserts that protected 
speech must be on a matter of public concern and that the employee’s interest in expressing 
himself/herself on the matter must not be “outweighed by any injury the speech could cause to 
‘the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.” The Waters decision, however, further advances the public 
policy by specifically requiring procedural due process for public employees by requiring 
employers to conduct “reasonable investigation” and requiring that protected speech be 
considered in the context of the circumstances and the facts (i.e., test of reasonableness).  
The practical application of this common law for administrators is to conduct thorough 
investigations of potential First Amendment violations and to base their decisions on factual and 
reasonable determinations. This practice can minimize school districts’ exposure to legal and 
financial risks.  
From a professional practice perspective, Waters underscored that at-will government 
employees generally have no First Amendment claims to protected speech. In effect, executive 
school administrators, as policy-level and decision-making employees, serve at the will of local 
boards of education, which are municipal branches of government. As such, school executives 
have different and minimized constitutional protections relative to free expression.  
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2006-U.S. Supreme Court, Gil Garcetti et al., Petitioners, v. Richard Ceballos. The 
case was previously reviewed in detailed, but is listed here again in title to emphasize its place in 
time and the evolution of the public policies of public employment and protected speech. 
After Garcetti, there were three related cases out of the Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of 
Appeals, which is jurisdictional to Illinois, that addressed speech in the public workplace. Those 
cases are detailed below before the U.S. Supreme Court, in 2014, handed down yet another 
seminal decision on the issue in Lane v. Franks. Lane and Franks is also briefed below.  
2007-U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Deborah A. Mayer, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. Monroe County Community School Corporation, et al., Defendants-Appellees. The case 
marked the first jurisdictional lower court decision rendered in the wake of Garcetti, and 
specifically concerned public elementary and secondary education. The fundamental premise of 
Mayer v. Monroe County was academic freedom in the public k-12 classroom.  
Mayer argued that her First Amendment rights had been violated when she answered a 
student’s question about her participation in political demonstrations. According to the record, 
Mayer told her elementary students, during a current events lesson, that when she passed a 
demonstration against the nation’s military operations in Iraq and saw a sign saying “Honk for 
Peace,” she honked in support of the demonstrators. Mayer agreed that the lesson was part of her 
official duties. The Court ruled on the standard established by Garcetti and found in favor of the 
school district. Mayer, however, argued that her circumstances were more consistent with the 
issues outlined in Piggee v. Carl Sandburg College, 464 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir.2006), whereby 
Garcetti was “not directly relevant” to the college instructor’s speech.  
The circumstances in Mayer v. Monroe County, however, are different than Piggee. The 
setting is in a public elementary school rather than an institution of higher education. The age 
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and maturity of the students is different. As such, the standard of law is different. Webster v. New 
Lenox School District No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) had already established that the 
First Amendment is “not a teacher license for uncontrolled expression at variance with 
established curricular content” and that public school teacher Ray Webster did not have a 
constitutional right to introduce his personal views on a curricular subject, but rather was 
required to follow the prescribed curriculum as well as the prescribed subject matter. Webster 
further asserted that “(t)hose authorities charged by state law with curriculum development 
require the obedience of subordinate employees, including the classroom teacher.” Clark v. 
Holmes, 474 F. 2d 928 (7th Cir.) further affirmed that individual teachers have no constitutional 
prerogative to override the judgement of their superiors as to the proper course content. The 
rationale for the Seventh Circuit of Appeals’ decision in Mayer is that a  
school system does not “regulate” teachers’ speech, but rather hires that speech. 
Expression is a teacher’s stock in trade, the commodity she sells to her employer in 
exchange for a salary. A teacher hired to lead a social-studies class can’t use it as a 
platform for a revisionist perspective that Benedict Arnold wasn’t really a traitor, when 
the approved program calls him one; a high-school teacher hired to explicate Moby-Dick 
in a literature class can’t use Cry, The Beloved Country instead, even if Paton’s book 
better suits the instructor’s style and point of view; a math teacher can’t decide that 
calculus is more important than trigonometry and decide to let Hipparchus and Ptolemy 
slide in favor of Newton and Leibniz. (Mayer v. Monroe County Community School 
Corporation, 2007) 
 
There are other legal implications from Mayer as well. First, the standard applied 
by the Mayer Court preempted the Garcetti standard by asserting that the employee did 
not provide the speech for which she was paid to provide to the employer. The 
preeminent issue from Mayer, however, is the fact that the students of public elementary 
and secondary schools are members of a captive audience. Because education is 
compulsory, and unless their parents arrange otherwise, children must attend public 
schools. As such, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that  
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(c)hildren who attend school because they must ought not to be subject to teachers’ 
idiosyncratic perspectives. Majority rule about what subjects and viewpoints will be 
expressed in the classroom has the potential to turn into indoctrination; elected school 
boards are tempted to support majority positions about religious or patriotic subjects 
especially. But if indoctrination is likely, the power should be reposed in someone the 
people can vote out of office, rather than tenured teachers. At least the board’s views can 
be debated openly, and the people may choose to elect persons committed to neutrality on 
contentious issues. (Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corporation, 2007) 
 
Legal question. Did Monroe County Community School Corporation violate public 
school teacher Deborah Mayer’s constitutional rights by retaliating against her when they did not 
renew her teaching position as a result of her expressing anti-war opinions in a public classroom 
of elementary students. 
Holding. The First Amendment did not entitle public school teacher Deborah Mayer to 
advocate her viewpoint on an antiwar demonstration in a current-events classroom. The Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Monroe County Community School Corporation had not 
retaliated against Ms. Mayer when it did not renew her teaching contract after one year of 
service.  
Judge. Chief Judge Easterbrook. 
Key findings of law. 
 First Amendment did not entitle public elementary school teacher to advocate her 
viewpoint on an antiwar demonstration during a classroom session on current events, 
since teacher’s expression of her viewpoint departed from curriculum adopted by school 
system, which permitted teacher to teach about controversy about policy related to the 
war, drawing out arguments from all perspectives, as long as teacher kept her opinions to 
herself. 
 The First Amendment does not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when conducting 
the education of captive audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart 
from the curriculum adopted by the school system. (Thomson Reuters Westlaw, n.d., 
p. 1) 
Key point of dissent. None noted. 
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Implications. While teachers at institutions of higher education enjoy academic freedoms 
relative to curriculum content, public elementary and secondary teachers do not. The courts have 
established common law whereby curriculum and content is decided at the sole discretion of 
local school boards. “(P)ublic-school teachers must hew to the approach prescribed by principals 
(and others higher up in the chain of authority)” (Thomson Reuters Westlaw, n.d., p. 2). 
This democratic approach allows public constituencies to vote board members out of 
office when they disagree with educational content. Further contributing to this argument is that 
public elementary and secondary students are members of a captive audience. Mayer and its 
antecedents dictate that teachers are not privy to constitutional protections when they subject 
their students in the classroom to personal perspectives beyond district-adopted curriculum.  
The point cannot be overlooked that Deborah Mayer, like Fred Doyle in Mt. Healthy City 
School District Board of Education v. Doyle (1977), was a probationary teacher with minimal 
protections. School administrators can rely on state tenure laws to release teachers without 
incident and to minimize their districts’ risk for litigation resulting from probationary teacher 
dismissals.  
2008-U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Michale Callahan, Plaintiff-Appellee 
v. Steven M. Fermon and Diane Carper, Defendants-Appellants. In a situation very similar to 
that of Richard Ceballos, a federal district court found that Illinois State Police Lieutenant 
Michale Callahan had been the subject of retaliation on the basis of protected speech when he 
alleged misconduct by two other ranking state police officers. While the case was pending on 
appeal, the Garcetti Court ruled that speech made pursuant to duty is not subject to 
Constitutional protection. Given the precedent-setting ruling, the Seventh Circuit of U.S. Court 
of Appeals held that the lieutenant spoke pursuant to his official duties and that the First 
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Amendment did not protect a public employee’s statements made as part of his official duties. 
Therefore, the First Amendment did not insulate Officer Callahan’s statements from employer 
discipline. 
2009-U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Richard Chaklos and Andrew Wist, 
Plaintiffs–Appellants v. Kathleen Stevens, Michael Sheppo, Donna Metzger, and Susan 
Vondrak, Defendants–Appellees. While things did not turn out as Richard Chaklos and 
Andrew Wist anticipated when they brought § 1983 action against Illinois State Police officials 
in the Seventh Circuit of U.S. Court of Appeals in 2009, the case was decided consistent with 
Garcetti’s standard of pursuant to duty. This case presents several relevant considerations.  
Illinois State Police employees, Richard Chaklos and Andrew Wist, who trained forensic 
scientists as part of their official duties, experienced an adverse disciplinary action when they 
were suspended for submitting a letter protesting a decision not to solicit bids on training 
services. The employees further proposed to provide the same training services for a lower price 
through their own personally owned company. A summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois was overturned by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals where Circuit Judge Williams held the following.  
1. The employees had standing to file a § 1983 action; 
2. The letter was not submitted as part of the employees’ public duties; 
3. The letter did address a matter of public concern; but  
4. The defendants as Illinois State Police officials were entitled to qualified immunity 
(Richard Chaklos and Andrew Wist, Plaintiffs–Appellants v. Kathleen Stevens, Michael 
Sheppo, Donna Metzger, and Susan Vondrak, Defendants–Appellees, 2009). 
Citing Pearson v. Callahan (2009), the Court held that defendants Stevens, Sheppo, 
Metzger, and Vondrak were entitled to qualified immunity because the law didn’t not make 
clear that their actions were unconstitutional. On its face, the case seemed to have all the 
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proper elements to qualify for protected speech (i.e., standing, speech not submitted pursuant 
to duty, speech that addressed a matter of public concern), but in reality the legal point that 
held was qualified immunity for state-level public officials.  
2014-U.S. Supreme Court, Edward R. Lane, Petitioner v. Steve Franks in his 
individual capacity, and Susan Burrow, in her official capacity as Acting President of Central 
Alabama Community College. While the opinion was long and detailed, as well as reflective on 
the historical evolution of the law and the public policy relative to public employees and the First 
Amendment, the Court did set forth several legal refinements and clarifications of public policy 
in this landmark whistleblower case. 
Edward Lane claimed his employer, Central Alabama Community College (CACC), and 
specifically its president Steve Franks, retaliated against him for giving sworn testimony in 
response to a subpoena requiring him to testify on a work-related matter that would be 
considered pursuant to his official duties. At the time, Lane was the director of the Community 
Intensive Training for Youth (CITY) program, a publicly-operated program through the local 
community college system and designed to support underprivileged students.  
Specifically, Lane was subpoenaed to testify in federal court after he, in his official 
capacity as the CITY director, terminated Suzanne Schmitz, a former Alabama Representative on 
CITY’s payroll, for not reporting for work. Schmitz was ultimately convicted and sentenced to a 
prison term. In the meantime, CITY was experiencing significant revenue shortages. Franks 
claims he acted to remedy the financial difficulties by then terminating Lane. Lane sued CACC 
and Steve Franks in his official capacity as the president of the public community college 
claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that his First Amendment rights had been violated when he was 
fired in retaliation for testifying again Schmitz.  
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Legal questions.  
 Does the First Amendment protect the truthful, sworn testimony of public employees 
when compelled by a subpoena and are not part of the employees’ regular job 
responsibilities? 
 Does qualified immunity protect Franks from Lane’s claim that his employment was 
terminated in an act of retaliation?  
Holding. Writing the majority decision for the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor held 
that: 
 director’s sworn testimony at former program employee’s corruption trials was citizen 
speech eligible for First Amendment protection, not unprotected employee speech; 
 director’s testimony was speech on matter of public concern; 
 government lacked any interest justifying allegedly retaliatory termination of director, 
and thus director’s testimony was protected by First Amendment; but 
 president in his personal capacity was entitled to qualified immunity.  
Justices. Decided by the Roberts Court (2010-2016). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan all voted 
unanimously (IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, n.d.) that Lane’s forced, sworn testimony was 
citizen speech and was eligible for First Amendment protection.  
Key findings of law. Among a number of key findings, the Court found the following.  
 First Amendment protection of a public employee’s speech depends on a careful 
balance between the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 
 Speech by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment, which was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. 
 Speech by citizens on matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First 
Amendment, and this remains true when the speech concerns information related 
to or learned through public employment. 
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 Public employees do not renounce their citizenship when they accept employment (Lane 
v. Franks, 2014). 
 First Amendment interest at stake in speech by a public employee on a matter of 
public concern related to or learned through public employment is as much the 
public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to 
disseminate it. 
 Under the Pickering framework for analyzing whether a public employee’s 
interest or the government’s interest should prevail in cases where the government 
seeks to curtail the speech of its employees on matters of public concern, court 
must balance the interests of the public employee, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon such matters and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 
 First Amendment protects speech on a matter of public concern by a public 
employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, 
outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities. 
 Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his 
ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen that is eligible for First Amendment 
protection, even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns 
information learned during that employment. 
 Public employee’s sworn testimony in judicial proceedings on a matter of public 
concern is a quintessential example of First Amendment speech as a citizen for a 
simple reason: anyone who testifies in court bears an obligation, to the court and 
society at large, to tell the truth.  
 Sworn testimony by director of community college’s program for underprivileged 
youth, at criminal corruption trials of former program employee who was also 
state representative, was “citizen speech” eligible for First Amendment 
protection, not unprotected employee speech, although director learned of the 
subject matter of his testimony in the course of his employment with program; 
providing sworn testimony was not a part of director’s ordinary job 
responsibilities. 
 Mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his 
public employment does not transform that speech into employee speech, rather 
than First Amendment-protected citizen speech, and the critical question is 
whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of the citizen’s 
duties as a public employee, not whether the speech merely concerns those duties. 
 Speech by public employee involves matters of public concern, as required for 
First Amendment protection, when the speech can be fairly considered as relating 
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it is 
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a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of 
value and concern to the public. 
 In determining whether speech by public employee involves matters of public 
concern, as required for First Amendment protection, inquiry turns on the content, 
form, and context of the speech.  
 Public employee’s sworn testimony is not categorically entitled to First 
Amendment protection simply because it is speech as a citizen on a matter of 
public concern; rather, if an employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern, the next question is whether the government had an adequate 
justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the 
public based on the government’s needs as an employer. 
 Community college president reasonably could have believed, when he fired 
director of college’s program for underprivileged youth, that government 
employer could fire employee on account of testimony employee gave, under oath 
and outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities, and thus president in his 
individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity in director’s § 1983 action 
alleging he was fired, in violation of First Amendment, in retaliation for speech 
on matter of public concern during his sworn testimony at criminal corruption 
trials of former program employee who was also state representative; circuit 
precedent did not preclude president from reasonably believing he could fire 
director and no decision of Supreme Court was sufficiently clear to cast doubt on 
circuit precedent. 
 Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but 
mistaken judgments about open legal questions. 
 Under “qualified immunity doctrine,” courts may not award damages against a 
government official in his personal capacity unless the official violated a statutory or 
constitutional right, and the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged 
conduct. (Thomas Reuters Westlaw, n.d., pp. 1-4) 
Key points of dissent. As a unanimous decision, there were not identified points of 
dissent. The Justices were, however, very diverse in their rationales for their vote.  
Implications. When the Court ruled that public employee’s sworn testimony was “not 
categorically entitled to First Amendment protection simply because it is speech as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern” (Lane v. Franks, 2014), the Justices moved the standard application of 
law from being very descript, was the speech made during the course of official duties, to be 
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wide open for interpretation. The implication of this ruling on school districts and school leaders 
is increased risk of making personnel decisions that have costly legal ramifications. While the 
intent may be justified, the end result is a cost burden on local school districts’ financial 
resources. Lane v. Franks ultimately moved the marker on the degree of subjectivity necessary to 
gauge whether an employee is speaking “as a citizen on a matter of public concern,” and then 
further contemplating whether “the government had an adequate justification for treating 
employees differently from any other member of the public based on the government’s needs as 
an employer” are challenging metrics to apply in the moment of navigating sensitive personnel 
issues. Where Garcetti v. Ceballos set forth a definitive standard, pursuant to duty, Lane v. 
Franks redefined the criteria for determining protected speech from unprotected speech. The 
results are the loosening of public policies around public employee speech and vague legal 
standards which practicing school administrators are left to navigate.  
There is some protection for school districts and administrators. Qualified immunity 
gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about 
open legal questions. So while the legal standards are vague, “qualified immunity doctrine” 
restricts courts from awarding damages against a government official in his personal capacity 
unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and the right was clearly 
established at the time of the challenged conduct. 
Lane v. Franks asserted that this remains true when speech concerns information related 
to or learned through public employment. Garcetti weathered a major challenge in 2014 when 
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014) that the First Amendment 
does protect a public employee who provides truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, 
outside the course of his ordinary job responsibilities. The case of Lane v. Franks offered yet 
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another refinement to the Court’s earlier holdings, based on Pickering’s separation of speech into 
content, form, and context and Garcetti’s criterion of pursuant to duty. The Court in Lane v. 
Franks unanimously held that when an employee is motivated to testify by subpoena, he is acting 
as a private citizen compelled by the obligation to submit truthful sworn testimony, and his 
speech is therefore protected by the First Amendment. The Court further opined as to whether 
public employees may be fired or suffer other adverse employment consequences for providing 
truthful, subpoenaed testimony outside the course of their ordinary job responsibilities. 
Social media has catapulted First Amendment rights to the forefront of issues that 
administrators handle with staff and students on a routine basis. Well versed administrators can 
navigate First Amendment issues much more efficiently.  
2016-U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, Lincoln Brown, Plaintiff, v. Chicago 
Board of Education; Barbara Byrd-Bennett, in her official capacity as Chief Executive Officer 
of Chicago Public Schools; and Gregory Mason, in his individual and official capacities, 
Defendants. This case was decided in the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, and 
while not a U.S. Supreme Court ruling, it does still have jurisdictional implications for Illinois 
school districts and administrators.  
Legal questions. Was public school teacher’s speech protected “when he used the word 
“nigger,” in violation of school board policies, during classroom discussion of why such words 
were hurtful and must not be used.” Was the teacher afforded due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment (2016) relative to the disciplinary action of an unpaid suspension taken against him?  
Holding. A middle-school “teacher was not speaking as a citizen when he used the 
word,” and the “Board’s policies were not so vague as to violate the Due Process Clause” (2016). 
The teacher, who received notice of, and was given, a disciplinary hearing before the school 
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board prior to his five-day suspension without pay for leading a sixth grade classroom discussion 
of the word “nigger” received adequate procedural due process required under the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the notice specifically explained the charges against him, allowed him to select his 
own representation at the hearing, and the teacher had the opportunity to appeal the school 
board's decision. 
Implications. Brown v. Chicago Board of Education clearly applies Garcetti’s pursuant 
to duty standard in deciding the case and rebuffs Brown’s argument that the policy fails to 
“distinguish between using the word in an educational manner from its use as a slur directed 
toward a student or colleague.” The Court clearly asserted that “(r)egardless of what he believes 
the Policy should be, the Policy in force forbids using such language “in front of students” 
(2016). Just like in the case of Williams v. Trotwood Madison City Schools, 2016 where the 
Madison City (Ohio) Schools’ teacher felt justified under the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
to complain about inadequate support for special education students. Even though her complaints 
were based on what she felt the policy and practice should be, she found that her speech was, 
pursuant to duty, and was therefore not protected by the First Amendment.  
2014-U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, David K. Demers v. Erica Austin; Erich 
Lear; Warwick M. Bayly; Frances McSweeney. While not a U.S. Supreme Court case, the 
unique issues presented very recently by Demers v. Austin were heard by the Ninth Circuit of 
Appeals. The judges’ decisions set forth a couple of substantive points that have potential for 
resurfacing again in the future and are henceforth included in this study.  
Circuit Judge W. Fletcher, speaking on behalf of the court, found that “as a matter of first 
impression, Pickering test, not Garcetti test, applies to teaching and writing on academic matters 
by state-employed teachers.” Plaintiff Demers was a professor of higher education, so the 
 96 
application to k-12 public schools is not entirely clear, but the reference to “state-employed 
teachers” and “teaching and writing on academic matters” gave legal reference to a uniquely 
identifiable category of employees for purposes of First Amendment protections. Justice Souter, 
in the Garcetti decision, had previously predicted important ramifications for academic freedom, 
but at the time, the Supreme Court deliberately excluded from their considerations other 
constitutional protections including expression related to academic scholarship or classroom 
instruction.  
Ultimately the court ruled in favor of the university administrators and against Professor 
Demers by asserting that he had failed to show that his actions resulted in retaliation by the 
administrators. The Court did acknowledge that Demers was addressing a matter of public 
concern; however, in this instance, the Court ultimately ruled that the university administrators 
were entitled to qualified immunity. This finding is consistent with the Ninth Circuit of Appeals’ 
earlier ruling in Ceballos v. Garcetti (2004) when it ruled in 2014 that the university 
administrators were eligible for sovereign immunity because the Eleventh Amendment applies to 
state employees. Garcetti and his staff were excluded from Eleventh Amendment protections 
because the duties in question were done in their official capacities of officials of the county and 
not the state. The implication is that if municipal employees are considered an ineligible 
“subdivision” of the state, then local school district employees, being similarly situated, are also 
not likely eligible for Eleventh Amendment protections. Employees like Demers who were 
employees of a state university system would be eligible for Eleventh Amendment protections – 
an important distinction between elementary and secondary education and higher education.  
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Demers v. Austin effectively prepares the way for a subsequent U.S. Supreme Court case; 
one which contemplates additional constitutional interests such as when expression is related to 
academic scholarship or classroom instruction. 
Conclusion 
This study is ultimately about constitutional rights to free speech, public employment, 
and due process, as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The setting is public 
education, and the target audience is executive school administrators, including superintendents, 
human resource administrators, policy-level administrators, principals, and all other managing 
personnel responsible for the development, supervision, evaluation, and discipline of other 
district staff. The purpose is to provide technical guidance to school administrators relative to the 
current laws, regulations, and legal considerations of First Amendment protected speech in the 
public school setting pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Garcetti (2006).  
Garcetti exemplifies how the courts have established layers of criteria, beyond the 
Constitution, effectively establishing points of common law which can be used to predict the 
outcomes of specific, personnel free-speech situations even when the Constitution in its entirety 
does not speak to specific circumstances.  
This is a study intended to interpret policy and guide practice. School leadership requires 
a working understanding of both policy and practice and a recognition of the interdependence. 
For example, the Pickering Court set forth the policy of protected speech when public employees 
speak as private citizens on matters of public concern; the Connick Court set forth the policy of 
protected speech for public employees asserting their constitutional rights to free speech but not 
when they are speaking for personal interest; the Garcetti Court added the layer of pursuant to 
duty, and the Lane Court added the concept of protected speech in relation to information learned 
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during the course of work. As explained herein, there are many other layers of policy as well, 
and the chronology of common law and legal standards continues to evolve.  
The courts have set forth the legal points underpinning current policy on which 
administrative decisions can be crafted. Applying the various criteria as established by the courts 
is essential to effective personnel management and school leadership. In due course, the courts 
have established broad policies relative to personnel management practices for public 
administrators to follow, but few situations share the exact circumstances, so application of 
common laws can be challenging for these public officials and their boards. This policy study is 
intended to generate technical guidance specifically for school practitioners to implement best-
practice personnel policies in their institutions based upon the findings from the courts. This 
dissertation identifies the key common law findings which are substantive and significant to the 
issue of free speech rights, pursuant to the duties of public school employees, and converts the 
common findings into technical guidance for school administrators to navigate the decision-
making processes inherent to effective personnel management.  
Gaps in the Literature 
Based upon an in-depth review of the literature, there is an obvious absence of 
topic-specific and reliable analyses on how the U.S. Supreme Court’s Garcetti decision 
has affected public k-12 school districts. There is a surfeit of literature on the impact of 
Garcetti in the public workplace, but there is little peer-reviewed, professional writing 
specifically dedicated to the decision’s impact on public k-12 school districts, even 
though the body of litigation in this area is growing. There is even lesser available 
literature dedicated to understanding the effects of Garcetti specifically on personnel 
management practices in public school districts.  
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Along this same logic, and given the propensity of the Lane (2014) decision to 
have a substantive impact on matters of public employment and free speech and to have a 
softening, if not reversing, effect on the stringency test of the current legal precedent of 
Garcetti’s pursuant to duty, there is a need for future research and analysis of the effects 
of Lane (2014) on public policy and administrative practice.  
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Chapter IV 
Legal Analysis and Discussion of Results 
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Garcetti v. Ceballos that speech uttered 
pursuant to the official duties of public employees is not constitutionally protected. Specifically, 
the Court said that “(w)hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, 
the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline” (2006). 
This common law has substantive implications for public school administrators whose 
duties, and whose staffs’ duties, include job-required speech. Discerning between job-required 
speech and private citizen speech is the point of debate. The official resolve has been 
occasionally decided in federal court as explained herein; however, before the differences were 
litigated in court, they first presented as personnel issues for an administrator to manage. 
Garcetti exemplifies the types of routine personnel issues and decisions that school 
administrators face as public, government employers. The point is that administrators are 
unknowing to the propensity for risk at the time when speech-related personnel issues emerge. 
This study was designed to inform the issue, and this chapter specifically outlines the impact of 
Garcetti on the major human resources functions in public schools. 
The Garcetti decision “introduced a new refinement to analysis of government employee 
speech rights” (Roosevelt, 2012, p. 631) by asserting that “government employers, like private 
employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without 
it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services” (Garcetti, et al., v. 
Ceballos, 2006). The continuum of court cases, from New York Times Company v. Sullivan 
(1964) to Garcetti (2006), chronicled the Supreme Court’s efforts to give independent review to 
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each case and the yielding outcomes of unique legal qualifiers like matters of public concern and 
pursuant to duty.  
The Garcetti decision triggered a seemingly radical departure from the policies set forth 
almost four decades earlier by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of 
Education of Township High School District 205, Will County Illinois (1968) which, by all 
accounts, was a landmark case relative to public employees’ rights to free speech. Time has 
revealed that a revolution of change occurred in the short period of time between the two cases, 
Pickering in 1968 and Garcetti in 2006, suggesting a provocative future ahead as the impact of 
the now decade-old Garcetti decision sifts through public organizations, including public 
schools, across the United States.  
Analysis of Garcetti v. Ceballos 
Thirty-eight years after the Pickering ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth to answer, 
in Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006), whether public employee Richard Ceballos’ speech was protected 
when he wrote and reported, pursuant to his employment duties, in a disposition memorandum 
that an affidavit used by police to obtain a critical search warrant in a specified case was 
inaccurate and made serious misrepresentation to the case supervisors.  
From this case, the legal concept of pursuant to duty debuted as a recognized, legal 
descriptor for ascertaining protected speech from unprotected speech. The Court ruled in 
Garcetti that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 
not insulate their communications from employer discipline” (2006). From this ruling came legal 
and operational implications for personnel management functions including job descriptions, 
personnel policies, personnel files, collective bargaining agreements and other employment 
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contracts, due process procedures, organizational risk management and financial budgeting, 
performance evaluation, teacher tenure and probationary terms, and whistle blowing protections.  
The Garcetti Court ruled in accordance with the legal precedents of Pickering and 
Connick, but added a new “threshold inquiry” that shifted the public policy on employee speech 
relative to matters of public concern. Rather the added litmus test of pursuant to duty first asked 
if the speech was made by a public employee pursuant to his official duties. The Garcetti ruling 
effectually usurped the standard balancing inquiry initiated by Pickering and considered 
foremost whether the speech was made during the normal course of official duties. The Court 
held that if the answer was yes, then the First Amendment did not apply, and the speech was not 
protected. This logic is illustrated in Figure 2 below. For school administrators attempting to 
navigate the dense web of legal provisions relative to protected speech and public employment, 
the logic below illustrates the simplicity with which the pursuant to duty standard can be applied. 
The alternative course for determining protected speech reveals many more complexities that 
need not be considered if the primary standard of pursuant to duty is not met first. The Garcetti 
standard of pursuant to duty answers the question of whether speech is protected by determining 
what it is not.  
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Figure 2. Logic for protected speech determination. 
The second part of the Garcetti threshold test was to consider whether the government 
employer had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other 
member of the general public. Justice Kennedy addressed this matter in the majority opinion by 
stating, 
(t)his consideration reflects the importance of the relationship between the speaker’s 
expressions and employment. A government entity has broader discretion to restrict 
speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be 
directed at speech that has some potential to effect the entity’s operations. To be sure, 
conducting these inquiries sometimes has proved difficult. This is the necessary product 
of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by teachers and 
other public employees may be thought by their superiors . . . to furnish grounds for 
dismissal. On the other hand, a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless still 
a citizen. The First Amendment limits a public employer’s ability to leverage the 
employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees 
enjoy in their capabilities as private citizens. (Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 2006)  
 
 Justice Kennedy, in writing the majority decision in Garcetti, launched the Court’s 
opinion straight from Connick v. Myers (1983) by asserting that “a State cannot condition public 
employment on a basis that infringes the employee’s constitutionally protected interest in 
freedom of expression” (2006). Given this condition, Justice Kennedy presented the case’s 
discrete legal question-does the First Amendment protect a government employee from 
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discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official duties. In other words, 
should a public employee’s purely job-related speech, expressed strictly pursuant to the duties of 
employment, be protected by the First Amendment simply because it touches on a matter of 
public concern, or must the speech also be engaged in “as a citizen?” (Garcetti, et al., v. 
Ceballos, 2006).  
This point exemplifies the Court’s evolution in refining the protections of public 
employee speech. Pursuant to duty is simply another layer of public policy relative to 
determining free and protected speech. Subsequent court cases will undoubtedly continue to 
refine the legal concepts and advance the public policy of protected speech in the municipal 
workplace.  
 Garcetti successfully argued that “if the Ninth Circuit were upheld, public employees 
would in effect get constitutional protection for performing their duties to the dissatisfaction of 
the employer” (2006). Ceballos argued unsuccessfully “that the result the government lawyers 
were seeking would cause an unacceptable chilling of the speech of potential whistle-blowers” 
(2006). These winning and losing points serve to define current policy.  
The ruling was consistent with previous decisions whereby a standard of logic was 
applied. In this case, the standard of logic was whether the First Amendment protects a 
government employee from discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee’s official 
duties. While not a case uniquely specific to public education, Garcetti v. Ceballos consolidated 
many legal issues into one court decision. Justice Kennedy incorporated precedential decisions 
of the High Court in writing the 5-4 majority opinion in Garcetti. In writing the majority opinion, 
Justice Kennedy provided a useful summary of prior court rulings when he provided a rationale 
for why 
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(w)hen a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept 
certain limitations on his or her freedom. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U. S. 
661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) ([T]he government as employer indeed has far 
broader powers than does the government as sovereign.). Government employers, 
like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ 
words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient 
provision of public services. Cf. Connick, supra, at 143 (government offices could 
not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter). Public 
employees, moreover, often occupy trusted positions in society. When they speak 
out, they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the 
proper performance of governmental functions. At the same time, the Court has 
recognized that a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a citizen. 
The First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the 
employment relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties 
employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens. See Perry v. Sindermann, 
408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972). So long as employees are speaking as citizens about 
matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are 
necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively. See, e.g., 
Connick, supra, at 147 (Our responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not 
deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working for the government.). 
(Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 2006)  
 
As exemplified by the contributing tenets of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, the 
judicial elements are numerous and complex. While Tinker introduced free speech claims for 
students, Pickering specifically addressed public school employees’ free speech issues. In doing 
so, Pickering set forth two fundamental inquiries to guide interpretation of the First Amendment 
protections accorded to public employee’s speech. The first inquiry is to determine whether the 
employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. If not, the employee has no First 
Amendment cause of action based on the government employer's reaction to the speech, but if 
the answer is yes, a First Amendment claim is plausible. The second inquiry questions whether 
the government employer had adequate justification for treating the employee differently from 
any other member of the public.  
On its surface, the Garcetti decision appeared to reverse course away from Pickering; 
however, the blueprint for deciding Garcetti had been laid by the Pickering Court 38 years 
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prior; in 1968 when the Pickering Court set forth to determine when public employee speech 
was protected by the First Amendment and when it wasn’t. The question the Pickering Court 
attempted to answer was how to arrive at “a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees” 
(1968). From the case emerged what is commonly referred to as the Pickering Balance Test 
which set forth two fundamental question strands. The Garcetti decision, in essence however, 
said that there is no need to even be concerned with applying the balancing test until there is an 
answer to the absolute first question which was to determine whether the employee was 
expressing speech pursuant to official duties or not. Figuratively, Garcetti expedited the process 
for determining protected speech for public employees. For this reason, the Garcetti case is 
most recognized for the policy concept of pursuant to duty when in reality pursuant to duty had 
been indirectly introduced in Pickering’s Balance Test of the interests of the public employee, 
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern” (1968). In retrospect, Garcetti was 
simply decided on the first strand of the Pickering inquiry by answering if the employee spoke 
as a private citizen on a matter of public concern.  
To further illustrate, Richard Ceballos, unlike Marvin Pickering, spoke as a public 
employee when he crafted his memo to his superiors criticizing the sheriff’s department’s 
practices in securing a search warrant; actions clearly within the scope of his duties. Marvin 
Pickering, on the other hand, wrote a letter to the editor of the local newspaper in which he 
claimed to submit his comments as a citizen, and he criticized the board of education for its 
handling of school finances.  
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The United States District Court for the Central District of California, while a court of 
lower jurisdiction, initially gave summary judgment for Garcetti on the basis of protection under 
the Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity. The analysis was later found to be flawed by 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Continuing the course set forth by the Ninth Circuit, 
the U. S. Supreme Court in Garcetti did not consider qualified immunity or protection under the 
Eleventh Amendment relative to free speech for public employees as a legal matter. The Ninth 
Circuit of Appeals had previously addressed and resolved the issue. Based upon this analysis of 
the issues, the Eleventh Amendment protections, as such, appear to have minimal influence on 
the legal contemplation of free speech rights for public education employees.  
This observation, in addition to the absence of other defense references to qualified 
immunities and Eleventh Amendment protections in subsequent, materially similar cases 
suggests that the Eleventh Amendment is not a viable legal protection. It has now been 
addressed, determined not to be a significant consideration by the courts, and is therefore 
minimized as a relative element in the remainder of the dissertation.  
Relevancy of Research 
Specifically, this study focuses on the policies of protected speech for public school 
employees pursuant to duty and theorizes about how case law can inform best administrative 
practices relative to free speech and school-employee legal relationships. Discerning the 
constitutional right to free speech of public employees, including public education employees, in 
specific situations and under varied circumstances, has become a practical matter of law. 
Nahmod asserted his legal opinion on this very topic in an article written for the University of 
Richmond Law Review, titled, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A 
Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos. He says that because public elementary and secondary teachers 
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are public employees paid to speak, there is plausibly little that they say in the classroom that is 
protected by the First Amendment (Nahmod, 2008, p. 8). Nahmod’s acknowledgement precisely 
characterizes the concept of job-required speech, and it projects even greater obligations onto 
public school administrators whose essential duties include communicating with students, staff, 
and community members, but also includes the supervision and evaluation of both licensed 
professional staff and classified staff.  
Both Nahmod and Dale published reviews in 2008 concurring that the Garcetti Court 
solidified the authority of managements’ rights in controlling public employee speech. Nahmod 
contended that pursuant to duty, while he disagrees with the policy, “is clearly intended to 
protect managerial authority and discretion by reducing the specter of judicial intervention in 
managerial decisions” (2008, p. 580). Dale advanced the argument by theorizing that Garcetti 
actually benefits the public employee in the long run. Dale says that while Garcetti emphasizes 
managements’ rights, she counterpoints that the decision actually benefits public employees. 
Dale contents that  
(i)n areas where a public employer has managerial control over the message expressed, 
public employees may only speak as employees, and therefore lack the protection of the 
First Amendment. But in areas where managements’ rights are constrained by the 
constitution, laws, contracts, or public policy, a public employee may speak as a citizen, 
and under Garcetti, those statements are protected by the First Amendment. (2008)  
 
Dale and Nahmod are among many reviewers who have published legal interpretations 
on Garcetti; however, they are among few who specifically reference Garcetti’s application to 
elementary and secondary public education settings. In any regard, these two legal analysts 
exemplify the ongoing need for adjudication of conflicting issues between employees and/or 
employers, inside and outside the workplace, about speech. The cases studied herein have 
cumulatively advanced an entwined cohort of rules including statutes, regulations, and case laws 
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which have collectively fomented the current public policy. This analysis attempts to make sense 
of the current policy of pursuant to duty and its effect on public school districts.  
Simply interpreted, the First Amendment offers, among other protections, a fundamental 
guarantee of free speech to American citizens. But there are human subjectivities necessary to 
conceptualize free speech into daily life and work. Consequently, there are disagreements. When 
there are discrepancies of thought, the courts, by default, have become the final arbiters of 
constitutional intent. The judicial system’s archive of precedence-setting court decisions serves 
as scaffolding to the multitude of issues that can convolute constitutional, statutory, or judicial 
intent. The court decisions have also established a pattern of legal points on which 
recommendations for best practices for school administrators can be coordinated and developed 
relative to the free speech rights of staff.  
This chapter contains a legal analysis of the effect of Garcetti v. Ceballos on public k-12 
schools in the areas of educational policy, finance, budgeting, and human resource and personnel 
management. From this in-depth analysis of court cases, key majority and dissent points were 
collected, compared, and converted to practical recommendations for school administrators who 
are responsible for managing the human resources, legal operations, and fiscal affairs of their 
organizations. 
The evidence on which the study’s final recommendations are based is the direct 
relationship between relative court decisions, key points of law, and distinct personnel functions 
as delineated previously in this dissertation. Chapter II outlined the study methodology to include 
conducting an information analysis for the purpose of identifying trending issues and systematic 
patterns. Consistent with the study plan, cases were identified and culled for legal patterns in 
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opinions and dissents, information was coded, and key points of law were categorized by 
function.  
The collection of data, as predicted, formed a usable pattern of information that allowed 
for the development of responsive recommendations for administrator practices in personnel 
management. For example, Garcetti specifically states that  
(p)ublic employers may not restrict employees' free speech rights by creating excessively 
broad job descriptions; the listing of a given task in an employee's written job description 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the 
scope of the employee's professional duties, for First Amendment purposes. (2006)  
 
The guidance to extract from this statement is that job descriptions must be specific to actual 
employee duties in order to be defensible in any type of a due process hearing (e.g., grievance, 
board, or court). This is useful information to practicing school administrators attempting to 
navigate the legal aspects of human resources; many of whom have been extensively trained in 
educational leadership, but lack field-specific training in personnel management practices.  
This study assumed that a direct line of logic could be drawn by back-planning from each 
respective human resources function to specific key points of law and ultimately the decisions of 
specific federal cases. The point of law, in this example (i.e., creating excessively broad job 
descriptions), was easily transferred to the essential human resources functions of writing and 
maintaining job descriptions as legal documents. This same type of reverse-planning, matching 
strategy was generalized to the remaining case data. As such, it was possible to use the data to 
form general conclusions and develop responsive recommendations.  
This research attempts to increase professional understanding of human resource 
practices and their emerging role in public k-12 school administration by deconstructing, as 
described above, the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) to learn the 
effect that the decision has had on the following personnel management practices.  
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 Risk management and budgeting for risk. 
 Collective bargaining agreements and administrator contracts. 
 Employee supervision, discipline, termination, and due process. 
 Job descriptions and essential job duties. 
 Performance evaluation and professional development. 
 Personnel policies. 
 Personnel records. 
 Teacher tenure and labor law. 
 Whistleblower protections. 
Superintendents and other school administrators need to know the applications of 
Garcetti for effective personnel management. In their official capacities, they will encounter 
situations such as employees submitting editorial comments to community media sources about 
local tax burdens on citizens caused by the financial support of public school districts. 
Superintendents, as the executive officers of their respective school districts, will experience 
employees who circumvent board policy such as the chain of command by going directly to 
school board members about issues of operational practices attributed to their supervisors. They 
will likely face situations where teachers supplement the district’s, board sanctioned curriculum 
with personal interest topics. Some school executives will have to address coaches who require 
their players to participate in pre-game prayer sessions. Many school executives will deal with 
staff members posting work-related information on their private social media sites. While it is 
impossible to capture the universe of potential scenarios, it is possible to help school 
administrators recognize personnel issues that are rooted in the First Amendment and help them 
know when to apply the logic set forth by the Garcetti decision and the doctrine of pursuant to 
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duty. Being able to recognize personnel issues that are applicable to Garcetti and other important 
Supreme Court decisions is an important skill for effective school leadership.  
The relevance of this legal analysis to school executives is that it projects best practices 
in personnel management practices. The study, a collective review of federal, especially U.S. 
Supreme Court, cases relative to the free speech rights of public school employees, reveals a 
systematic legal pattern among court rulings before and after the significant, landmark, and 
bookend cases of Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) and Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006). The 
information gathered from case law can guide public school administrators to make informed 
decisions on matters of public action. Poorly crafted personnel decisions, based on insufficient 
information, can cost school districts, and ultimately taxpayers, unnecessary legal and 
operational expenses. Efficient operations for public schools require access to factual 
information for decision-making purposes.  
Results 
This next section presents the results of the data as collected for this dissertation. 
Remembering that the study design was structured to cast broadly for concepts, it was done in an 
effort to gather data about the unique legal elements that have come to define the current policy 
on First Amendment rights to free speech and public employment. By conducting an in-depth 
review of relevant U.S. Supreme Court and federal appellate cases that have ruled on the issues 
of public employment and free speech, and by deconstructing their respective key points of law, 
a definite pattern of rules has been set forth as legal precedents. These data are presented below. 
Recurring Legal Precepts 
In reviewing the relevant cases, the following concepts were identified as recurring key 
legal points: 
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 Academic freedom 
 Balance of interests 
 Clearly established rules 
 Citizen speech 
 Content, form, and context 
 Critical speech (actual malice) 
 Discipline 
 Due process 
 Efficiency of public service 
 Efficiently and effectively 
 Employee contracts 
 Employee speech 
 Employee speech as citizen 
 Evaluation 
 Job descriptions 
 Justification for treating employee differently 
 Matter of public concern 
 Most likely to have informed and definite opinions 
 Obscenity is not protected speech 
 Protected speech 
 Public official 
 Pursuant to duty 
 Qualified immunity 
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 Reached same decision even in absence of protected speech 
 Related to or earned through public employment 
 § 1983 action 
o First Amendment 
o Eleventh Amendment 
o Fourteenth Amendment 
 Sworn testimony; forced truthful testimony 
 Tenure as a property right 
 Truthful speech/false speech (actual malice) 
 Unfettered interchange of ideas; debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open 
 Whistleblower protections 
These key concepts and terms were culled from the cases as recurring trends and then 
coded to identify commonalities and interrelatedness of the cases and the legal precepts. Once 
the cases were coded respectively, the software search feature was used to identify which cases 
were relevant to each term. For example, the concept of matters of public concern was 
referenced in several different cases, albeit sometimes articulated differently as shown below, but 
synchronous in meaning across cases. Table 1 below exemplifies the strand of information that 
was located by simply searching for the word “matter.”  
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Table 1 
Sample Data Search Queue 
Year Case Search yield 
1964 The New York Times Company v. Sullivan Matters of the highest public interest 
and concern 
1967 Keyishian v. The Board of Regents of the 
University of the state of New York 
Matters of public concern 
1968 Pickering v. Board of Education of Township 
High School District 205, Will County, Illinois 
Matters of public interest 
1968 Pickering v. Board of Education of Township 
High School District 205, Will County, Illinois 
Matters of legitimate public concern 
1983 Connick v. Myers Matters of public concern 
1994 Waters v. Churchill Matters of public concern 
1994 Waters v. Churchill On a matter not of public concern 
2006 Garcetti v. Ceballos Matters of public concern 
2014 Lane v. Franks Matters of public concern 
2016 Brown v. Chicago Board of Educ.  Matters of public concern 
 
The first exercises of the study, such as the one shown above, helped establish the 
connections between cases. All of the legal precepts as listed above, were searched in full or 
partial phrase for presence in the collection of key legal points from each court case. The key 
legal points, once coordinated, were analyzed to determine case interconnectedness. The data 
was used throughout the dissertation to crosswalk cases and compare and contrast legal points.  
The second part of the data analysis included back-planning from each respective human 
resource function to applicable key points of law and their emanating cases to establish a direct 
line of logic, grounded in common law and public policy, to inform the personnel practices of 
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school administrators. Writing job descriptions is one example of how data was collected from 
relative court cases and deconstructed to inform practice for school administrators. In this regard, 
it was possible to use the collected data to form general conclusions and develop useful 
recommendations about writing and using job descriptions as a key personnel function. There are 
other relevancies explained in the sections on personnel management functions below.  
Personnel Management Functions: How Rulings Have Come to Bear on Public Education 
Employees and School Districts  
Each personnel management function strand is discussed in detail below; however, the 
functions are neither exhaustively listed nor mutually exclusive. As such, the information on how 
U.S Supreme Court cases and other federal appellate court decisions have affected the nine 
function strands is presented in a blended, practical approach. While each strand is individually 
addressed, the study findings reveal dense interconnectedness among the functions.  
Risk management and budgeting for risk. While listed as an individual function strand, 
risk management, including planning and budgeting for risk, is the underpinning on which the 
remaining functions are based. As such, none of its features could be separated from the other 
functions. From this universal perspective, the topic of risk management and budgeting for risk 
are discussed. 
Projecting costs relative to personnel matters and budgeting accordingly is good fiscal 
practice, but predicting risk with accuracy is impossible. Being proactive and being informed are 
the best offense and defense respectively in risk management. Many routine human resources 
functions incur expenses, including employee turnover and replacement costs, unemployment 
claims, worker’s injury compensation payments, and legal allegations of harassment and 
discrimination, and they carry varying degrees of risk potential for school districts. 
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In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western N.Y., U.S., Supreme Court Justice Souter 
in her dissent of the Garcetti decision, acknowledged that it had been clearly established that 
“open speech by a private citizen on a matter of public importance lies at the heart of expression 
subject to protection by the First Amendment” (2006). But what does that mean in practical 
terms? Claims, founded and unfounded, of free speech and due process violations can actuate 
costly legal proceedings for school districts. As demonstrated in Ely v. Dearborn Heights School 
District No. 7 (2016), the cost of litigation can be extreme.  
Employee discipline and dismissal as extreme personnel management functions that, 
when done poorly, can result in lost trust, diminished organizational culture, and costly grievance 
and legal proceedings as exemplified by Ely v. Dearborn Heights School District No. 7. 
Organizations, including public schools, attempting to lower relative risk thresholds espouse 
administrative practices that are in accordance with current laws. Personnel practices such as 
disciplining tenured staff members for speaking out on matters of public concern such as district 
incompliance with smoke detectors or the financing of athletic facilities in the community, for 
example, are generally fruitless and can result in wasted human resources and unnecessary legal 
expenditures. Compliance with laws regarding public safety regulations, just like in Ely, presents 
protected speech on a matter of public concern.  
The Courts have advised that clearly established policies are the standard on which legal 
decisions are based. School administrators are accordingly advised to establish personnel 
management practices that ensure clearly written expectations are systematically provided to 
staff. Administrators can utilize board and administrative policies, employee handbooks, relative 
professional development, job descriptions and essential duties, and collective bargaining 
agreements to accomplish this personnel practice. 
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Immunity provisions. Terms such as qualified immunity/sovereign immunity and tort 
immunity imply that public officials are protected from liability from the effects of their 
decisions as policy-makers. As the name implies, immunity is protective; however, it is not an 
absolute guarantee against being sued. It is important for school administrators, whose essential 
duties include job-required speech, to know that they, as public officials, are vulnerable to public 
scrutiny in this regard. Immunity provisions are available to help mitigate risk for them in their 
professional capacities.  
Government officials are entitled to assert immunity as a protection to being sued, and 
one of the protections available to them is qualified immunity. As has been explained at length in 
this dissertation, qualified immunity doctrine has been contemplated by multiple courts as a way 
of mitigating risk for public officials. The doctrine imposes that the courts may not award 
damages against a government official in his personal capacity unless the official violated a 
statutory or constitutional right, and the right was clearly established at the time of the 
challenged conduct (Casey v. West Las Vegas Independent School Dist., 2007; Ceballos v. 
Garcetti, 2004; Lane v. Franks, 2014). While the act protects public officials from being 
assessed damages for violating statutory or constitutional law, qualified immunity does not 
protect those who act with malice or disregard of the clearly established rules.  
Sovereign immunity is authorized by the Eleventh Amendment, and it simply establishes 
that states possess sovereign immunity from being sued in federal court without their consent. 
Sovereign immunity provides little protection to school administrators as they do not typically 
act in the capacities of state officials. As local officials, they are not eligible for sovereign 
immunity.  
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In Illinois, there are protections built into state law such as the Local Governmental and 
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act which says  
(a) (t)he purpose of this Act is to protect local public entities and public employees from 
liability arising from the operation of government. It grants only immunities and 
defenses. (b) Any defense or immunity, common law or statutory, available to any private 
person shall likewise be available to local public entities and public employees (The 
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 1965).  
The Act was passed to mitigate personal and professional risk by providing immunity protections 
for public officials who serve in positions involving the determination of policy or the exercise 
of discretion. Specifically, the Act asserted that government officials are not liable for injuries 
resulting from their acts or omissions in determining policy. The Tort Immunity Act offers 
personal and professional defense in some circumstances, but it does not offer protection to 
school districts named in law suits. 
Finally, administrators face the risk of being sued civilly for taking actions in the scope of 
their employment; they are vulnerable in this regard. As such, administrators need to know that 
their actions are not always protected by immunity clauses, nor is the conduct of their staffs.  
Collective bargaining agreements and administrator contracts. Drawing on a legal 
point from Keyishian (1967), administrators are cautioned to balance employee accountability 
with their constitutional rights. Practices such as having employees sign receipt of documents 
explaining conduct expectations, for example, is a good practice for ensuring that staff are 
sufficiently informed of clearly established policies and practices; however, the language of the 
sign-off should be crafted to avoid the appearance of a requirement that employees waive any 
form of their constitutional rights. For example, a signature statement verifying, “I have received 
a copy of the employee handbook” is appropriate. To the contrary, a signature statement that 
says “I have received a copy of the employee handbook and agree to comply with all provisions 
stated and implied” can leave the district vulnerable to risk of grievance and legal proceedings 
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should employees or union associations claim that the district is restricting employee 
constitutional rights. This same caution applies to other personnel management practices as well 
like requiring staff or employment candidates to sign waivers or denounce political memberships 
and effectually establishing a contractual agreement (Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 1967). 
These personnel practices would also have implications for collective bargaining agreements and 
clauses prohibiting independent bargaining.  
Employee supervision, discipline, termination, and due process. This specific strand 
of human resources functions is directly affected by the Garcetti decision. As has been repeated 
throughout the dissertation, the relevant language of Garcetti specifically states that “when 
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline” (2006). In this regard, the term discipline is used 
broadly to characterize the scope of supervision, discipline, termination, and due process duties 
that school administrators routinely fulfill in the regular expanse of their responsibilities. These 
duties command job-required speech that increase professional exposure, and they reveal how 
administrators are vulnerable to attacks on their speech. The First Amendment asserts and the 
courts have upheld employees’ rights to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
Administrators’ and their staffs’ speech can expose the school district to risk liability in this 
regard.  
There are legal rulings from the courts that can be used to inform school administrator 
practice relative to employee supervision, discipline, termination, and due process. Garcetti 
specifically cautioned to write and maintain official job descriptions that clearly outline 
occupational requirements and essential job duties. While writing and maintaining job 
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descriptions is recognized in this study as an independent human resources function; the 
personnel function overlaps into other areas. To this end, job descriptions should be crafted by 
school administrators to reflect actual duties of the respective positions. Even duties that are 
completed on an intermittent basis should be included in the job descriptions. The Garcetti Court 
also warned that  
(p)ublic employers may not restrict employees' free speech rights by creating excessively 
broad job descriptions; the listing of a given task in an employee's written job description 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the 
scope of the employee's professional duties, for First Amendment purposes.  
 
There are other official documents that can be used similarly to fulfill the personnel 
management functions of employee supervision, discipline, termination, and due process. 
Administrators can ensure that all staff are equipped with the information necessary to make 
position-level decisions and that they know the employers’ expectations for their work 
performance and conduct. Board personnel policies, such as code of conduct and chain of 
command policies, employee handbooks, collective bargaining agreements, administrative 
contracts, and student handbooks should all align to a synchronous communications’ plan. These 
documents should also clearly align to the actual practices of the school district. Outdated and/or 
unfollowed policies with failed results, such as student injury or internal personnel claims of 
harassment and/or retaliation, can expose the district to risk.  
What administrators need to know is that teachers and educational support personnel are 
authorized only to deliver the curriculum, programs, and services that have been adopted by the 
local board of education. Speech outside these terms dictates administrative personnel actions 
including closer employee supervision, likely disciplinary action, possible termination, and 
always due process. 
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As introduced earlier by Nahmod (2008, p. 580), public elementary and secondary 
teachers are public employees paid to speak, so there is little that they say in the classroom that is 
protected from employer discipline by the First Amendment. Nahmod characterizes this concept 
as job-required speech, and suggests that it carries significant responsibility for public school 
administrators whose essential duties include communicating with students, staff, and 
community members (Nahmod, 2008). Nahmod (2008) and Dale (2008) both address the 
implication of the Garcetti ruling for managements’ rights, and they assert that pursuant to duty 
is weighted in favor of the employer.  
Academic freedom presents another area where administrators frequently experience 
First Amendment personnel supervision and disciplinary issues. The courts have been clear. 
Academic freedom is reserved for teachers of higher education. Public elementary and secondary 
school curriculum is decided by the local board of education, and teachers do not have a 
protected right to stray from the approved curriculum (Mayer v. Monroe County Community 
School Corporation, 2007; Brown v. Chicago Board of Education, 2016).  
“The Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos may indeed have “profoundly 
altered how courts review First Amendment retaliation claims,” but it should not be assumed that 
the change significantly rolled back public employee speech rights. Instead, by characterizing 
those rights in relation to management rights and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the 
Court clarified its previous case law in a way that should increase the protections for public 
employees in the long run. In areas where a public employer has managerial control over the 
message expressed, public employees may only speak as employees, and therefore lack the 
protection of the First Amendment. But in areas where management's rights are constrained by 
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the constitution, laws, contracts, or public policy, a public employee may speak as a citizen, and 
under Garcetti, those statements are protected by the First Amendment” (Dale, 2008) 
Job descriptions and essential job duties. A prior example illustrated the logical 
connection of the personnel function of writing job descriptions to the Garcetti ruling in this 
way. The opinion reads that “the listing of a given task in an employee's written job description 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of 
the employee's professional duties, for First Amendment purposes” (2006). The line of logic that 
can be shared with school administrators is, that although a state has greater leverage to restrict 
employee speech, it must be done only for the purpose of ensuring efficient and effective 
operations. The official job description is one appropriate place to document board policies on 
the duties of employee positions. When crafted strategically, job descriptions can serve not only 
to inform the staff of expected duties and responsibilities, it can also serve as a blueprint for and 
evidence of efficient and effective operations. School administrators can accomplish this by 
ensuring that job duties are purposefully interconnected and scaffolded onto appropriate layers of 
authority and expertise. Job descriptions should be clearly written to establish the rules for 
expected behavior, and it is important to avoid ill-prepared written job descriptions with 
overlapping critical duties, omissions of links in the chains of command, and outdated duties.  
Garcetti can also be used as guidance to ensure that job descriptions are written with 
fidelity to the expected duties of the respective positions and not just loose placeholders with 
vague duties. Garcetti warns that  
(p)ublic employers may not restrict employees' free speech rights by creating excessively 
broad job descriptions; the listing of a given task in an employee's written job description 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task is within the 
scope of the employee's professional duties, for First Amendment purposes. (2006)  
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The Garcetti opinion specifically asserted that public employers may not restrict 
employees' free speech rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions. This specific 
reference to job descriptions in establishing the common law of pursuant to duty offers a direct 
relationship to the personnel management functions of writing and maintaining accurate job 
descriptions. The Garcetti Justices opined that, for First Amendment purposes, “the listing of a 
given task in an employee's written job description is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
demonstrate that conducting the task is within the scope of the employee's professional duties” 
(2006).  
Administrators can heed this advice as a strategy for minimizing risk exposure by 
ensuring that job descriptions are documented for all staff and are written to align with 
the actual duties of each respective position. The Court is saying that it is not enough just 
to have an inventory of job descriptions. Employees’ actual work activities must also 
align to the written duties delineated in the job descriptions in order to sustain the district 
in a defensible position in a conflict-resolution hearing (e.g., grievance hearing, board 
hearing, arbitration, court of law). Garcetti and the other cases confirm that court rulings 
are relevant to public school districts, and the litigated decisions guide administrators to 
ensure that rules of employee conduct are clearly established and there is a genuine 
relationship between policies and practices. Administrators can rely on official school 
documents like job descriptions, collective bargaining agreements, administrator 
contracts, personnel policies, due process procedures, performance evaluations, teacher 
tenure and probationary terms, and whistle blowing policies to ensure that behavior 
expectations are clearly established with staff.  
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Lane v. Franks held that a public official’s compelled (i.e., subpoenaed) sworn 
testimony, made as part of a criminal trial against a former subordinate accused of 
defrauding the agency, was entitled to First Amendment protection because the director’s 
testimony was speech outside the scope of his ordinary job duties. Eight years after 
Garcetti, Lane served to distinguish the prior controversial ruling of Garcetti, which held 
that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, to rule that there 
are occasions when speech spoken on a condition of knowledge gained from the 
workplace is protected (Allred, 2014).  
Performance evaluation and professional development. Utilizing professional 
preparation programs and providing professional development opportunities to in-service staff to 
communicate expectations relative to behaviors and rights to speak out about work-related 
matters can facilitate more informed decision-making about what can be said and what should be 
avoided. Ensuring consistent personnel policies and practices contributes to overall operational 
efficiency.  
Nahmod asserted his legal opinion on this very topic in an article written for the 
University of Richmond Law Review, titled, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing 
and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos. He says that because public elementary and 
secondary teachers are public employees paid to speak, there is plausibly little that they say in 
the classroom that is protected by the First Amendment. Nahmod’s recognition precisely 
characterizes the concept of job-required speech, and it projects even greater obligations onto 
public school administrators whose essential duties include communicating with students, staff, 
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and community members, but also includes the supervision and evaluation of both licensed 
professional staff and classified staff.  
Personnel policies. Personnel policies are important to the efficient operation of 
organizations, including school districts. Specifically, policies that outline the organizational 
chain of command are necessary for establishing clear expectations for staff conduct. Garcetti 
asserted that “(s)upervisors must ensure that their employees’ official communications are 
accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s mission” (Garcetti, et al., v. 
Ceballos, 2006). Policies are the practical places where this directive can be accomplished. The 
Garcetti Justices collectively concurred that the “government needs civility in the workplace, 
consistency in policy, and honesty and competence in public service” (Garcetti, et al., v. 
Ceballos, 2006). Organizational policies can be implemented in many ways including official 
board policies, including code of conduct and chain of command policies, employee handbooks, 
collective bargaining agreements, administrative contracts, and student handbooks. Personnel 
practices aligned to the organization’s written policies provide an effective foundation for risk 
management and a viable defense against claims of constitutional rights’ violations.  
Personnel records. Personnel files and the maintenance thereof are authorized by the 
Illinois Personnel Records Review Act and are incorporated into the School Code [820 ILCS 
40/1, et seq.]. The practical application of Garcetti to personnel records is administrative 
procedure. The official personnel file is the appropriate place to maintain any employment 
records that relate to the supervision, discipline, termination, and due process of staff. In order to 
prevail against any claims of retaliation or due process violations, a complete and official record 
that clearly establishes the history of performance, as well as the pattern of administrative 
communication in response to the conduct, is necessary. Maintaining clear, accurate, and 
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chronicled personnel records in accordance with the law is essential practice, and ensuring 
consistent personnel policies and practices contributes to overall operational efficiency of the 
organization.  
Teacher tenure and labor law. Garcetti ruled that “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline” 
(2006). The issue is that “discipline” can lead to termination, and tenured teachers and 
administrators have property and due process rights vested in their employment. These 
conditions impose significant legal obligations on school districts and their administrators to 
properly supervise their staffs and administer appropriate discipline. 
“The presence of a statutory tenure contract relationship creates a substantive due process 
interest as well as a constitutionally protected contract right on behalf of the teacher” (Alexander 
& Alexander, 2012, p. 809), so a § 1983 claim of violation of First Amendment rights are likely 
to result in a secondary claim of violation of Fourteenth Amendment protections, thereby 
increasing exposure to organizational risk. Ordinary dismissals from government service which 
violate no fixed tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review even 
if reasons for dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable (Connick v. Myers, 1983). 
Whistleblower protections. The courts have ruled that speech spoken outside the scope 
of duties is protected (Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 1979), and speech 
spoken inside the scope of duties is not protected (Garcetti, et al., v. Ceballos, 2006). One 
exception, however, where the circumstance of speech spoken pursuant to duty is protected is 
whistle-blower speech. More than any other provision, whistleblower protections blur the lines of 
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pursuant to duty and make the jobs of school administrators attempting to navigate free speech 
issues in the public workplace even more difficult.  
Whistleblower protections are authorized by both federal and state laws. The Illinois 
Whistleblower Act (2004) provides that  
(a)n employer may not make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy preventing 
an employee from disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency if 
the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of 
a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.  
 
The Act (2004) further defines the parameters of protections by stating that retaliation is 
prohibited against those employees  
who disclose information in a court, an administrative hearing, or before a legislative 
commission or committee, or in any other proceeding, where the employee has 
reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of a State or federal 
law, rule, or regulation.  
 
The federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act or 2012 provide basically the same protections with the exception that these 
Acts authorize specific protections for federal employees; not state or local government 
employees. Most public school employees in Illinois are local government officials, although not 
all, and therefore would rely specifically on the Illinois Whistleblower Act (2004).  
The law says that a federal agency violates the Whistleblower Protection Act of 2012 if it 
takes, threatens to take, or fails to take a personnel action with respect to any employee or 
applicant because of any disclosure of information by the employee or applicant that he 
or she reasonably believes evidences a violation of a law, rule or regulation; gross 
mismanagement; gross waste of funds; an abuse of authority; or a substantial and specific 
danger to public health or safety. 
 
Subject to the Pickering Balancing Test, First Amendment protections are available to 
public employees who suffer retaliation for whistleblowing, regardless of whether the act of 
whistleblowing consists of informing higher level public officials, Congressional committees, or 
the media. The Supreme Court in Connick made no distinction between internal and external 
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whistleblowing when it noted that speech that is “of public import in evaluating the performance 
of the District Attorney” may include efforts by an employee “to bring to light actual or potential 
wrongdoing or breach of public trust.” (Connick v. Myers, 1983).  
School administrators, charged with managing risk need to know where whistleblowing 
and job-required speech collide. Nahmod cautions that the policy of excluding job-required 
employee speech from First Amendment protection against employer discipline could have 
serious repercussions. He asserts that the policy of pursuant to duty is “clearly intended to protect 
managerial authority and discretion” (Nahmod, 2008, p. 580). He also projects that Garcetti will 
create an incentive for public employees to go public and whistle-blow their concerns in an 
attempt to retain protection under the First Amendment. Nahmod cautions that this approach 
could cause greater harm to public employers than simply dealing with employee speech issues 
internally (Nahmod, 2008, p. 580).  
Conclusion of the Impact of Garcetti on the Nine Human Resources Functions 
Ultimately this is a discussion of constitutional rights. It involves the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments and, with some lesser degree of involvement, the Eleventh Amendment. The 
premise is that the First and Fourteenth Amendments tie closely with human resources 
management and are worthy topics of continuous professional development for school 
administrators. Knowing that the employer is exposed to unpredictable risk when an employee 
files a § 1983 violation claim under the United States Code alleging that his or her constitutional 
rights have been violated is useful information for school leaders. Knowing that there can be 
professional and financial consequences for not handling personnel claims legally is also useful 
information.  
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Cases of protected speech for public employees have yielded many split rulings 
signifying the continued discrepancy in opinion and dissent about the constitutional and legal 
rights of public employees to exercise free speech at work and about work (Hudson, 2002). 
Henceforth, the need for rigorous public discourse on this issue continues.  
 First, from a constitutional perspective, limiting American citizens’ access to the full 
breadth of rights and freedoms, including the right to exercise free speech, as sanctioned by the 
First Amendment, has the potential for encroaching upon the hallowed policy ground of 
American democracy doctrine, as guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. This 
perspective is exemplified, in part, in the Pickering decision with the assertion that  
(t)he public interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public 
importance—the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment – is so 
great that it has been held that a State cannot authorize the recovery of damages by a 
public official for defamatory statements directed at him except when such statements are 
shown to have been made either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard 
for their truth or falsity. (Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School 
District 205, Will County Illinois, 1968) 
 
In essence, the standard for guaranteeing free speech is so broad that the criteria buttress upon 
the verge of violating the constitutional rights of public officials as private citizens.  
Public accountability. Policy decisions about the allocation of public resources are 
statutorily reserved for local boards of education and are to be executed by official action, 
(School Boards, 1961). As such, the allocation of local taxpayer resources, as a fundamental 
function pursuant to public policy, is a matter of public concern that can sometimes lead to 
controversy. Relative to this study is the critical argument that superintendents and members of 
local boards of education, as policy-makers, are inherently ordained by contract and oath 
(Section 10-16.5 of the School Code [105 ILCS 5/10-16.5]) respectively to deal with matters of 
public concern and controversy and are democratically held accountable by way of public 
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election for their decisions. Whether legal issues begin as disputes over student or staff due 
process rights, school administrators and members of boards of education need to know the risk 
factors, including financial risk, associated with major legal proceedings. Whether the 
disagreements are student- or employee-based is irrelevant, the cumulative costs to districts can 
be substantial.  
In Illinois, district administrators, especially superintendents, are ultimately evaluated and 
held accountable by boards of education, as well as the public. Their handling of administrative 
matters such as these are subject to performance evaluation and can have financial, professional, 
and legal ramifications. See Section 10-16.7 of the School Code [105 ILCS 5/10-16.7].  
Board members evaluating and community members judging the performance of its 
school administrators have a hindsight advantage. School leaders, on the other hand, do not have 
a foresight advantage when making frontend, policy-making decisions. So having a good 
understanding of the issues relative to free speech in the public workplace and being familiar 
with the constitutional standards and the legal criteria established by past court rulings provides 
guidance for administrators who make high-stakes’ and complex personnel decisions about 
employee rights relative to the First Amendment and protected speech. For this reason, it is 
advantageous for public school administrators to know the potential implications for school 
districts of constitutional, statutory, and case law on personnel matters such as protected speech 
in the workplace such to craft their actions prudently.  
Gaps of law. Contrary to literal interpretation, constitutionally protected free speech does 
not guarantee U.S. citizens the right to say whatever they want, about anything, about anyone, at 
any time, regardless the impact (Marcum & Perry, 2014, p. 5). A litany of court cases, including 
the 2006 landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, stands as evidence. The 
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Garcetti Court specifically asserted that “when public employees make statements pursuant to 
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, 
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline” (2006). 
To many, the decision applied a harsh either-or standard that clearly gave boards of education 
and administrators the upper hand in managing the personnel operations of their schools as 
public organizations and limited labor’s control over First Amendment-related conduct 
(Nahmod, 2008; Dale, 2008).  
The Garcetti decision, like those that have followed, resulted from a gap in the law, 
specifically from the combined outcomes of the Pickering and Tinker decisions. The Pickering 
Court established teachers’ rights to speak as private citizens on matters of public concern, but 
only when a substantial disruption to organizational operations was not created. The Tinker 
Court confirmed broad constitutional rights to students and teachers alike, but did not specify 
what qualified as protected speech. The Garcetti Court was then open to preempt the standards 
established by Pickering and Tinker with a precursor criterion requirement for determining if 
speech was spoken pursuant to duty. The Connick Court had earlier hinted at the concept of 
pursuant to duty by saying, “(w)hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of 
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the 
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not appropriate forum in which to review wisdom 
of personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to employee’s behavior” 
(1983). Logic suggests that if a public employee is not speaking as a citizen, he or she must be 
speaking as a public employee. The Connick Court, however, did not pursue this element of the 
law and focused rather on employee speech upon matters of personal interest (1983). 
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This gap left the Garcetti Court to expound upon the undefined circumstances of 
employee speech relative to work duties and job-required speech, and as such, it re-set the initial 
standard for determining protected speech by applying the standard of pursuant to duty at the 
onset of the inquiry process. In effect, Garcetti preempted the Pickering Balance Test and 
restricted subjectivity for determining a case outcome.  
The general nature of the Garcetti ruling opened new possibilities to re-conceptualize and 
redefine the legal employee and employer relationship. Now determining what litmus test to 
apply in given circumstances became more defined. Applying the Garcetti/Pickering analysis, 
the five types of criteria that can be considered are: (a) whether the speech was made pursuant to 
an employee’s official duties; (b) whether the speech was on a matter of public concern; (c) 
whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s free speech interests; (d) whether the protected 
speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action; and (e) whether the defendant 
would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct. 
Cases such as this exemplify that, while Garcetti refined the criterion for discerning 
protected work speech from non-protected work speech, there are still many areas open to 
interpretation where the courts have not yet opined. The Garcetti ruling triggered other 
significant gaps in the law that have already been addressed by subsequent court rulings and will 
undoubtedly continue to be addressed by the judiciary as individual case circumstances arise. 
Practical matters, such as subpoenaed testimony pursuant to duty, job descriptions versus scopes 
of duties, and how the courts will handle public employees expressing themselves, pursuant to 
duty, on matters of private concern have been addressed in Garcetti. These issues are echoed in 
the dissent of the Garcetti Justices. Categorizing instances of protected speech from unprotected 
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speech, pursuant to First Amendment protections, they argued cannot be viewed as simplistically 
as asking if the speech was submitted pursuant to duty.  
Differing opinions have prompted diverse interpretations requiring judicial intervention. 
So in the absence of a more definitive litmus test, the issues left unrequited by the Garcetti 
decision have defaulted to the courts and resulting case law. Lane v. Franks and Brown v. the 
Chicago Board of Education are two cases that have recently contributed to the closing of the 
gap. These decisions have possible implications for public schools.  
The Scope of Public Employment  
Public employment includes ever expanding categories of employment. Examples, 
among many, of public employees include police officers, fire fighters, librarians, road 
construction employees, postal workers, public health officials, human services employees, 
elected officials, and public school employees.  
Within each category there are further delineations of employment ranging from 
classified to professional. Public school employees are also government workers whose ranks 
include teachers, administrators, and educational support personnel including paraprofessionals, 
secretaries, bus drivers, school nurses, food service staff, and coaches all with varying degrees of 
education, qualifications, skills, and authorities.  
And so for all of these people who are also government employees, the Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947, also known as the Taft-Hartley Act, applies to them in that  
a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of 
the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
to the furtherance of that . . . when ‘speech’ and ‘non-speech’ elements are combined in 
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating 
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.  
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Public Service as a Growing Industry 
Sheer population growth and occupation volumes will perpetuate free speech and public 
employment issues into the future, transcending the need to project and plan responses to the 
ever-changing social landscape underpinning matters of free speech in institutions of public 
education. The United States Census Bureau’s most recent Annual Survey of Public 
Employment & Payroll Summary Report indicates that 90,000 state, local, and federal 
governments employed approximately 21.8 million people as public employees in 2013 
(Willhide, 2014, pp. 1-2). According to U.S. Census data, public education employees make up 
nearly half of the total federal, state, and local government workforce with 10.9 million people, 
or 49.9% (Willhide, 2014, p. 3). In fact, education is the “single largest functional category for 
all governments,” (Willhide, 2014, p. 3).  
In 2010, there were some 22,632,000 local, state, and federal public employees in the 
United States representing, among other civil occupations, fire protection, police protection, 
postal service, and national defense. But the largest subcategory of public employees, some 
8,037,000 workers, were employed that year by institutions of elementary and secondary 
education (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012). Also in 2010, the United States’ Department 
of Commerce reported the national population at 308,745,538 (Department of Commerce, 2012); 
139,064,000 individuals were employed that year overall; and 13,155,000 employees worked in 
occupations categorized as the educational services’ industry. That means that a little more than 
four percent of the U.S. population works in the public school workforce and almost ten percent 
of the total workforce is made up of public school employees. While occupations such as 
construction and manufacturing have experienced declining populations of employees, the 
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educational services’ industry has experienced an increase of almost 17% in its employee 
population (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2012).  
Clearly, public employees, and specifically elementary and secondary education 
employees, represents a large sector of the general population. According to the Department of 
Commerce, education is the fastest growing sector among public service industries.  
Clearly public education employees constitute a significant portion of all public 
employees, and public employees constitute a significant portion of the general citizenry. With 
growing density of teachers and other educational support staff, the issues of free speech and 
public employment will continue to evolve. Social media has demonstrated that the evolution can 
progress quickly.  
While individual rights form the core standard of the First Amendment, the breadth of 
judicial interpretation has shifted and expanded over time. For many people, a constant part of 
everyday life is communication in the workplace and communication about the workplace 
(Jones, 1998), which means that the legal interpretation of free speech and protected speech is 
fluid and constantly expanding. Emerging social issues, reaching further extremes through the 
conduit of social media, provide fertile ground for entanglement between First Amendment 
rights and public employment. Administrators spend a lot of time managing personnel issues 
which are rooted in human interaction, opinions, and language, which at their core, are progenies 
of the First Amendment. 
Today there are some 21.8 million public employees (Willhide, 2014, p. 1) who fill a 
wide and diverse spectrum of governmental positions. Accordingly, there are multiple 
contributories from which potential free speech issues may arise in the future.  
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Chapter V 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
This concludes a legal analysis intended to explore the substantive issues relative to the 
First Amendment, public school employment, and free speech and to encourage further thinking 
on ways in which court decisions can better inform the practices of public school administrators 
in public k-12 settings.  
 This study attempted to identify relevant court rulings which have narrowly interpreted 
the law, and specifically identified individual situations and circumstances of constitutionally 
protected free speech for government employees, with special attention to public school 
employees. The theory underlying the study was that there existed a consistent pattern of 
thought, established by federal courts and set forth as legal precedents, from which school 
administrators could craft their human resources and personnel management practices. The study 
set about to collect pertinent data via court decisions, including opinions and points of dissent, 
and then develop evidence-based guidance for school administrators on how best to navigate 
employment law, personnel management, and human resources in the post-Garcetti era given 
everything learned from past to present. The intended outcome was to propose analysis-based 
recommendations as best practice for school administrators to manage their public organizations 
in accordance with the First Amendment, the constitutional rights of their employees, and the 
managerial rights of the board of education and its agents (i.e., administrators).  
The practical side of First Amendment considerations in schools is that administrators 
routinely face them, whether they recognize them as such or not, is a different issue. The reality, 
however, is that school administrators face diverse First Amendment personnel issues every day. 
Situations grounded in the First Amendment are common such as when an assistant principal 
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asks if she can rate an employee’s performance evaluation inclusive of a personal Facebook post 
submitted off work time and from a private home computer and when a principal asks if she is 
eligible to run for a neighboring district school board seat. Obviously, these are superficial 
introductions of issues, and there are definitely deeper considerations to these scenarios that must 
be made, but superficial introductions are typically how administrators first encounter every 
issue they face. Effective leadership commands good judgment from the start and sound 
decision-making in the actions that follow. The primary outcome of this research is to suggest 
that there is a specialized area of school management that can be developed in school 
administrators in order for them to be more effective leaders in human resource and personnel 
management. Administrators must first be able to recognize First Amendment issues, then 
effectively distinguish between protected and unprotected speech, and finally, take actions based 
on informed decisions that are made in accordance with statutory and common law as established 
by the pattern of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal appellate courts.  
There are real questions and issues that school administrators face relative to the First 
Amendment, their employees, and potential constitutional violations. Providing professional 
development on these issues can help administrators legally navigate First Amendment-based 
labor issues and can potentially save their school districts money. Helping employees, not only to 
recognize First Amendment issues, but also to help them understand the rationale behind the 
district’s policies and practices, serves to reinforce their capacity to respond in accordance with 
the organizational mission, which is the goal of effective leadership. This approach can be 
generalized from professional development to professional practice by rationalizing that 
informed staffs perform to higher standards of expectations. As such, professional development, 
which includes employee training on First Amendment issues informing on the types of speech 
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that are protected by the First Amendment and the types not constitutionally protected, is 
recognized as a best practice in personnel management.  
 There are potential financial implications, as well, when First Amendment circumstances 
turn to unresolved disagreements rooted in constitutional rights. Cases can include employees 
filing contractual grievances, for example, or making claims of discrimination to the Department 
of Human Rights; a retaliatory wages dispute at the Department of Labor; or a lawsuit in federal 
court under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for violations of constitutional rights, including First Amendment 
violations. Regardless the action, the relative expenses can be substantial. The best juncture for 
school administrators to manage the circumstances and reduce risk to the district is at the outset 
before the issue potentially becomes an expensive legal proceeding (Saucier v. Katz, 2001). This 
is the point where the administrator has a point of control and should contemplate if the risk to 
the organization is worth the risk. In other words, does the purpose behind the conflict rise to the 
level worth the investment of fiscal and human resources that will be necessary to procure 
resolve? The best practice is to have knowledgeable administrators on the front lines who can 
adeptly navigate First Amendment personnel issues in accordance with common law. To this 
end, and based on the in-depth analysis conducted in this study, the following recommendations 
are made.  
Recommendations 
The continuum of U.S. Supreme Court decisions from Pickering (1968) to Garcetti 
(2006) articulates the legal findings that can serve as useful guidance to school administrators in 
performing their professional responsibilities. Toward this end goal, the following 
recommendations are proposed to school administrators as a result of this in-depth study and 
analysis.  
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Recommendation #1. Best practices: convert jurisdictional court rulings to best 
practice in human resources and personnel management.  
 Pickering, Connick, Givhan, and Garcetti exemplify that each case warrants 
independent review. School administrators too should independently investigate 
each employee case with potential First Amendment implications before making 
assumptions and/or taking official action like discipline or termination. 
 Pursuant to Garcetti, administrators should ensure that job descriptions delineate 
the actual duties being performed. Direct supervision and evaluation should serve 
as the window for administrators to ascertain the genuine relationship between 
policy (i.e., job description) and practice (i.e., actual duties) and take the initiative 
to facilitate a reconciliation when necessary. This proactive personnel 
management can serve as an important strategy for avoiding organizational risk 
exposure.  
 Also pursuant to Garcetti, administrators can rely on official school documents 
like job descriptions, collective bargaining agreements, administrator contracts, 
personnel policies, due process procedures, performance evaluations, teacher 
tenure and probationary terms, and whistle blowing policies to ensure that 
behavior expectations are clearly established with staff. Saucier v Katz (2001); 
Lane v. Franks (2014); and Brown v. Chicago Board of Education (2016) assert 
the benefits of clearly established expectations.  
 Pursuant to Pickering (1968) and Garcetti (2006), follow the logic as plotted in 
figure 1. 
 Pursuant to Connick (2008) and Casey (2007), know that speech is not 
monolithic. It can contain protected and non-protected speech concurrently. 
Connick advises that when discerning if “public employee’s speech addresses a 
matter of public concern so as to shield employee from discharge for expressing 
those views” the decision “must be determined by content, form and context of 
given statement as revealed by the whole record” (Connick v. Myers, 1983). 
 Pursuant to Lane v. Franks even speech that contains information learned during the 
course of public employment can be protected speech under certain circumstances. Just 
because speech includes information learned at work does not mean, in every 
circumstance, that it is subject to pursuant to duty policies and is therefore not protected. 
Following the guidance of Connick, personnel decisions relative to speech should be 
based on the “content, form and context” of the statements (Connick v. Myers, 1983). 
 Pursuant to Mt. Healthy, Ceballos, Lane, Casey, qualified immunity, in some situations, 
gives government officials protection from civil damages unless the official violated a 
statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the action. The 
“clearly established” prong of the doctrine carries useful guidance for school 
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administrators responsible for staff communication. The doctrine also qualifies who is 
eligible for protection, and the courts have ruled that state-level, policy-making officials 
are protected. Public school administrators in Illinois are considered local or municipal 
officials. While there could be times when school administrators would act in a state 
capacity, routine duties would fall within local jurisdiction thus minimizing the protection 
of qualified immunity.  
Recommendation #2. Risk management: minimize the risk of legal costs to the school 
district by following the path established by the sequence of U.S. Supreme Court and other 
federal appellate court decisions and applying their respective key legal points to guide decisions 
about issues rooted in labor law and the First Amendment rights of employees.  
Administrators must know that legal disputes are costly; proceedings are fluid; and 
litigation outcomes are never guaranteed. It is important for school administrators to make 
informed and prudent decisions when making recommendations to their boards of education 
relative to unpredictable legal endeavors. Pursuits that will undoubtedly command substantial 
district human and fiscal resources. Administrators need to be fully cognizant that pursuing 
resolve via legal action presents multi-faceted risk to the school district. Accordingly, board 
members must be informed.  
Managing organizational risk is a human resources function in that organizations are 
exposed to risk via the window of their human capital. Leading action and navigating critical 
personnel management decisions are best accomplished when school administrators are informed 
of court decisions and their practical applications.  
Recommendation #3. Strategic organizational planning. When administrative control of 
finances is a primary objective and essential duty for chief school administrators (Illinois School 
Code, 2006), legal issues relative to personnel management can have a direct impact on 
available, fiscal resources, and as such, should be included in the ongoing strategic planning and 
operational budgeting process. 
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Recommendation #4. Professional development plans: develop and utilize professional 
development plans as a systematic outcome of the strategic organizational planning process. 
Execute a professional development plan to ensure that in-service and pre-service training 
opportunities include First Amendment issues informing staff on the types of speech that are 
protected and the types that are not constitutionally protected.  
Specifically, rely on training opportunities via principal and superintendent preparation 
programs; professional development license renewal programs; and administrative in-service 
training to advance best practices in personnel management and First Amendment matters. 
Equipping administrative personnel with the necessary knowledge to legally navigate First 
Amendment-based labor issues is a proactive effort to build organizational efficiency and 
effectiveness with the intended outcome of reserving districts resources.  
Finally, a call is recommended specifically to institutions of higher education with 
principal and superintendent preparation programs to include structured content regarding public 
employee speech in and about the workplace into the required curriculum.  
This recommendation also extends to professional organizations to keep their 
constituencies informed on current and changing case law and to advise their clients in practical 
terms about the applications and implications of the rulings. To know the outcomes of precedent-
setting cases and to understand the legal implications can help guide the actions of practicing 
school administrators, teachers, and educational support personnel. Institutions of higher 
education and professional organizations should play an important and direct role in 
disseminating vital information on best practices relative to the topic of public school employee 
speech. There remains a need for school leadership preparation, continuing education, and 
professional development programs to teach the applications and practices of educational policy.  
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Recommendation #5. Qualified immunity and clearly established expectations: follow 
the wisdom of Mt. Healthy v. Doyle (1977); Saucier v Katz (2001); Lane v. Franks (2014); and 
Brown v. Chicago Board of Education (2016), and be explicitly clear in communicating 
expectations of employee behavior. This policy applies directly to administrative practices and 
human resources and personnel management functions which include crafting board policies, 
developing administrative procedures, publishing employee and student handbooks, negotiating 
collective bargaining agreements, writing job descriptions, managing past labor practices, issuing 
disciplinary write-ups, and creating any other documents which provides direction to staff. 
Facilitating a clear message to all employees of their free speech rights in terms of their public 
employment can advance a proactive effort of risk management with minimal cost to the 
organization.  
Board policies generally set forth the beliefs about how employees should conduct 
themselves, including their speech. While such value beliefs are incorporated throughout board 
policies such as in code of conduct, workplace harassment, and social media policies, the key is 
providing frontend, explicit information on employer to employee expectations and giving 
specific details and types of circumstances, including potential consequences. This approach is 
aligned to a qualified immunity defense (Saucier v Katz (2001); Lane v. Franks (2014); a 
procedural due process Fourteenth Amendment defense (Brown v. Chicago Board of Education 
(2016); and with the Courts’ repeated directives to ensure that rules are clearly established at the 
time the behaviors are expected. This approach can offer an effective, proactive strategy for 
potentially avoiding complicated and costly disputes relative to employee free-speech rights.  
 144 
Recommendation #6: Fourteenth Amendment and due process: ensure that 
employees are given proper due process when they make claims of First Amendment 
violations to their rights of free expression.  
There are Fourteenth Amendment applications to this discussion as well. Public 
employees are guaranteed, by the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to due process when 
they claim their First Amendment rights have been violated at work. Court records prove 
a frequent, co-existent nature between First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment 
violation claims. Given the propensity for double constitutional violation claims, with the 
propensity for increased exposure to risk, school administrators should recognize this as 
an area where their leadership can serve to minimize organizational risk by simply 
following standard due process steps when dealing with the supervision, evaluation, 
discipline, and termination of employees. Collective bargaining agreements and board 
policies typically outline the steps to due process for which employees are owed.  
While there is never a guaranteed outcome of employee grievances and/or 
litigation, avoiding the adverse effects of reckless to malicious compliance with the law, 
is good practice for school administrators for financial reasons and for organizational 
culture issues. Staff seek trusting relationships. They want to work in organizations where 
they feel valued and where they feel systems are fair and equitable. Effective school 
leadership includes administrative skill in facilitating this environment (formerly known 
as ISLLC Standards, 2015).  
Recommendation #7: Academic freedom: follow the pathway of the courts. Academic 
freedom is reserved for teachers of higher education. Public elementary and secondary school 
curriculum is determined by local boards of education, and teachers do not have a protected right 
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to stray from the approved curriculum. Be proactive and avoid potential litigation by supervising 
teachers to teach the standards and objectives within the parameters of the locally-adopted 
curriculum.  
Recommendation #8: Whistleblower protections: know where Garcetti ends and 
whistleblower protections begin. Administrators as fiduciary stewards of taxpayer resources, are 
typically bound by executive contracts with morality clauses. First and foremost, school 
administrators should fulfill the terms of their contracts, and avoid making decisions that will 
compromise the professionalism and integrity of employees or themselves. Administrators 
should avoid unethical behavior and/or the appearance of impropriety so that employees do not 
feel compelled to invoke protections under the state Whistleblower Act of Illinois (2004), the 
federal Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 and the federal Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act of 2012.  
Whistleblowers are most typically addressing matters of public concern and are therefore 
eligible for First Amendment protection for their speech. Based on the analysis contained herein, 
the issue of pursuant to duty becomes wholly important to the outcome. These are topics that 
should be included in professional development for pre-service and in-service education 
professionals.  
Conclusion 
The theory behind this study was that there exists a consistent pattern of thought, 
established by federal courts and set forth as legal precedents, from which school administrators 
can craft their human resources and personnel decisions. In conclusion, this theory is founded. 
The evidence, as outlined in this dissertation, is the network of direct connections with relative 
court decisions, key points of law, and distinct personnel functions. As such, the final 
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recommendation from this study is for executive school administrators to approach human 
resources and personnel management duties in light of the sequence of Supreme Court decisions 
in public employment and First Amendment cases and apply their respective key legal points as 
specifically as possible. This is best practice for school administrators relative to the First 
Amendment rights of their employees and an effective strategy for avoiding unnecessary risk for 
the school district.  
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Appendix A 
Relative Terms and Definitions 
 The following are terms and definitions relative to this study. 
Academic Freedom 
According to the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, the courts have typically 
supported states determining instructional content in primary and secondary schools because “the 
state may have a viewpoint, that the state may teach this viewpoint to its students, and that the 
state may compel its voluntary employees to serve as its agents in this task” (Levy & Karst, 
2007, p. 1137). To the contrary, at the college and university level, the higher education 
“doctrine” holds that “both the free speech rights of teachers and the First Amendment’s 
commitment to the university classroom as an important forum for the marketplace of ideas urge 
a moderately extensive amount of First Amendment-based judicial oversight” (Levy & Karst, 
2007, p. 1137).  
Bill of Rights 
First ten Amendments to the U.S. Constitution providing for individual rights, freedoms, 
and protections (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 168).  
Common Law (also known as case law) 
As distinguished from statutory law created by the enactment of legislatures, the common 
law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action, relating to the government and 
security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of 
immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, 
and enforcing such usages and customs, and, in this sense particularly the ancient unwritten law 
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of England. In general, it is a body of law that develops and derives through judicial decisions, as 
distinguished from legislative enactments (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 276).  
The Constitution 
The organic and fundamental law of a nation or state, which may be written or unwritten, 
establishing the character and conception of its government, laying the basic principles to which 
its internal life is to be conformed, organizing the government, and regulating, distributing, and 
limiting the functions of its different departments, and prescribing the extent and manner of the 
exercise of sovereign powers (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 311).  
Constitutional Law  
That branch of the public law of a nation or state which treats of the organization, powers 
and frame of government, the distribution of political and governmental authorities and 
functions, the fundamental principles which are to regulate the relations of government and 
citizen, and which prescribes generally the plan and method according to which the public affairs 
of the nation or state are to be administered. A constitutional law is one which is consonant to, 
and agrees with, the constitution; one which is not in violation of any provision of the 
constitution (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 311).  
Democracy 
The form of government in which the sovereign power resides in and is exercised by the 
whole body of free citizens directly or indirectly through a system of representation, as 
distinguished from a monarchy, aristocracy, or oligarchy (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 432).  
Doctrine of Managements’ Rights 
A managements’ rights provision is an agreement between the union and management 
“that certain issues are reserved solely to management” (Murray III, 2017, p. 65). It is a “waiver 
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by the union of the right to bargain over certain issues that would otherwise require bargaining 
during the life of the collective bargaining agreement” (Murray III, 2017, p. 65). Sometimes 
referred to as the reserved rights clause of a collective bargaining agreement.  
Managements’ rights provide a useful metric for gauging the distinction between 
managerial rights as supervisors and representatives of the government and employee’s rights as 
citizens in the workplace.  
Eleventh Amendment 
The Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which provides that the judicial power of the 
U.S. shall not extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against, one of the 
United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state (Black’s 
Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 521).  
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, As Amended, 1938/2011(FLSA) 
A Federal Act which set a minimum standard wage (periodically increased by later 
statues) and a maximum work week of 40 hours in industries engaged in interstate commerce. 
Such Act also regulates hours of work, and type of work, that can be performed by teen-agers 
(Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 597).  
Fifth Amendment 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution providing that no person shall be required to answer 
for a capital or otherwise infamous offense unless on indictment or presentment of a grand jury 
except in military cases; that no person will suffer double jeopardy; that no person will be 
compelled to be a witness against himself; that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law and that private property will not be taken for public use 
without just compensation (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 627).  
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First Amendment 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guaranteeing basic freedoms of speech, religion, 
press, and assembly and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. The 
various freedoms and rights protected by the First Amendment have been held applicable to the 
states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Black’s Law Dictionary, 
1990, p. 635).  
Fourteenth Amendment  
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, creates or at least recognizes for the 
first time a citizenship of the United states, as distinct from that of the states; forbids the making 
or enforcement by any state of any law abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States; and secures all “persons” against any state action which results in either 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or, in denial of the equal 
protection of the laws. This Amendment also contains provisions concerning the apportionment 
of representatives in Congress (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 657).  
Freedom of Speech 
The right, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, to express beliefs and ideas without 
unwarranted government restriction. (Gale Encyclopedia of American Law, 2011, p. 103).  
Government Speech 
Most commonly, this variety of question about the coverage the First Amendment comes 
up in the context of government employment. As with the other examples, one side of the 
argument maintains that no one is obliged to take government employment, and that for the state 
to restrict the speech of its employees, especially when they are in the very process of doing their 
job (as with teachers while actually teaching), is an inevitable part of the employer–employee 
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relationship, and no part of the concept of freedom of speech. But on the other side is once again 
the argument against viewpoint-based restrictions, holding that it is one thing to tell a teacher 
that he or she must teach history and not mathematics (a much more permissible subject-matter 
distinction), and quite another, and one with serious First Amendment implications, to tell a 
teacher that he or she must teach one view of how to interpret a particular historical event to the 
exclusion of another. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 
(1991). 
Public Employee/Official  
Means an individual employed by a public agency, including the Government of the 
United States; as a civilian in the military departments; in any executive agency; in any unit of 
the judicial branch of the Government which has positions in the competitive service; in a non-
appropriated fund instrumentality under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces; in the Library of 
Congress; or the Government Printing Office; by the United States Postal Service or the Postal 
Regulatory Commission; and by a State, political subdivision of a State, or an interstate 
governmental agency” (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, As Amended, 1938/2011).  
Black’s Online Law Dictionary defines an employee simply as  
any individual employed by an employer” and further states that employee means 
a person in the “service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, 
oral or written, where the employer has the power or right to control and direct the 
employee in the material details of how the work is to be performed.” (Black, 
Nolan, & Nolan-Haley, 1990, p. 525) 
 
Public Employer 
Includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation 
to an employee and includes a public agency, but does not include any labor organization (other 
than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such 
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labor organization. Section 203 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) defines employer, in 
part, as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee and includes a public agency” (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, As Amended, 
1938/2011).  
Qualified Immunity 
Affirmative defense which shields public officials performing discretionary functions 
from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which reasonable personal would have known (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, p. 752).  
Sovereign Immunity 
The legal protection that prevents a sovereign state or person from being sued without 
consent. (Dictionary of Legal Terms: Gale Encyclopedia of American Law, 2011, p. 206).  
Sovereignty 
The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which an independent state is 
governed and from which all specific political powers are derived; the intentional independence 
of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign 
interference (Dictionary of Legal Terms: Gale Encyclopedia of American Law, 2011, p. 206-
207). 
State 
Means any State of the United States or the District of Columbia or any Territory or 
possession of the United States. 
Unconstitutional-conditions Doctrine  
This is a rule which prohibits the government from conditioning “a person’s receipt of a 
governmental benefit on the waiver of a constitutionally protected right” (US Legal, n.d., p. 1).  
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Whistleblower Protections 
Statutes contain anti-retaliation provisions which prohibits employers from taking 
adverse employment action, including discharge, against an employee because the employee has 
filed a complaint or exercised any rights provided to the employee.  
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights 
The Supreme Court has held that local governments can be sued directly under this 
statute for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where “the action that is alleged to be 
unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision 
officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers (Black’s Law Dictionary, 1990, 
p. 752). The law allows civil action for the deprivation of those rights secured by the 
Constitution and laws, and further allows liability assignment to the party causing injury, except 
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity (Civil Rights Act, 1871).  
The statutory vehicle to file a civil claim in federal court for the deprivation of 
Constitutional rights. § 1983 states  
that (e)very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia subjects, or causes 
to be subjected, any citizen of the United states or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any 
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia.  
 
